Challenging Abortion Informed Consent Regulations through the First Amendment: The Case for Protecting Physicians’ Speech
Introduction
TOPA woman finds out she is pregnant. She makes the choice to terminate her pregnancy. Maybe she decides this instantly. Perhaps she reaches her decision through a series of conversations with her partner, her family, or her friends. Regardless, there is only one person she will need to have a conversation with before she can have an abortion: her physician.
Right? Actually, wrong. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,1
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
Because of this, obtaining an abortion can be a dramatically different experience depending on where you live.2
Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, Guttmacher Inst. (Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/counseling-and-waiting-periods-abortion[https://perma.cc/V9ED-QU3M].
Audrey Carlsen, Ash Ngu & Sara Simon, What It Takes to Get an Abortion in the Most Restrictive U.S. State, N.Y. Times (July 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/07/20/us/mississippi-abortion-restrictions.html[https://perma.cc/WRA6-NHJ8].
Requirements for Ultrasound, Guttmacher Inst. (Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/requirements-ultrasound[https://perma.cc/XK9E-6KXS].
Induced Abortion in the United States, Guttmacher Inst. (Jan. 2018), https://www.guttmacher.org/fact-sheet/induced-abortion-united-states[https://perma.cc/QHU5-Z8NM].
Requirements for Ultrasound, supra note 4.
Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra note 2.
Id.
Rick Rojas, Arizona Orders Doctors to Say Abortions with Drugs May Be Reversible, N.Y. Times (Mar. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/01/us/politics/arizona-doctors-must-say-that-abortions-with-drugs-may-be-reversed.html[https://perma.cc/WAJ3-6HCQ].
Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra note 2.
Id.
Id.
Claiming to balance the rights of women with those of the state, the Casey court created a new test, dubbed the undue burden standard. Under this test, regulations on abortion are permissible provided they do not impose an undue burden on a woman’s choice to have an abortion before the fetus reaches viability (i.e. is potentially able to live outside the woman’s body).13
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973) (defining viability as “potentially able to live outside the mother’s womb, albeit with artificial aid”).
See Christine L. Raffaele, Annotation, Validity of State “Informed Consent” Statutes by Which Providers of Abortions Are Required to Provide Patient Seeking Abortion with Certain Information, 119 A.L.R. 5th 315 (originally published 2004).
However, the undue burden standard poses a low bar that most regulations clear. As an alternative, some challengers have brought their claims as violations of physicians’ free speech rights under the First Amendment. Courts review First Amendment challenges under standards ranging from strict scrutiny to rational basis review, “depending on the type of regulation and the justifications and purposes underlying it.”15
Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 244 (4th Cir. 2014).
The challengers in Casey brought precisely such a claim, arguing that the informed consent provisions at issue infringed physicians’ First Amendment rights. The Court dismissed this claim in an ambiguous three-sentence paragraph that left open the question of whether such challenges can be sustained in the abortion context.16
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992).
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence with particular emphasis on Casey. Part II analyzes the circuit split and the rationales of the Eighth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourth Circuits. Part III looks closely at the language and reasoning of Casey and argues that it supports the view that First Amendment challenges to informed consent measures—even those that are truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant—can exist independently of the undue burden standard. Part IV advocates for intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate standard of review for such challenges.
I. Abortion at the Supreme Court
TOPA. Pre-Casey
TOPA woman’s right to have an abortion has been constitutionally protected since the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade17
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Id. at 120.
Id. at 153.
The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative and struck down the Texas statute.20
Id. at 166.
Id. at 164–65.
Id. at 163.
Id.
Id. at 164. The Court listed examples of “permissible state regulation in this area,” which included regulating qualifications of the performing physicians and facilities in which abortions occur, including licensure. Id. at 163.
Id. at 164–65.
B. Casey and the Undue Burden Standard
TOPRoe’s trimester framework governed abortion regulations, albeit shakily,26
The Casey court acknowledged the uncertainty that followed Roe in its bold opening: “[l]iberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt. Yet 19 years after our holding that the Constitution protects a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy in its early stages that definition of liberty is still questioned.” Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
Id. at 844.
Id. at 881 (quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
See id. at 898.
Id. at 882.
While discarding Roe’s trimester framework, the Court claimed to affirm “Roe’s essential holding”33
Id. at 846.
The Court grounded this right in the Due Process Clause, a departure from Roe’s penumbral privacy approach. See id. at 846.
Id.
Id. at 877.
Id.
Id. at 878.
Id. The measures must still conform to the undue burden standard and cannot create “a substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to choose.” Id. at 877.
While the petitioners in Casey challenged the Pennsylvania statute primarily as a violation of Roe, they also brought a First Amendment challenge, claiming the informed consent provisions impermissibly controlled physicians’ speech.40
See id. at 881.
All that is left of petitioners’ argument is an asserted First Amendment right of a physician not to provide information about the risks of abortion, and childbirth, in a manner mandated by the State. To be sure, the physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated, see Wooley v. Maynard [citation omitted], but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State, cf. Whalen v. Roe [citation omitted]. We see no constitutional infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide the information mandated by the State here.41
41Id. at 884.
Thus, while overall the Court upheld the informed consent requirements under the undue burden standard,42
“[T]he right protected by Roe is a right to decide to terminate a pregnancy free of undue interference by the State. The informed consent requirement is not an undue burden on that right.” Id. at 887.
The undue burden standard remains good law. The Court used it in Gonzales v. Carhart,43
550 U.S. 124 (2007) (upholding a federal ban on “partial-birth” abortions under the undue burden standard).
136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (striking down a Texas regulation on abortion clinics under the undue burden standard).
A recent Supreme Court case also deserves mention. In National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra (“NIFLA”),45
138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
Id. at 2368.
Id. at 2373–74.
Id. at 2375.
Id. The state argued that the requirements should be considered professional speech and therefore receive a lower standard of review. The Court, although highly skeptical of the professional speech doctrine, determined it did not need to answer the professional speech question “because the licensed notice cannot survive even intermediate scrutiny.” Id.
Id. at 2378. The State argued that, as commercial speech, the unlicensed requirements should be subject to the more deferential Zauderer standard. The Court again did not feel the need to answer whether Zauderer applied because it held that the unlicensed center notice requirements could not meet even its lower standard of review.
Relevant here, in its opinion the NIFLA Court characterized the informed consent provisions in Casey as regulations of professional conduct only incidentally burdening speech, a category subject to a lower standard of review.51
Id. at 2372–73.
The Court’s characterization of Casey provides only an example of a category of speech the Court notes as warranting lower protection. The Court supports this category with citations to many other cases as well. Id. at 2373. Defining Casey is therefore “not necessary” nor a “necessary antecedent” to the Court’s holding. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 916 F.3d 1047, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C. v. Beshar, 920 F. 3d 421, 449 (6th Cir. 2019) (Donald, J., dissenting).
II. The Circuit Split: Singularity of the Undue Burden Standard?
TOPA. Eighth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits Dismiss First Amendment Challenges to Informed Consent Laws
TOPThe Eighth Circuit has twice upheld the supremacy of the undue burden test when considering First Amendment challenges to informed consent requirements. In Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds (Rounds I),54
530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 726.
Overruling the district court, the Eighth Circuit found the mandated statements well within the state’s regulatory power. The court concluded:
Casey and Gonzales establish that, while the State cannot compel an individual simply to speak the State’s ideological message, it can use its regulatory authority to require a physician to provide truthful, non-misleading information relevant to a patient’s decision to have an abortion, even if that information might also encourage the patient to choose childbirth over abortion.56
56Id. at 734–35.
Therefore, in order to succeed on its compelled speech claim, Planned Parenthood had to show that the mandated disclosures were untruthful, misleading, or irrelevant.57
See id. at 735.
Id. at 727.
“South Dakota recognizes the well-settled canon of statutory interpretation that ‘[w]here [a term] is defined by statute, the statutory definition is controlling.’” Id. at 735 (citing Bruggeman v. S.D. Chem. Dependency Counselor Certification Bd., 571 N.W.2d 851, 853 (S.D. 1997)).
Id. at 735. The court did not explicitly discuss why this statement is not misleading, but did note that it would be “incumbent upon one preparing the disclosure form required by [the statute], and upon a physician answering a patient’s questions about it, to account for any applicable statutory definitions.” Id.
Four years later, the Eighth Circuit, again sitting en banc and again reversing the district court, reaffirmed its reading of Casey and upheld another part of the South Dakota statute in Rounds II.61
Planned Parenthood of Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 894.
“[T]he studies submitted by the State are sufficiently reliable to support the truth of the proposition that the relative risk of suicide and suicide ideation is higher for women who abort their pregnancies compared to women who give birth or have not become pregnant.” Id. at 898–99.
Id. at 904.
Id. at 905.
The Fifth Circuit held similarly in Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services v. Lakey.66
667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 572.
Id. at 573.
Id.
Id. at 578 n.6.
Id. at 573. The provisions were also challenged as void for vagueness, outside of the scope of this Comment.
The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that Casey precluded the plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge. The Lakey court focused on Casey’s brief discussion of the First Amendment claim, finding its absence of inquiry into compelling interests or narrow tailoring to be the “antithesis of strict scrutiny.”72
Id. at 575.
Id. at 575–76 (citing Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 128 (2007)) (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 576.
“Fortifying this reading, the Eighth Circuit sitting en banc construed Casey and Gonzales in the same way.” Id. at 576–77 (citing Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 735 (8th Cir. 2008)).
The Fifth Circuit then noted that, unlike the plaintiffs in Casey and Rounds, the plaintiff-appellees in the case at hand had brought solely a First Amendment claim.76
Id. at 577.
If the disclosures are truthful and non-misleading, and if they would not violate the woman’s privacy right under the Casey plurality opinion, then Appellees would, by means of their First Amendment claim, essentially trump the balance Casey struck between women’s rights and the states’ prerogatives. Casey, however, rejected any such clash of rights in the informed consent context.77
77Id.
The Fifth Circuit finally denied the contention raised by plaintiff-appellees that the disclosure requirements at issue differed qualitatively from those in Casey.78
Id. at 578.
Id.
Id. at 579.
“Appellees’ argument ignores that Casey and Gonzales emphasize that the gravity of the decision may be the subject of informed consent through factual, medical detail, that the condition of the fetus is relevant, and that discouraging abortion is an acceptable effect of mandated disclosures.” Id.
Id. at 579–80.
Id. at 580.
Press Release, Center for Reproductive Rights, Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Denies Request to Rehear Texas Ultrasound Case (Feb. 10, 2012), https://www.reproductiverights.org/press-room/fifth-circuit-court-of-appeals-denies-request-to-rehear-texas-ultrasound-case[https://perma.cc/2X5L-7W5Y].
The Sixth Circuit recently confronted the issue and aligned in decision with the Eighth and Fifth Circuits. In EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C. v. Beshar,85
920 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 446.
Id. at 424.
Id. at 424–25.
Relying heavily on its reading of Casey and NIFLA, the Beshar court determined that “First Amendment heightened scrutiny does not apply to incidental regulation of professional speech89
The Beshar court made NIFLA’s characterization of Casey central to its analysis and dismissed the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Stuart (see part B) because it pre-dated NIFLA and therefore gave “insufficient regard” to NIFLA’s characterization of Casey. Id. at 435.
Id. at 429.
Id. at 431 (internal citations omitted).
Id. (“one can hardly dispute the relevance of sonogram images for twenty-first-century informed consent.”).
Id. at 434.
B. Fourth Circuit Upholds First Amendment Challenge to Informed Consent Law
TOPTwo years after the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Lakey, but before the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Beshar, the Fourth Circuit addressed a compelled speech challenge to a strikingly similar statute. In Stuart v. Camnitz,94
774 F. 3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 242–43.
Id. at 243.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 244.
Unlike in Lakey or Rounds, here a unanimous Fourth Circuit affirmed.100
Id. at 256.
Id. at 246. Note that the state freely admitted “the purpose and anticipated effect of the Display of Real-Time View Requirement is to convince women seeking abortions to change their minds or reassess their decisions.” Id.
[While] it is true that the words the state puts into the doctor’s mouth are factual, that does not divorce the speech from its moral or ideological implications. “[C]ontext matters.” [The regulations] explicitly promote[] a pro-life message by demanding the provision of facts that all fall on one side of the abortion debate—and does so shortly before the time of decision when the intended recipient is most vulnerable.102
102Id.
The Fourth Circuit then assessed the requirements as standard medical regulation, acknowledging that states retain rights to regulate professional speech and mandate informed consent to medical procedures.103
Id. at 247.
Id. The court supported this with reference to Casey (“[T]he physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated.”) Id.
Id.
Id. at 248.
The Fourth Circuit explicitly stated its reasons for diverging from the Fifth and Eighth Circuits:
With respect, our sister circuits read too much into Casey and Gonzales. The single paragraph in Casey does not assert that physicians forfeit their First Amendment rights in the procedures surrounding abortions, nor does it announce the proper level of scrutiny to be applied to abortion regulations that compel speech to the extraordinary extent present here the plurality simply stated that it saw ‘no constitutional infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide the information mandated by the State here.’ That particularized finding hardly announces a guiding standard of scrutiny for use in every subsequent compelled speech case involving abortion.107
107Id. at 249.
The court also held Gonzales, an undue burden case raising no First Amendment claim, inapplicable to the issue at hand. The court noted that Gonzales “says nothing about the level of scrutiny courts should apply when reviewing a claim that a regulation compelling speech in the abortion context violates physicians’ First Amendment free speech rights.”108
Id.
Walker-McGill v. Stuart, 135 S. Ct. 2838 (2015).
III.Casey Does Not Foreclose Physicians’ First Amendment Challenges to Informed Consent Laws
TOPA. Casey Does Not Displace First Amendment Protection for Physicians
TOPThe Eighth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have curtailed First Amendment protection for physicians in the context of abortion informed consent measures. Each circuit held that when mandated informed consent disclosures are truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant to the decision to have an abortion, they are permissible under Casey as long as they do not constitute an undue burden. Essentially, these circuits have disallowed independent First Amendment analysis of physicians’ compelled speech claims by collapsing free speech analysis into the undue burden test. This reasoning misinterprets Casey. As Nadia Sawicki writes, “it is essential to recognize that the ‘truthful, not misleading, and relevant’ requirement is a condition on the constitutionality of disclosure laws under the Fourteenth Amendment’s ‘undue burden’ standard, rather than a condition of the First Amendment.”110
Nadia N. Sawicki, Informed Consent as Compelled Professional Speech: Fictions, Facts, and Open Questions, 50 Wash. U. J. L. & Pol’y 11, 24–25 (2016).
The majority relies on undue burden jurisprudence to fashion a test that they believe comprehensively captures informed consent. The result is erroneous. The three elements the majority identifies—truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant—were drawn from Casey, a controlling case that considered both an undue burden and a First Amendment challenge. These three elements, however, were central only to Casey’s undue burden analysis. Nowhere are these elements even mentioned in Casey’s discussion of the First Amendment. It is a mistake to transpose Casey’s holding on undue burden to the First Amendment challenge here.111
111EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C. v. Beshar, 920 F. 3d 421, 448 (6th Cir. 2019) (Donald, J., dissenting).
In other words, Casey holds that truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant informed consent disclosures do not per se violate a woman’s constitutional right to choose. Casey does not, however, indicate that such disclosures can never be subject to First Amendment review.
Common sense indicates that this must be the case. Imagine South Dakota revises its disclosure requirement with the only change being physicians are now required to stand up on a chair and yell at a woman that her abortion will end the life of a unique living human being. While this hypothetical obviously steps outside of the bounds of the regulations considered in Casey, the Eighth Circuit does not offer a framework through which to challenge it. The disclosure has already been held truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant, ending the First Amendment inquiry. While the yelling could be challenged as creating an undue burden, the Eighth Circuit would struggle to qualitatively differentiate it from the written statement, especially given the permissibility of regulations designed to dissuade women from choosing abortion.112
“Casey and Gonzales establish that, while the State cannot compel an individual simply to speak the State’s ideological message, it can use its regulatory authority to require a physician to provide truthful, non-misleading information relevant to a patient’s decision to have an abortion, even if that information might also encourage the patient to choose childbirth over abortion.” Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 734–35 (8th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added).
It does not seem plausible that the Court would create this large exemption from First Amendment protection in such an ambiguous way. Justice Scalia famously wrote that “Congress does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”113
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018) (citing Denver Area Ed. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 804 (1996)).
Id. (citing United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 722 (2012)).
I recognize the irony of using NIFLA to support this claim, given its characterization of Casey—but disputing that characterization does not rob other portions of the opinion of their persuasiveness.
The courts that have found otherwise have arguably fallen prey to a phenomenon recently articulated in a different context by Justice Gorsuch: “treating judicial opinions as if they were statutes, divorcing a passing comment from its context, ignoring all that came before and after, and treating an isolated phrase as if it were controlling.” Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2139 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
B. Whalen Does Not Trump Wooley
TOPIn its discussion of the First Amendment issues in Casey, the Court cited to Wooley v. Maynard118
430 U.S. 705 (1977).
429 U.S. 589 (1977).
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716 (“We must also determine whether the State’s countervailing interest is sufficiently compelling to justify requiring appellees to display the state motto on their license plates.”).
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598.
Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, U. Ill. L. Rev. 939, 946 (2007).
The Supreme Court struck down the license plate statute in Wooley, recognizing that “the right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”123
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714.
Tex. Medical Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 578, 580 (5th Cir. 2012).
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715 (emphasis added).
Immediately following its reference to Wooley, the Casey court acknowledges that the medical context tempers its First Amendment analysis, citing to Whalen. In Whalen, the Court upheld, against a privacy challenge, a New York statute requiring that the state receive a copy of every prescription for a certain class of drugs categorized as highly dangerous.127
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603–04.
Lakey, 667 F.3d at 575.
Nor can it be said that any individual has been deprived of the right to decide independently, with the advice of his physician, to acquire and to use needed medication the decision to prescribe, or to use, is left entirely to the physician and the patient. We hold that [the] impact of the patient-identification requirements in the [statute] on either the reputation or the independence of the patients is [not] sufficient to constitute an invasion of any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment (emphasis added).129
129Whalen, 429 U.S. at 604 (emphasis added).
While the Court did uphold the medical regulation, it clearly weighed, as highly significant, the regulation’s effect on the independence of patients’ and physicians’ decision making. With regards to the independence of patients, Casey and Gonzales admittedly allow for states to voice their disapproval of abortion even if it results in altering a woman’s choice to have one. Application of the undue burden standard thus encompasses any infringement on patients’ decision making in its calculation. However, while the undue burden standard speaks to the relevance of women’s independence in receiving abortions, it does not speak to that of the physicians offering them.
The Casey Court’s citation to Whalen indicates that infringements on the independence of doctors should be factored into the permissibility of medical regulations. Excluding First Amendment challenges to informed consent measures, however, removes the only avenue through which such infringements can be considered. Although in Casey, like in Whalen, the extent of infringement on the independence of the physician-patient relationship fell within permissible grounds, that determination was limited to the facts of Casey.130
“We see no constitutional infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide the information mandated by the State here.” Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (emphasis added).
In sum, allowing physicians to bring First Amendment challenges to informed consent provisions does not “trump the balance Casey struck between women’s rights and the states’ prerogatives.”131
Lakey, 667 F.3d at 577.
IV. Adopting Intermediate Scrutiny As the Standard of Review
TOPA. Competing Interests Clash in the Context of Informed Consent Laws
TOPAssuming that Casey does not foreclose physicians from bringing First Amendment challenges to informed consent laws, there remains an open question: what standard should courts use to review these challenges? With First Amendment claims, context drives this inquiry.132
“Laws that impinge upon speech receive different levels of judicial scrutiny depending on the type of regulation and the justifications and purposes underlying it.” Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 244 (4th Cir. 2014).
Id.
Content-based restrictions on speech are generally assessed under strict scrutiny.134
See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015).
Id.
Robert McNamara & Paul Sherman, NIFLA v. Becerra: A Seismic Decision Protecting Occupational Speech, Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 197, 205 (2018).
Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (U.S. 1988) (“Mandating speech that a speaker would not otherwise make necessarily alters the content of the speech.”).
However, compelled speech of medical professionals runs up against another line of precedent. States have police powers through which they can regulate medicine and other professions.138
Police powers come from the Tenth Amendment. “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. Const. amend X. See also Sawicki, supra note 112 at 12 (“States are authorized to regulate medicine and other professions by virtue of their police power, the unenumerated power to protect the health, safety, and welfare of a state’s citizenry”). See also Dent v. W. Va., 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889).
Thomas B. Nachbar, The Rationality of Rational Basis Review, 102 Va. L. Rev 1627, 1629 (2016).
See generally W.M. Moldoff, Malpractice: Physician’s Duty to Inform Patient of Nature and Hazards of Disease or Treatment, 79 A.L.R. 2d 1028 (originally published 1961).
“Without so much as a nod to the First Amendment, doctors are routinely held liable for malpractice for speaking or for failing to speak.” Post, supra note 125, at 950.
In Casey, the Court acknowledged both these lines of precedent: “the physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated, but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State.”142
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
B. Eliminating the Extremes (Strict Scrutiny and Rational Basis Review)
TOPWhile the appropriate standard could thus fall anywhere from strict scrutiny to rational basis review, the endpoints of the range can be eliminated from consideration. A standard of strict scrutiny seems hard to reconcile with Casey.143
This statement should not be taken as an endorsement of Casey’s holding. However, this Comment seeks to offer a standard that coheres with precedent and could be used with the current state of the law. Consistency with Casey is a necessary element of such a standard.
Tex. Medical Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 575 (5th Cir. 2012). See also Carl H. Coleman, Regulating Physician Speech, N.C. L. Rev. 9 (forthcoming), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3234300(“The most that can be said about Casey is that the plurality was clearly not applying strict scrutiny in its First Amendment analysis, as it made no effort to determine whether the statute was ‘narrowly tailored’ or based on a ‘compelling state interest.’”).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
Rational basis review, at first blush, appears better supported by the language used by the Casey court in its discussion of the First Amendment claim. The Court’s use of the word “reasonable” can be read as synonymous with rational,146
“On the one hand, [the Casey plurality’s] use of the word ‘reasonable’ might mean that such laws are permissible as long as they have a rational basis, given that the word ‘reasonable’ is often used as a synonym for ‘rational.’” Coleman, supra note 144, at 9.
Id.
In sum, both extremes—strict scrutiny and rational basis review—fail as potential standards of review. Strict scrutiny is incompatible with the language in Casey and fails to acknowledge the state’s legitimate regulatory role in the realm of medical disclosures. Rational basis review ignores the context of Casey and would, in effect, impermissibly excuse abortion informed consent measures from meaningful review.
C. Searching the Middle for a Standard
TOPRejecting both strict scrutiny and rational basis review eliminates the clearest available standards, forcing an examination of the mushy middle ground of First Amendment protection. As will be discussed in sub-section D, intermediate scrutiny emerges from this search as the best standard. Reaching that conclusion requires analysis of why other possible intermediate standards fail in the context of informed consent to abortion.148
For the purposes of this Comment I have set aside the concept of professional speech as a framework through which to consider abortion informed consent requirements. Professional speech has received varied and inconsistent treatment in the circuit courts. See Erika Schutzman, We Need Professional Help: Advocating For a Consistent Standard of Review When Regulations of Professional Speech Implicate the First Amendment, 56 B.C. L. Rev. 2019, 2023 (“Courts have provided little clarity as to the extent to which the First Amendment rights of professionals should be protected or balanced against the interests of the state several circuits have tackled the issue of professional speech, with varying results.”). Moreover, the Court’s opinion in NIFLA casts doubt on the validity of the professional speech doctrine. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 (2018) (“this Court has not recognized ‘professional speech’ as a separate category of speech.”).
As discussed in section II(a), the Eighth, Fifth, and Sixth circuits used a “truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant” standard to assess the challenged informed consent measures. In so doing, these circuits inappropriately folded First Amendment analysis into the undue burden test (see section III). This does not, however, mean that a TNR standard should be disregarded per se. While the Eighth, Fifth, and Sixth circuits erred in failing to acknowledge the necessity of an independent First Amendment analysis, had they done so, TNR could have been an appropriate standard. Such an approach would uphold informed consent measures that mandate truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant disclosures.
A TNR test has the benefit of seemingly easy compatibility with Casey. The Casey court held the truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant disclosures at issue in the Pennsylvania law admissible under the undue burden test. It then went on to find no First Amendment issue with the mandated disclosures. It follows that, at a minimum, truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant disclosures similar in kind to those seen in Casey pass First Amendment scrutiny.149
However, a reasonableness assessment also seems baked into the Casey Court’s discussion of the informed consent measures. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (“In short, requiring that the woman be informed of the availability of information relating to fetal development and the assistance available should she decide to carry the pregnancy to full term is a reasonable measure to ensure an informed choice”) (emphasis added); id. at 885 (“Thus, we uphold the provision [requiring a physician as opposed to a qualified assistant to provide information regarding informed consent] as a reasonable means to ensure that the woman’s consent is informed”) (emphasis added). Therefore, truthful, nonmisleading, and reasonable (as opposed to or in addition to relevant) could be a more appropriate test to draw from Casey. Given that none of the circuits discussed in this Comment offered it as a standard, I am not giving this test full analysis. Moreover, I am not proffering it as an alternative standard because the flexibility of a reasonableness assessment would not adequately safeguard against free speech abuses in the abortion context.
Applied beyond Casey, however, TNR offers a slippery standard. The circuit split discussed in Part II illustrates this: in some jurisdictions, information relevant to having an abortion includes an often unnecessary and costly medical procedure, while in others it does not. Laboratories of democracy notwithstanding, a standard does not offer good guidance if speech relating to a medical procedure can be so differently conscripted depending on the state in which it occurs. Pulling a unique First Amendment standard from Casey stretches the Court’s acknowledgment of abortion exceptionalism beyond recognition.150
Id. at 852 (“Abortion is a unique act the liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the human condition and so unique to the law.”). See also Linda Greenhouse, Why Courts Shouldn’t Ignore the Facts About Abortion Rights, N.Y. Times (Feb. 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/28/opinion/sunday/why-courts-shouldnt-ignore-the-facts-about-abortion-rights.html(“‘abortion exceptionalism’” is the argument “that abortion has a moral valence that makes it different from the many other medical procedures that states subject to less rigorous oversight. The Supreme Court’s current abortion jurisprudence recognizes this”).
Another midway standard comes from the context of commercial speech. In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio,151
471 U.S. 626 (1985).
Id. at 652.
Id. at 651.
Id.
Id.
Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018).
Open questions include whether state interests aside from preventing consumer deception can sustain disclosure requirements, and what qualifies as “controversial.” For one circuit’s take, see Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that government interests in addition to correcting deception can be invoked to sustain disclosure mandates under Zauderer); Nat’l Ass’n of Manufacturers v. S.E.C., 800 F.3d 518, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding as controversial an S.E.C. requirement that a company that could not determine the origin of its minerals must list its products as not Democratic Republic of the Congo conflict free).
Some commentators have suggested that courts could use the Zauderer standard to assess regulations relating to abortion, including informed consent measures.158
See Coleman, supra note 149, at 22 (noting the similarity between the Rounds I court’s focus on whether the compelled disclosures were “truthful and not misleading” and the Zauderer standard). Interestingly, this was the approach adopted by the Third Circuit in Casey. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 705–06 (3d Cir. 1991) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372.
D. Intermediate Scrutiny Is the Appropriate Standard
TOPIntermediate scrutiny (sometimes also referred to as heightened scrutiny) straddles the line between rational basis review and strict scrutiny. It developed as a response to gender discrimination claims under the Fourteenth Amendment160
See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 572 (2011).
Id. at 572 (citing Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)) (internal citations omitted).
Evergreen Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233, 245 (2d Cir. 2014) (defining intermediate scrutiny as looking to whether a law is “no more extensive than necessary to serve a substantial governmental interest”).
Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F. 3d 238, 250 (4th Cir. 2014).
Intermediate scrutiny appropriately balances the tensions created by informed consent measures. On the one hand, the regulation of private medical decisions falls within the ambit of the state. On the other hand, abortion is a matter of public concern, and many informed consent measures are designed precisely to express the state’s disapproval of the practice in general. The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that “[i]t is speech on ‘matters of public concern’ that is ‘at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection’. In contrast, speech on matters of purely private concern is of less First Amendment concern.”166
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758–59 (1985).
Id. at 759.
Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2374 (2018) (citing Wollschaleger v. Governor of Florida, 848 F.3d 1293, 1328 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc)) (quotations omitted).
This raises concerns of government overreach, flagged by Justice Thomas in NIFLA. Justice Thomas observed that the Supreme Court “has stressed the danger of content-based regulations ‘in the fields of medicine and public health, where information can save lives.’”169
Id. (citing Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011)).
Id. (citing Wollschlaeger, 848 F.3d at 1328).
Id. (citing Toward a First Amendment Theory of Doctor-Patient Discourse and the Right to Receive Unbiased Medical Advice, 74 B.U.L. Rev. 201, 201–202 (1994)).
While this Comment has focused narrowly on abortion informed consent measures, this approach could supply a model for other regulations of physicians’ speech that touch issues of public concern, e.g. informed-consent to vaccinations.
Moreover, informed consent measures implicate two constitutional guarantees: a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy, and her physician’s right to be free from compelled speech. As noted, the law handles each separately, under the undue burden test and the First Amendment, respectively. However, a better approach would recognize that each infringement does not occur in a vacuum. In compelling physicians’ speech and conduct, informed consent measures necessarily touch on a woman’s right to an abortion as well. The law should recognize this dual infringement by adopting a higher standard of review in assessing the relevant free speech claim—namely, intermediate scrutiny.173
Under this reasoning, the reverse, a higher standard of review for assessing the infringement on the constitutional right to an abortion when physicians’ First Amendment rights are implicated, would also be true. This argument proves more difficult, given that in the case of abortion rights the Court has codified the standard of review into the constitutional test itself. One would have to argue that the threshold of what constitutes an undue burden rises when physicians’ First Amendment rights are involved. While not untenable, there is more room to make the argument for a hybrid rights approach on the flip side, where the standard of review has not been set.
Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990) (defining hybrid rights as a Free Exercise Clause claims in conjunction with another constitutional violation).
Analogous reasoning should apply in the case of abortion informed consent measures. This is not to advocate for a generally more liberal adoption of the hybrid rights approach. However, such an approach would be particularly appropriate in the limited context of abortion informed consent measures, where the relevant harm to women is deemphasized when informed consent measures are challenged under the First Amendment (see part E). A hybrid rights approach would also help insulate informed consent measures from being challenged as regulations of conduct that only incidentally burden speech, thereby ensuring a higher standard of review.
Advocating for intermediate scrutiny as the correct standard for assessing abortion informed consent requirements necessitates addressing its consistency with Casey. The Fourth Circuit in Stuart offered intermediate scrutiny as consistent with Supreme Court precedent but did not explain its rationale.175
“[Casey] says nothing about the level of scrutiny courts should apply when reviewing a claim that a regulation compelling speech in the abortion context violates physicians’ First Amendment free speech rights. A heightened intermediate level of scrutiny is thus consistent with Supreme Court precedent and appropriately recognizes the intersection here.” Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F. 3d 238, 249 (4th Cir. 2014).
As discussed in part B supra, while the word “reasonable” could be read to mean “rational,” the Court makes this statement only after having already concluded the existence of a substantial state interest and noting the tailoring of the regulation. Thus, the Court’s language in Casey does not preclude intermediate scrutiny.
However, one can also plausibly argue that the Casey requirements would withstand intermediate scrutiny review. In light of the weight the Supreme Court has given to this particular state interest, the disclosure requirements in Casey seem minimally invasive and appropriately tailored. To put it simply, this is a close call. However, given the other reasons weighing in favor of intermediate scrutiny, a slightly precarious relationship with Casey should not ultimately be disqualifying. Rather, courts should use Casey as a helpful guide for framing their fit inquiry. Regulations similar in kind to those in Casey, such as giving the age of the fetus or offering printed materials describing alternative options and support, can be seen as representative of the appropriate balance between a state’s interest in potential life and the means it can use to further it.
E. #MeToo Movement Supports Use of Intermediate Scrutiny
TOPThe context of #MeToo also supports the use of intermediate scrutiny for assessing informed consent regulations. When Casey replaced Roe’s trimester system, it fundamentally altered the reproductive rights of women. Casey’s undue burden standard has allowed states to encumber pre-viability abortions through a wide range of regulations. The laxity of the undue burden standard as a tool through which to attack these increasingly severe state regulations has created a special need for First Amendment claims in this context.
First Amendment claims to informed consent measures, however, necessarily shift the focus from women to their doctors. The relevant constitutional harm is no longer the burden on the woman, but rather the infringement on her doctor. Particularly in the context of #MeToo, this should give us pause. The #MeToo movement has shone a bright and harsh light on the prevalence of sexual violence and harassment against women. While sexual harassment is a critical issue, #MeToo also goes beyond this. At its core, it speaks to our culture’s historic and deeply-rooted disregard of women’s agency in all aspects of life, from the bedroom, to the boardroom, to the street. The Court in Casey acknowledged that the right to an abortion is justified in part by “the right to physical autonomy.”177
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992).
This harm is lost, though, when framing the legal issue under the First Amendment. This is not to question the exigency of free speech concerns. However, the informed consent laws considered in this Comment were designed, above all, to impact women seeking abortions, not their doctors. By focusing on physicians, we surrender the interests of women to those of others.178
Admittedly, many physicians are female. However, this does not negate the harm in a shift from an entirely female category—women seeking abortions—to a category that, while inclusive of women, also includes men. Moreover, the necessity of obtaining an abortion for the women seeking them makes them a particularly vulnerable group of women, a fact that does not extend to female physicians.
The undue burden test does not adequately protect women’s agency and autonomy when seeking an abortion. Free speech challenges to abortion informed consent measures offer a second-best tool with which to attack invasive regulations. Assessing these regulations through intermediate scrutiny allows courts to consider how a state has tailored a regulation and its effect on the listener. In this inquiry, there is room to consider a regulation’s impact on women. Therefore, adopting intermediate scrutiny as the standard of review for informed consent measures does some work toward remedying the harm done by the First Amendment framing of this issue.
Conclusion
TOPIn crafting the undue burden standard in Casey, the Supreme Court carefully weighed the rights of women and the rights of the state. The rights of physicians, however, received no such measured consideration. Reading Casey as exempting abortion informed consent provisions from First Amendment challenge bends reason to the breaking point. Casey does not foreclose these challenges, nor does it offer a precise standard with which to review them. Intermediate scrutiny is the only standard that appropriately handles the conflicting interests at the heart of abortion informed consent regulations, particularly in the era of #MeToo.
- 1505 U.S. 833 (1992).
- 2Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, Guttmacher Inst. (Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/counseling-and-waiting-periods-abortion[https://perma.cc/V9ED-QU3M].
- 3Audrey Carlsen, Ash Ngu & Sara Simon, What It Takes to Get an Abortion in the Most Restrictive U.S. State, N.Y. Times (July 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/07/20/us/mississippi-abortion-restrictions.html[https://perma.cc/WRA6-NHJ8].
- 4Requirements for Ultrasound, Guttmacher Inst. (Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/requirements-ultrasound[https://perma.cc/XK9E-6KXS].
- 5Induced Abortion in the United States, Guttmacher Inst. (Jan. 2018), https://www.guttmacher.org/fact-sheet/induced-abortion-united-states[https://perma.cc/QHU5-Z8NM].
- 6Requirements for Ultrasound, supra note 4.
- 7Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra note 2.
- 8Id.
- 9Rick Rojas, Arizona Orders Doctors to Say Abortions with Drugs May Be Reversible, N.Y. Times (Mar. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/01/us/politics/arizona-doctors-must-say-that-abortions-with-drugs-may-be-reversed.html[https://perma.cc/WAJ3-6HCQ].
- 10Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra note 2.
- 11Id.
- 12Id.
- 13Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973) (defining viability as “potentially able to live outside the mother’s womb, albeit with artificial aid”).
- 14See Christine L. Raffaele, Annotation, Validity of State “Informed Consent” Statutes by Which Providers of Abortions Are Required to Provide Patient Seeking Abortion with Certain Information, 119 A.L.R. 5th 315 (originally published 2004).
- 15Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 244 (4th Cir. 2014).
- 16Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992).
- 17410 U.S. 113 (1973).
- 18Id. at 120.
- 19Id. at 153.
- 20Id. at 166.
- 21Id. at 164–65.
- 22Id. at 163.
- 23Id.
- 24Id. at 164. The Court listed examples of “permissible state regulation in this area,” which included regulating qualifications of the performing physicians and facilities in which abortions occur, including licensure. Id. at 163.
- 25Id. at 164–65.
- 26The Casey court acknowledged the uncertainty that followed Roe in its bold opening: “[l]iberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt. Yet 19 years after our holding that the Constitution protects a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy in its early stages that definition of liberty is still questioned.” Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
- 27Id. at 844.
- 28Id. at 881 (quotation marks omitted).
- 29Id.
- 30Id.
- 31See id. at 898.
- 32Id. at 882.
- 33Id. at 846.
- 34The Court grounded this right in the Due Process Clause, a departure from Roe’s penumbral privacy approach. See id. at 846.
- 35Id.
- 36Id. at 877.
- 37Id.
- 38Id. at 878.
- 39Id. The measures must still conform to the undue burden standard and cannot create “a substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to choose.” Id. at 877.
- 40See id. at 881.
- 41Id. at 884.
- 42“[T]he right protected by Roe is a right to decide to terminate a pregnancy free of undue interference by the State. The informed consent requirement is not an undue burden on that right.” Id. at 887.
- 43550 U.S. 124 (2007) (upholding a federal ban on “partial-birth” abortions under the undue burden standard).
- 44136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (striking down a Texas regulation on abortion clinics under the undue burden standard).
- 45138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
- 46Id. at 2368.
- 47Id. at 2373–74.
- 48Id. at 2375.
- 49Id. The state argued that the requirements should be considered professional speech and therefore receive a lower standard of review. The Court, although highly skeptical of the professional speech doctrine, determined it did not need to answer the professional speech question “because the licensed notice cannot survive even intermediate scrutiny.” Id.
- 50Id. at 2378. The State argued that, as commercial speech, the unlicensed requirements should be subject to the more deferential Zauderer standard. The Court again did not feel the need to answer whether Zauderer applied because it held that the unlicensed center notice requirements could not meet even its lower standard of review.
- 51Id. at 2372–73.
- 52The Court’s characterization of Casey provides only an example of a category of speech the Court notes as warranting lower protection. The Court supports this category with citations to many other cases as well. Id. at 2373. Defining Casey is therefore “not necessary” nor a “necessary antecedent” to the Court’s holding. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 916 F.3d 1047, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
- 53EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C. v. Beshar, 920 F. 3d 421, 449 (6th Cir. 2019) (Donald, J., dissenting).
- 54530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008).
- 55Id. at 726.
- 56Id. at 734–35.
- 57See id. at 735.
- 58Id. at 727.
- 59“South Dakota recognizes the well-settled canon of statutory interpretation that ‘[w]here [a term] is defined by statute, the statutory definition is controlling.’” Id. at 735 (citing Bruggeman v. S.D. Chem. Dependency Counselor Certification Bd., 571 N.W.2d 851, 853 (S.D. 1997)).
- 60Id. at 735. The court did not explicitly discuss why this statement is not misleading, but did note that it would be “incumbent upon one preparing the disclosure form required by [the statute], and upon a physician answering a patient’s questions about it, to account for any applicable statutory definitions.” Id.
- 61Planned Parenthood of Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012).
- 62Id. at 894.
- 63“[T]he studies submitted by the State are sufficiently reliable to support the truth of the proposition that the relative risk of suicide and suicide ideation is higher for women who abort their pregnancies compared to women who give birth or have not become pregnant.” Id. at 898–99.
- 64Id. at 904.
- 65Id. at 905.
- 66667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012).
- 67Id. at 572.
- 68Id. at 573.
- 69Id.
- 70Id. at 578 n.6.
- 71Id. at 573. The provisions were also challenged as void for vagueness, outside of the scope of this Comment.
- 72Id. at 575.
- 73Id. at 575–76 (citing Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 128 (2007)) (internal quotations omitted).
- 74Id. at 576.
- 75“Fortifying this reading, the Eighth Circuit sitting en banc construed Casey and Gonzales in the same way.” Id. at 576–77 (citing Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 735 (8th Cir. 2008)).
- 76Id. at 577.
- 77Id.
- 78Id. at 578.
- 79Id.
- 80Id. at 579.
- 81“Appellees’ argument ignores that Casey and Gonzales emphasize that the gravity of the decision may be the subject of informed consent through factual, medical detail, that the condition of the fetus is relevant, and that discouraging abortion is an acceptable effect of mandated disclosures.” Id.
- 82Id. at 579–80.
- 83Id. at 580.
- 84Press Release, Center for Reproductive Rights, Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Denies Request to Rehear Texas Ultrasound Case (Feb. 10, 2012), https://www.reproductiverights.org/press-room/fifth-circuit-court-of-appeals-denies-request-to-rehear-texas-ultrasound-case[https://perma.cc/2X5L-7W5Y].
- 85920 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2019).
- 86Id. at 446.
- 87Id. at 424.
- 88Id. at 424–25.
- 89The Beshar court made NIFLA’s characterization of Casey central to its analysis and dismissed the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Stuart (see part B) because it pre-dated NIFLA and therefore gave “insufficient regard” to NIFLA’s characterization of Casey. Id. at 435.
- 90Id. at 429.
- 91Id. at 431 (internal citations omitted).
- 92Id. (“one can hardly dispute the relevance of sonogram images for twenty-first-century informed consent.”).
- 93Id. at 434.
- 94774 F. 3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014).
- 95Id. at 242–43.
- 96Id. at 243.
- 97Id.
- 98Id.
- 99Id. at 244.
- 100Id. at 256.
- 101Id. at 246. Note that the state freely admitted “the purpose and anticipated effect of the Display of Real-Time View Requirement is to convince women seeking abortions to change their minds or reassess their decisions.” Id.
- 102Id.
- 103Id. at 247.
- 104Id. The court supported this with reference to Casey (“[T]he physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated.”) Id.
- 105Id.
- 106Id. at 248.
- 107Id. at 249.
- 108Id.
- 109Walker-McGill v. Stuart, 135 S. Ct. 2838 (2015).
- 110Nadia N. Sawicki, Informed Consent as Compelled Professional Speech: Fictions, Facts, and Open Questions, 50 Wash. U. J. L. & Pol’y 11, 24–25 (2016).
- 111EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C. v. Beshar, 920 F. 3d 421, 448 (6th Cir. 2019) (Donald, J., dissenting).
- 112“Casey and Gonzales establish that, while the State cannot compel an individual simply to speak the State’s ideological message, it can use its regulatory authority to require a physician to provide truthful, non-misleading information relevant to a patient’s decision to have an abortion, even if that information might also encourage the patient to choose childbirth over abortion.” Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 734–35 (8th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added).
- 113Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
- 114Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018) (citing Denver Area Ed. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 804 (1996)).
- 115Id. (citing United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 722 (2012)).
- 116I recognize the irony of using NIFLA to support this claim, given its characterization of Casey—but disputing that characterization does not rob other portions of the opinion of their persuasiveness.
- 117The courts that have found otherwise have arguably fallen prey to a phenomenon recently articulated in a different context by Justice Gorsuch: “treating judicial opinions as if they were statutes, divorcing a passing comment from its context, ignoring all that came before and after, and treating an isolated phrase as if it were controlling.” Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2139 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
- 118430 U.S. 705 (1977).
- 119429 U.S. 589 (1977).
- 120Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716 (“We must also determine whether the State’s countervailing interest is sufficiently compelling to justify requiring appellees to display the state motto on their license plates.”).
- 121Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598.
- 122Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, U. Ill. L. Rev. 939, 946 (2007).
- 123Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714.
- 124Tex. Medical Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 578, 580 (5th Cir. 2012).
- 125319 U.S. 624 (1943).
- 126Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715 (emphasis added).
- 127Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603–04.
- 128Lakey, 667 F.3d at 575.
- 129Whalen, 429 U.S. at 604 (emphasis added).
- 130“We see no constitutional infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide the information mandated by the State here.” Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (emphasis added).
- 131Lakey, 667 F.3d at 577.
- 132“Laws that impinge upon speech receive different levels of judicial scrutiny depending on the type of regulation and the justifications and purposes underlying it.” Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 244 (4th Cir. 2014).
- 133Id.
- 134See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015).
- 135Id.
- 136Robert McNamara & Paul Sherman, NIFLA v. Becerra: A Seismic Decision Protecting Occupational Speech, Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 197, 205 (2018).
- 137Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (U.S. 1988) (“Mandating speech that a speaker would not otherwise make necessarily alters the content of the speech.”).
- 138Police powers come from the Tenth Amendment. “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. Const. amend X. See also Sawicki, supra note 112 at 12 (“States are authorized to regulate medicine and other professions by virtue of their police power, the unenumerated power to protect the health, safety, and welfare of a state’s citizenry”). See also Dent v. W. Va., 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889).
- 139Thomas B. Nachbar, The Rationality of Rational Basis Review, 102 Va. L. Rev 1627, 1629 (2016).
- 140See generally W.M. Moldoff, Malpractice: Physician’s Duty to Inform Patient of Nature and Hazards of Disease or Treatment, 79 A.L.R. 2d 1028 (originally published 1961).
- 141“Without so much as a nod to the First Amendment, doctors are routinely held liable for malpractice for speaking or for failing to speak.” Post, supra note 125, at 950.
- 142Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
- 143This statement should not be taken as an endorsement of Casey’s holding. However, this Comment seeks to offer a standard that coheres with precedent and could be used with the current state of the law. Consistency with Casey is a necessary element of such a standard.
- 144Tex. Medical Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 575 (5th Cir. 2012). See also Carl H. Coleman, Regulating Physician Speech, N.C. L. Rev. 9 (forthcoming), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3234300(“The most that can be said about Casey is that the plurality was clearly not applying strict scrutiny in its First Amendment analysis, as it made no effort to determine whether the statute was ‘narrowly tailored’ or based on a ‘compelling state interest.’”).
- 145Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
- 146“On the one hand, [the Casey plurality’s] use of the word ‘reasonable’ might mean that such laws are permissible as long as they have a rational basis, given that the word ‘reasonable’ is often used as a synonym for ‘rational.’” Coleman, supra note 144, at 9.
- 147Id.
- 148For the purposes of this Comment I have set aside the concept of professional speech as a framework through which to consider abortion informed consent requirements. Professional speech has received varied and inconsistent treatment in the circuit courts. See Erika Schutzman, We Need Professional Help: Advocating For a Consistent Standard of Review When Regulations of Professional Speech Implicate the First Amendment, 56 B.C. L. Rev. 2019, 2023 (“Courts have provided little clarity as to the extent to which the First Amendment rights of professionals should be protected or balanced against the interests of the state several circuits have tackled the issue of professional speech, with varying results.”). Moreover, the Court’s opinion in NIFLA casts doubt on the validity of the professional speech doctrine. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 (2018) (“this Court has not recognized ‘professional speech’ as a separate category of speech.”).
- 149However, a reasonableness assessment also seems baked into the Casey Court’s discussion of the informed consent measures. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (“In short, requiring that the woman be informed of the availability of information relating to fetal development and the assistance available should she decide to carry the pregnancy to full term is a reasonable measure to ensure an informed choice”) (emphasis added); id. at 885 (“Thus, we uphold the provision [requiring a physician as opposed to a qualified assistant to provide information regarding informed consent] as a reasonable means to ensure that the woman’s consent is informed”) (emphasis added). Therefore, truthful, nonmisleading, and reasonable (as opposed to or in addition to relevant) could be a more appropriate test to draw from Casey. Given that none of the circuits discussed in this Comment offered it as a standard, I am not giving this test full analysis. Moreover, I am not proffering it as an alternative standard because the flexibility of a reasonableness assessment would not adequately safeguard against free speech abuses in the abortion context.
- 150Id. at 852 (“Abortion is a unique act the liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the human condition and so unique to the law.”). See also Linda Greenhouse, Why Courts Shouldn’t Ignore the Facts About Abortion Rights, N.Y. Times (Feb. 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/28/opinion/sunday/why-courts-shouldnt-ignore-the-facts-about-abortion-rights.html(“‘abortion exceptionalism’” is the argument “that abortion has a moral valence that makes it different from the many other medical procedures that states subject to less rigorous oversight. The Supreme Court’s current abortion jurisprudence recognizes this”).
- 151471 U.S. 626 (1985).
- 152Id. at 652.
- 153Id. at 651.
- 154Id.
- 155Id.
- 156Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018).
- 157Open questions include whether state interests aside from preventing consumer deception can sustain disclosure requirements, and what qualifies as “controversial.” For one circuit’s take, see Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that government interests in addition to correcting deception can be invoked to sustain disclosure mandates under Zauderer); Nat’l Ass’n of Manufacturers v. S.E.C., 800 F.3d 518, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding as controversial an S.E.C. requirement that a company that could not determine the origin of its minerals must list its products as not Democratic Republic of the Congo conflict free).
- 158See Coleman, supra note 149, at 22 (noting the similarity between the Rounds I court’s focus on whether the compelled disclosures were “truthful and not misleading” and the Zauderer standard). Interestingly, this was the approach adopted by the Third Circuit in Casey. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 705–06 (3d Cir. 1991) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
- 159NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372.
- 160See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).
- 161See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
- 162Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 572 (2011).
- 163Id. at 572 (citing Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)) (internal citations omitted).
- 164Evergreen Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233, 245 (2d Cir. 2014) (defining intermediate scrutiny as looking to whether a law is “no more extensive than necessary to serve a substantial governmental interest”).
- 165Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F. 3d 238, 250 (4th Cir. 2014).
- 166Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758–59 (1985).
- 167Id. at 759.
- 168Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2374 (2018) (citing Wollschaleger v. Governor of Florida, 848 F.3d 1293, 1328 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc)) (quotations omitted).
- 169Id. (citing Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011)).
- 170Id. (citing Wollschlaeger, 848 F.3d at 1328).
- 171Id. (citing Toward a First Amendment Theory of Doctor-Patient Discourse and the Right to Receive Unbiased Medical Advice, 74 B.U.L. Rev. 201, 201–202 (1994)).
- 172While this Comment has focused narrowly on abortion informed consent measures, this approach could supply a model for other regulations of physicians’ speech that touch issues of public concern, e.g. informed-consent to vaccinations.
- 173Under this reasoning, the reverse, a higher standard of review for assessing the infringement on the constitutional right to an abortion when physicians’ First Amendment rights are implicated, would also be true. This argument proves more difficult, given that in the case of abortion rights the Court has codified the standard of review into the constitutional test itself. One would have to argue that the threshold of what constitutes an undue burden rises when physicians’ First Amendment rights are involved. While not untenable, there is more room to make the argument for a hybrid rights approach on the flip side, where the standard of review has not been set.
- 174Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990) (defining hybrid rights as a Free Exercise Clause claims in conjunction with another constitutional violation).
- 175“[Casey] says nothing about the level of scrutiny courts should apply when reviewing a claim that a regulation compelling speech in the abortion context violates physicians’ First Amendment free speech rights. A heightened intermediate level of scrutiny is thus consistent with Supreme Court precedent and appropriately recognizes the intersection here.” Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F. 3d 238, 249 (4th Cir. 2014).
- 176As discussed in part B supra, while the word “reasonable” could be read to mean “rational,” the Court makes this statement only after having already concluded the existence of a substantial state interest and noting the tailoring of the regulation. Thus, the Court’s language in Casey does not preclude intermediate scrutiny.
- 177Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992).
- 178Admittedly, many physicians are female. However, this does not negate the harm in a shift from an entirely female category—women seeking abortions—to a category that, while inclusive of women, also includes men. Moreover, the necessity of obtaining an abortion for the women seeking them makes them a particularly vulnerable group of women, a fact that does not extend to female physicians.