Print Archive

For five straight cycles (the 1970s through the 2010s), Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act dominated redistricting in states covered by the provision. In these states, district plans had to be precleared with federal authorities before they could be implemented. Preclearance was granted only if plans wouldn’t retrogress, that is, reduce minority representation. Thanks to the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Shelby County v. Holder, Section 5 is no longer operative. So what happened to minority representation in formerly covered states after Section 5’s protections were withdrawn? This Article is the first to tackle this important question. We examine all states’ district plans before and after the 2020 round of redistricting at the congressional, state senate, and state house levels. Our primary finding is that there was little retrogression in formerly covered states. In sum, the number of minority ability districts in these states actually rose slightly. We also show that formerly covered states were largely indistinguishable from formerly uncovered states in terms of retrogression. If anything, states unaffected by Shelby County retrogressed marginally more than did states impacted by the ruling. Lastly, we begin to probe some of the factors that might explain this surprising pattern. One possible explanation is the status quo bias of many mapmakers, which is reflected in their tendency to keep minority representation constant. Another potential driver is many line-drawers’ reluctance to use retrogression as a partisan weapon. This reluctance is evident in the similar records of all redistricting authorities with respect to retrogression, as well as in the absence of any relationship between retrogression and change in plans’ partisan performance.

International borders have become divisive issues in international and domestic politics. They have also become sites where the human rights of vulnerable persons have increasingly been documented as at risk. Policies of border harden- ing in the face of growing human mobility and other external threats—real and imagined—have made international borders focal sites of conflict at many levels. This Article argues that international law can reframe our understanding of bordering, leading to a more constructive approach to border management and greater respect for human rights. Borders are essentially institutions with the po- tential to settle coordination problems over territory. But of growing importance, they are also relational institutions that often have drastic effects on social and economic interactions. Their relational aspects require governance, for which international law has developed the law of neighborliness. In turn, the law of neighborliness requires, among other things, respect for mutually agreed cove- nants between sovereign states. Borders should not be presumed to pose inherent national security risks. Indeed, the presumption should be reversed: borders create zones where the need and obligation for friendly cooperation, including policies aimed at human rights protections, is at its highest.

Categorical distinctions are foundational to firm competition and regulation. Yet, market categories are notoriously difficult to define. The question of how to delineate markets is well-worn in the antitrust literature but is now the focus of a growing sociocognitive literature in strategy and organizational sociology.1 Histor- ically, there has been little cross-pollination between these research areas. More integration, however, may be increasingly important in modern markets, where change is rapid, new technologies are key differentiators in many traditional in- dustries, and platform competition is on the rise. In this paper, I introduce recent theoretical and empirical advances in sociocognitive research on categories in mar- kets. I describe a theoretical model that incorporates the probabilistic nature of how people categorize, ambiguity in category boundaries, and that multiple audi- ences are relevant in most markets. Empirically, researchers employ a range of approaches to represent these aspects of market definition, from qualitative stud- ies, to surveys, to computational approaches that leverage recent advances in ma- chine learning applied to large corpora of text. I discuss key implications from this theoretical model and how they might inform market definition in antitrust.

Democratic systems inevitably seek to reflect and realize a range of values. But democratic and legal theory in recent decades have given too little attention and weight to the value and importance of delivering effective government. Much of democratic theory and legal scholarship on democracy focuses on values such as political equality, fair representation, democratic deliberation, political partic- ipation, and individual rights, among other values. But less weight is given to the capacity of government to deliver effectively on the issues citizens care about most urgently.

This Article explores the fact that United States law permits domestic cross-border political influences while restricting foreign interference in elections. It tries to show that the law is inconsistent in trying to balance its faith in democracy (in a given jurisdiction) with its concern for externalities. Laws forbidding all cross-border attempts to influence politics would seem to reflect the view that decision-making processes across a border should be respected rather than subject to interference, assuming that the other jurisdiction is reasonably democratic. The analysis explores, and offers examples of, the interaction between a faith in democracy and the consideration of externalities, such as cross-border pollution. 

The border has never played a larger role in the American psyche than it does today, and yet it has never been less legally significant. Today, a non-citizen’s place of residence tells you less about what rights and privileges they enjoy than it ever has in the past. The border has migrated inward, affecting many aspects of non-citizens’ lives in the United States. The divergence between the physical and legal border is no accident. Instead, it is a policy response to the perceived loss of control over the physical border. But the physical border remains porous despite these legal changes. People keep migrating even as we continue to draw boundaries within communities, homes, and workplaces far away from the border. This paper explores how U.S. law has evolved to render the border superfluous, even as its symbolic importance has grown, and how it might further evolve in the future.

Borders do not exist. They are made and remade. At every step, the law creates, moves, reforms, reproduces, and reinforces the border. Focusing on the boundary that México and the United States share, this essay critiques the U.S. Supreme Court’s privileging of the sovereign prerogative to control access to the nation’s territory. In their efforts to control movement across and near the border, legal doctrine permits Executive officials to deviate from ordinary legal constraints on the use of violence. This creates a modern version of the sovereign that Carl Schmitt described a century ago: extra-constitutional in origin and subject to law only on its own terms. Urging an end to the law of border exceptionalism, the essay argues that the Schmittian sovereignty that exists in the borderlands is neither justified by the facts on the ground nor required by the very legal principles that the Supreme Court points to.

Deploying trustworthy AI is an increasingly pressing and common concern. In a court of law, the challenges are exacerbated by the confluence of a general lack of expertise in the judiciary and the rapid speed of techno-logical advancement. We discuss the obstacles to trustworthy AI in the courtroom through a discussion that focuses on the legal landscape sur-rounding electoral redistricting. We focus on two particular issues, data bi-as and a lack of domain knowledge, and discuss how they may lead to problematic legal decisions. We conclude with a discussion of the separate but complementary roles of technology and human deliberation. We em-phasize that political fairness is a philosophical and political concept that must be conceived of through human consensus building, a process that is distinct from algorithm development.

A persistent empirical finding is that bilateral trade between two countries is proportional to the size of their economies and inversely proportional to their geographic distance. We hypothesize that a similar pattern is likely to hold for the diffusion of laws. We specifically argue that countries’ propensity to update their laws to converge with the leading regulator in a given policy area is likely to be proportional to the size of their economies and inversely proportional to their geographic distance. We then empirically test this theory in the area of antitrust and assess countries’ convergence to the world’s leading antitrust regulator: the European Union. Using a modified gravity equation, we find that a country’s economic size is consistently positively correlated with continued legal convergence and that a county’s distance from the European Union is consistently negatively correlated with continued convergence. These results suggest that a modified gravity model may offer a simple model of legal diffusion that does not requiring strong epistemic and empirical assumptions.

The rules of international economic law are changing. In a range of areas, governments are asserting that if a multinational firm touches the state’s market, the state can claim the authority to regulate the firm everywhere. This departure from multilateral economic coordination and towards more unilateral regulatory power over firms’ global operations represents an important shift in international economic policy. We have entered an era where governments are embracing more unilateral tools to resist foreign economic influence and reinvigorating national industrial policies.  This Article examines the political dynamics that lead states to use access to their national markets as the basis for global corporate regulation in the national security and corporate social responsibility (CSR) fields. Specifically, this Article analyzes how market-entry-based global regulations represent an expansive conception of states’ extraterritorial jurisdiction and what constraints there are on states’ exercise of these jurisdictional claims.

It has long been assumed in large, modern, democratic states that the successful practice of democratic politics requires some kind of internal division of the polity into subunits. In the United States, the appropriate methods and justifications for doing so have long been deeply and inconclusively contested. One reason for the intractability of these disputes is that American practices of political self-division are rooted in, and have been largely carried forward from, premodern practices that rested originally on overtly illiberal assumptions and justifications that are difficult or impossible to square with contemporary commitments to philosophical liberalism.

Climate change represents one of the defining global problems of the twenty-first century. The effects of warming have led to mass displacement, more extreme weather events, and degradation of natural habitat.