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Reimagining National Security
War Powers and the Return of Major Power Conflict
Scott R. Anderson
Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution; Non-Resident Senior Fellow in the National Security Law Program at Columbia Law School.

The author would like to thank Matthew Waxman and the participants in the University of Chicago Legal Forum’s 2023 Symposium on “Reimagining National Security” for their useful comments and feedback. He would also like to thank Saloni Jaiswal and the rest of the University of Chicago Legal Forum staff for their flexibility and excellent editing, as well as his wife, Elizabeth, for her support and endless patience.

The United States is, by many accounts, facing a renewed risk of major power conflict. This Article considers what the reemergence of this risk may mean for the executive branch’s operational understanding of constitutional war powers, specifically as they relate to the use of military force. This Article ultimately argues that the political branches must acknowledge and begin dialogue on how to approach the new strategic challenges the United States is facing. Otherwise, they risk compounding the political crisis of a major power conflict with a constitutional crisis over how the President may respond.

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Reimagining National Security
Resilience for a Digital Age
Danielle Keats Citron
Jefferson Scholars Foundation Schenck Distinguished Professor in Law, University of Virginia School of Law; Vice President, Cyber Civil Rights Initiative; 2019 MacArthur Fellow

For helpful comments and conversations, we thank Ryan Calo, Louis Citron, Woodrow Hartzog, Spencer Overton, Richard Re, Shirin Sinnar, Ari Waldman, and John Woods. We are also grateful to participants in The University of Chicago Legal Forum’s Symposium on “Reimagining National Security,” the Multi-Racial Democracy and AI Panel at the American Association of Law Schools meeting, the University of Pittsburgh’s seminar series on the Future of Law in Technology and Governance, and the 7th Annual North American Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources Conference at the University of Houston Law Center, where Eichensehr’s keynote address explored some of the points in this piece. For excellent research assistance, we thank Samantha Blond, Alexander Chen, Toluwani Ojuola, and librarian extraordinaire Kate Boudouris, and thanks to the editors of The University of Chicago Legal Forum for great suggestions and careful editing.

Kristen E. Eichensehr
David H. Ibbeken ‘71 Research Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law; Samuel Willison Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard Law School (2024-25).

A resilience agenda is an essential part of protecting national security in a digital age. Emphasizing resilience offers several benefits: 1) Resilience is threat agnostic or at least relatively threat neutral; 2) its inward focus emphasizes actions under the control of a targeted country, rather than attempting to change behaviors of external adversaries; and 3) because resilience can address multiple threats simultaneously, it may be less subject to politicization. This Article identifies tactics to bolster resilience against digitally enabled threats across three temporal phases: anticipating and preparing for disruptions, adapting to and withstanding disruptions, and recovering from disruptions. This Article concludes that a resilience strategy is ours to imagine and pursue, and doing so is a crucial step to strengthen national security for a digital age.

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Reimagining National Security
Deepfakes in Court: How Judges Can Proactively Manage Alleged AI-Generated Material in National Security Cases
Abhishek Dalal
Pritzker School of Law, Northwestern University.
Chongyang Gao
Ph.D. Candidate at Northwestern University.
Hon. Paul W. Grimm (ret.)
David F. Levi Professor of the Practice of Law & Director, Bolch Judicial Institute, Duke Law School.
Maura R. Grossman
Research Professor, David R. Cheriton School of Computer Science, University of Waterloo & Adjunct Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
Daniel W. Linna Jr.
Senior Lecturer and Director of Law and Technology Initiatives, Pritzker School of Law & McCormick School of Engineering, Northwestern University.
Chiara Pulice
Dept. of Computer Science & Buffett Institute for Global Affairs, Northwestern University.
V.S. Subrahmanian
Walter P. Murphy Professor of Computer Science, Buffett Faculty Fellow at the Buffett In-stitute for Global Affairs, Northwestern University.
Hon. John Tunheim
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota.

With the widespread availability of Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools, specifically Generative AI, whether in the context of text, audio, video, imagery, or even combinations of these, it is inevitable that trials related to national security will involve evidentiary issues raised by Generative AI. We must confront two possibilities: first, that evidence presented is AI-generated and not real and, second, that other evidence is genuine but alleged to be fabricated. These are not challenges of a far-off future; they are already here. Judges will increasingly need to establish best practices to deal with a potential deluge of evidentiary issues. Our suggested approach illustrates how judges can protect the integrity of jury deliberations in a manner that is consistent with the current Federal Rules of Evidence and relevant case law.

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Reimagining National Security
Addressing IP and Technology Challenges to Pandemic Protection: A Need for Global Coordination to Promote National Security
Cynthia M. Ho
Clifford E. Vickrey Research Professor of Law and Director of the Intellectual Property program at the Loyola University of Chicago School of Law.

This Article argues that effective national security mandates protection against the spread of infectious diseases, which requires addressing intellectual property (IP) and technology obstacles. Without modification, IP laws can bar the manufacture of needed treatments by anyone besides the IP owner and its licensees. This Article explains how usual IP norms can frustrate public health and national security, why current proposals for a pandemic agreement are largely inadequate, as well as what countries can and should do to protect national security even if there is not adequate consensus for binding obligations in an international pandemic agreement.

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Reimagining National Security
A Transformational Agenda for National Security
Maryam Jamshidi
Associate Professor of Law at the University of Colorado Law School.

Many thanks to Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Aziz Rana, and Wadie Said, as well as participants in The University of Chicago Legal Forum Symposium on Reimagining National Security and the University of Iowa College of Law’s Faculty Speaker Series, for helpful feedback on this piece. Many thanks as well to the editors of The University of Chicago Legal Forum, especially Saloni Jaiswal, for insightful suggestions and careful editing of this Article. All errors are my own.

Past efforts to “reimagine” national security in legal scholarship have largely avoided systematic engagement with the foundational assumptions and presumptions of the field. Challenging and critiquing those assumptions is, however, necessary to producing scholarly work that reimagines, rather than reproduces, status quo approaches to U.S. national security. This Article presents an agenda for reimagining national security through legal scholarship, which is premised on the view that challenging the national security status quo should be part of those efforts. In doing so, this agenda explores seven premises central to how U.S. national security is currently conceived of, practiced, and implemented. Moving beyond the law, the agenda presented in this Article examines the structural power dynamics and political economy of national security, demonstrating why these issues are important to reimagining and transforming how we approach the discipline of national security as legal academics and advocates.

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Reimagining National Security
Cultural Heritage and Security Policy
Morag M. Kersel
Associate Professor, Department of Anthropology, DePaul University.
Patty Gerstenblith
Professor, DePaul University College of Law.

I want to thank Cat Mossing (DePaul Law ‘25) and Makayla Reynolds (DePaul Law ‘25) for their research assistance.

National security and cultural heritage protection are connected in several ways. This Article explores how the real or perceived relationship between threatened cultural heritage and national security developed, how this relationship has changed U.S. foreign and cultural policy, and whether these changes are for the better or the worse from a broader policy perspective, particularly with respect to the goal of cultural heritage preservation.

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Reimagining National Security
Climatizing National Security
Mark Nevitt
Mark Nevitt is an Associate Professor, Emory University School of Law. Prior to academia, he served for twenty years in the U.S. Navy in the rank of commander.

He thanks Travis Schneider for outstanding research support as well as Professor Hajin Kim, Caleb Jeffreys, Peer Oppenheimer, and Eliza Martin of The University of Chicago Law School for their thoughtful insights and edits.

This Article addresses the growing nexus between climate change and various conceptions of security with a particular emphasis on climate change’s national security impacts. This Article ultimately argues that it is far better to proactively acknowledge and address climate change’s national security impacts today rather than waiting for catastrophe to strike. Indeed, upon closer examination, climate change is not just a complex collective action environmental problem—it also is a challenging national security issue with far-reaching impacts.

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Reimagining National Security
Terrorism, Not Treason: The Rise and Fall of Criminal Charges
Shirin Sinnar
William W. and Gertrude H. Saunders Professor of Law, Stanford Law School.

I owe sincere thanks to Elena Chachko, Kristen Eichensehr, Carlton Larson, Darryl Li, Katerina Linos, Wadie Said, and participants at the University of Chicago Legal Forum workshop and Berkeley Law School Colloquium on Law and Geopolitics for helpful feedback on earlier drafts; Meaghan Corcoran, Olivia Morello, and Shafeen Pittal for indispensable research assistance; the Stanford Law Librarians for extraordinary reference support; Justin Fu for excellent administrative support; and the student editors at The University of Chicago Legal Forum for thorough and careful editing.

This Article advances both legal and sociocultural explanations for the near absence of treason charges in the “war on terror” and the implications for addressing political violence. On the legal side, terrorism charges have replaced treason because they enable the government to do almost everything that it once sought to accomplish with treason charges: they impose extraordinary stigma, they reach speech and advocacy, and they trigger severe penalties. At the same time, terrorism charges face fewer limits than treason charges: they criminalize conduct far removed from actual plots, they require a lesser showing of intent, and they dispense with treason’s constitutionally imposed evidentiary restriction. This Article argues that reimagining national security requires vigilance regarding the shape-shifting nature of responses to political violence.

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Reimagining National Security
Big Data as a National Security Issue
Paul B. Stephan
John C. Jeffries, Jr., Distinguished Professor of Law and Senior Fellow, Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia.

I am grateful to Stewart A. Baker, Ashley S. Deeks, and Kristen Eichensehr for comments and criticism, and to the editors of The University of Chicago Legal Forum for their thoughtful and helpful suggestions. Responsibility for errors, blunders, and misjudgments remains mine alone. My work as Special Counsel to the General Counsel of the U.S. Department of Defense encompassed some of the issues I discuss here, but I do not rely on or otherwise make use of any privileged or classified information that came my way. The views found here are entirely my own and should not be attributed to the U.S. government or the Department of Defense.

This Article considers the national security implications of the legal vacuum concerning modern enhancements of data mining. Its key insight is to distinguish big data as an emergent entity from the countless events that constitute collectable information. The distinction allows us to think separately about the property entitlements and regulatory constraints attributable to the elements and the systems. This analytical step in turn clarifies which legal approaches may advance national security interests consistent with other values and commitments.