The T+0 Imperative: Modernizing Markets by Shortening the Settlement Cycle

I.  Introduction

The arc of financial regulation generally proceeds in a predictable manner: first, a crisis-level event occurs that causes profound market instability or systemic risk.1 Shortly thereafter, the regulators arrive, scrambling to keep up with the changed circumstances engendered by the event and to plug the regulatory gaps it has exposed.2 The regulators then impose new regulatory burdens on system participants and alter definitions within existing regulations, all in the hope of preventing a repeat event.3 In January 2021, one such crisis-level event occurred: the GameStop short squeeze.4

The GameStop story is now a familiar one that has been recounted throughout popular media, including in the 2023 movie “Dumb Money.”5 In the weeks leading up to January 28, 2021, day traders, largely coordinated on the online social media forum Reddit, initiated a short squeeze on GameStop stock (GME).6 A short squeeze occurs when the price of a security increases, with no apparent link to the security’s fundamentals, sufficiently enough that short sellers are forced to purchase the stock.7 A short seller is an investor who expects the price of a stock to fall, and borrows money to buy the stock at its current price before the fall. As the price of the stock rises, short sellers face higher losses and may purchase the stock to cover their short positions and hedge these losses, further increasing the price and demand for the stock. Keith Gill, known online by his username “Roaring Kitty,” led the coordinated short squeeze of GameStop via his Reddit postings, where he convinced the r/WallStreetBets online community that there were unrealized gains in GME due to the short positions taken by large hedge funds.8 And he was right: between January 4 and 28, 2021, the coordinated short squeeze caused GME’s price to increase 2,701.62%, from $4.31 per share to $120.75 per share.9 But then things started going wrong.

On the day that GME hit its peak, the online financial services company Robinhood—which largely attracts the same retail traders who had initiated the short squeeze—suspended its customers’ ability to buy GME.10 Robinhood imposed a “position closing only” restriction on GME and seven other highly volatile stocks, which prevented customers from buying GME.11 The public response was swift and outraged: how could Robinhood stop its customers from trading right when their windfall was about to hit?12

The answer to this question has everything to do with the clunky mechanics of executing and settling trades. Trades do not settle automatically; they are routed through and recorded by the clearinghouse, resulting in a gap between trade execution and settlement.13 In January 2021, that gap was two days throughout the U.S. financial industry, also known as “T+2” settlement.14 During their unsettled period, trades operate on credit risk.

To solve the problem of credit risk, enter the National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC), and its parent, the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC), which together oversee trades and settlement within the U.S. and globally.15 All NSCC member broker-dealers, including Robinhood Securities,16 contribute margin into the NSCC’s “Clearing Fund,” which protects the NSCC from potential losses if a member defaults.17 Various inputs determine a particular clearinghouse’s depository margin requirements for the NSCC, including stock volatility.18 When certain clearinghouse members are experiencing significant volatility in trading, the NSCC requires higher deposit amounts from its member broker-dealers to mitigate that increased risk.19

And that is exactly what happened during the GameStop short squeeze: in the volatility of trading generated by the short squeeze, the NSCC imposed significantly higher clearing costs on Robinhood, which it was unable to meet.20 In other words, the problem was directly exacerbated by the two-day clearance and settlement cycle.21

During the GME short squeeze, the NSCC required Robinhood to post approximately $3 billion in addition to the approximately $696 million in collateral already on deposit, or it would risk losing the ability to clear trades for its customers at all.22 In a public statement on the event, Robinhood wrote,

We [stopped the trading] because the required amount we had to deposit with the clearinghouse was so large—with individual volatile securities accounting for hundreds of millions of dollars in deposit requirements—that we had to take steps to limit buying in those volatile securities to ensure we could comfortably meet our requirements.23

Although trading returned to normal the next day, investors and politicians alike were outraged and pronounced the series of events a regulatory failure, calling for regulation of everything from retail investors, the hedge funds that had shorted the stock, and the broker-dealers like Robinhood.24

The GME saga prompted a series of lawsuits and a regulatory response by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Affected customers filed lawsuits against various involved parties, including Robinhood, Apex Clearing Corporation25 (Apex), Keith Gill’s employer, Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company (MassMutual) and its subsidiary MML Investors Services, LLC (MML), and Gill himself.26 None of these suits succeeded, and some were even voluntarily withdrawn.27 The only “successful” litigation was brought by Massachusetts securities regulators against MassMutual for failing to adequately supervise Gill—which resulted in a settlement between the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and MassMutual for $4.75 million.28

At the same time, the SEC issued several rules aiming to “provide greater transparency to investors and regulators by increasing the public availability of short sale-related data.”29 It did this through two primary moves: first, by updating Regulation SHO, which is the primary rule regulating short sellers; and second, by shifting the U.S. financial system from “T+2” to “T+1,” thus reducing the time it takes for trades to settle.30 This second change is the focus of this Comment.

In a press release, the SEC wrote that shifting to T+1 would “reduce the credit, market, and liquidity risks in securities transactions faced by market participants and U.S. investors.”31 And after undergoing the notice and comment process, the rule, “Shortening the Securities Transaction Settlement Cycle,” became effective on May 5, 2023.32 The final rule amended Rule 15c6-1(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and changed the time of delivery of securities to no “later than the first business day after the date of the contract.”33 The industry was given a little over a year to prepare for implementation, and on May 28, 2024, the settlement cycle officially moved to T+1.34

Despite these regulatory changes, U.S. financial markets continue to experience volatility related to meme stocks.35 For example, following Newsmax’s March 31, 2025 Initial Public Offering (IPO), the Newsmax stock experienced a rapid price increase linked to its meme stock status, only for its price to fall a day later.36 And GME itself still often creates headlines. In July 2024, Gill made his first online post in three years using his Roaring Kitty account on the social media platform X, which took the form of a meme depicting a gamer in a suit, leaning forward in his chair.37 The post resulted in a familiar cycle. First came a “frenzy” of buying GME, accompanied by an increase in GME’s price. Then Gill revealed that he had dumped his GME stock, which was followed quickly by a sharp price drop, causing amateur retail investors to lose out on money. Ultimately, these investors filed another suit against Gill.38

The GME short squeeze is evidence that parties can and will take advantage of the rise of retail investing in ways that current securities regulations are unprepared to handle. This Comment offers a solution to these shortcomings by suggesting that regulators should go even further and move from “T+1” to “T+0,” or same-day settlement. First, it chronicles efforts to impose legal liability on actors who manipulate stocks via online forums (so-called meme stock-related events) and demonstrates why present avenues for legal recourse are inadequate. It will then demonstrate how the historical acceleration of the settlement cycle has made the U.S. financial markets more efficient, identifying a regulatory solution to the existing gap that the new trading landscape has created. It argues that in the absence of effective tools for legal accountability for nefarious online short-selling activity, the continued acceleration of the settlement cycle is the best pathway to reduce short-seller-induced destabilizing market activity. Finally, the Comment argues that same-day netted settlement, or T+0, should be the industry’s ultimate landing point, which necessarily requires an overhaul of the industry’s existing technological infrastructure.

II.  Background on the Existing Legal and Regulatory Landscape

A.  Existing Avenues for Market Manipulation Claims and the Current Regulatory Landscape

The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”) was created to govern securities transactions on the secondary market.39 Its goal was to ensure greater financial transparency, accuracy, and less fraud and manipulation within U.S. financial markets and was adopted following the financial crash of 1929 and the depression of the 1930s.40 Various provisions within the 1934 Act specifically address fraud and manipulation in the securities market. However, these provisions do not adequately regulate short selling and squeezing, nor do they provide significant paths of recourse for retail investors impacted by high-volatility events, because they create a high threshold to bring a claim, making it difficult for investors impacted by meme stock-related events to recover.

1.  Anti-fraud provisions in securities laws

a.  Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act

Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and SEC Rule 10b-5 thereunder are the main anti-fraud provisions in the securities laws.41 Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act prohibits the use of deceptive or manipulative devices in connection with the sale or exchange of securities.42 Rule 10b-5, promulgated under Section 10(b), makes it illegal to “employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,” to “make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact,” and to “engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person” in connection with the sale of a security.43 Rule 10b-5 operates as a catchall for many forms of securities fraud and does not require a specific intent showing. The SEC has brought most of its market manipulation suits under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.44

The Supreme Court has held that the word “manipulative” in Section 10(b)’s title “connotes intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities.”45 A wide range of activities may be designated manipulative under Section 10(b), including material misrepresentations, fictitious trades, and price manipulation.46 Essentially, the rule prohibits any act or omission that results in fraud or deceit in connection with the purchase or sale of any security, regardless of the entity’s intention.47 In Stoneridge Investment Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta,48 the Supreme Court held that for a defendant to be held liable as a primary violator of Section 10(b), the defendant must have made misrepresentations that were relied on by the plaintiff.49 It is not enough for a plaintiff to merely allege acts facilitating a fraud.50

A plaintiff must prove seven elements in order to prevail under a Rule 10b-5 fraud claim: (1) a misstatement or omission of fact; (2) materiality; (3) that the claim was in connection with the purchase or sale of a security; (4) a culpable mental state (defined as “a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud,”51 which includes recklessness52 ); (5) reliance; (6) loss causation; and (7) damages.53 These elements mean that it is difficult to bring claims of fraud in the online meme stock context since it is often onerous for online retail investors to demonstrate loss causation and scienter.

b.  Section 9(a) of the 1934 Act

Section 9(a) of the 1934 Act sets the rules for charging individuals and entities with market manipulation of a specific security, and targets actions that “creat[e] a false or misleading appearance of active trading.”54 Broadly speaking, § 9(a) makes it unlawful to:

1. Create “a false or misleading appearance of active trading in any security other than a government security, or a false or misleading appearance with respect to the market for any such security”;
2. Engage in a series of transactions that creates “actual or apparent active trading” or raises or depresses prices “or the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale” of a security by others; or
3. Knowingly spread false information about a security in order to raise or depress its price and thereby induce the purchase or sale of a security by another.55

Section 9(a) targets “wash sales,” and matched orders—two types of “fictitious trades” that “create the false appearance of market activity” and thereby serve to artificially increase the supply and demand for a given security.56 A wash sale occurs when an entity simultaneously buys and purchases the same amount of stock so that there appears to be movement in the security without the entity incurring any risk.57 Matched orders function in the same manner, but are prearranged and performed with a secondary party.58

The Second Circuit has explained that the purpose of § 9(a) is to prevent manipulation of prices and to allow for the natural functioning of markets.59 Section 9(a) claims are narrower than § 10(b) claims because they target the manipulation of a specific security, unlike § 10(b)’s broader general market manipulation scope.60 Section 9(a) also requires a showing of specific intent, a higher standard than Rule 10b-5’s scienter requirement which can be satisfied by recklessness.61 Sections 10(b) and 9(a) work together to discourage fraud and misinformation in the markets, ultimately in the pursuit of efficient markets. All market participants are subject to both provisions, but the requirements to bring a claim under each differ.

c.  Rule 17(a) of the 1933 Act

In addition to the anti-fraud provisions under the 1934 Act discussed above, § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 also proscribes illegal market manipulation in the context of a securities offering.62 The structure of § 17(a) is similar to the structure of Rule 10b-5 and prohibits fraud and misrepresentations in the offer or sale of securities, with subsections (a)(1) covering schemes, (a)(2) covering misrepresentations and omissions, and (a)(3) covering practices that operate as fraud or deceit.63 Section 17(a) is broader than Rule 10b-5 and can fold in more conduct, because claims under § 17(a) can be based on negligence, while Rule 10b-5 claims require a showing of recklessness at a minimum.64

2.  Criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1348

A separate avenue for securities fraud claims exists under 18 U.S.C. § 1348, which allows for the criminal prosecution of those who engage in securities fraud, imposing penalties of up to 25 years in imprisonment.65  18 U.S.C. § 1348 prohibits executing or attempting to execute a “scheme or artifice . . . to defraud any person in connection with any” registered security or “to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, any money or property in connection with the purchase or sale of any” registered security.66 Courts have interpreted this statute to require a specific intent to defraud traditional property interests and to prohibit the execution of a “scheme to defraud.”67 Insider trading is also often prosecuted under 18 U.S.C § 1348.68

3.  Short selling and Regulation SHO

Short selling is regulated under Regulation SHO, a set of rules the SEC implemented in 2005 specifically targeting short-selling practices.69 As defined by the SEC, short selling is “any sale of a security which the seller does not own or any sale that is consummated by the delivery of a security borrowed by, or for the account of, the seller.”70  Put more simply, short selling is the sale of a security or financial instrument that the seller has borrowed in the hopes that the stock’s price will decline, and that the seller will be able to buy back the stock at its lower price for a profit.71 A short squeeze, like GME’s, depends on investors who engage in short selling and are forced to purchase the stock as it rises to hedge their loss.72

Regulation SHO was adopted in response to abuses related to short selling, particularly abuses related to “naked” short selling.73 Naked short selling is the practice of shorting an asset without first borrowing the asset from someone else.74 Regulation SHO defines ownership of securities, specifies aggregation of long and short positions, and requires broker-dealers to mark sales in all equity securities “long,” “short,” or “short exempt.”75 Regulation SHO also requires short sellers in all equity securities to locate securities to borrow before selling (the prohibition on “naked” short selling), and imposes delivery requirements on broker-dealers for certain securities with a history of failures to deliver.76  After the 2021 events, the SEC adopted a new short sale disclosure rule, Rule 13(f)(2), that “require[s] certain institutional investment managers to report short sale related information to the Commission on a monthly basis.”77 The SEC also adopted other regulations that increase transparency into short-selling data.78

Short selling is not all bad. In fact, there are cases in which short selling serves a legitimate market purpose, such as “providing market liquidity,” and “enhanc[ing] pricing efficiency by helping to move the prices of overvalued securities toward their intrinsic values.”79 For example, the Second Circuit delineated the distinction between short selling, which is legal, and market manipulation, which is not, in ATSI Communications, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd.80 There, the Second Circuit wrote that “short selling—even in high volumes—is not, by itself, manipulative. . . . To be actionable as a manipulative act, short selling must be willfully combined with something more to create a false impression of how market participants value a security.”81 The Second Circuit did not provide a precise definition of exactly what the “something more” must be to qualify as manipulation. But, case law in the Second Circuit suggests that to be manipulative, short selling must be combined with some sort of misinformation that is “activity that is outside the ‘natural interplay of supply and demand,’” which would trigger a violation under Section 10(b) or 9(a).82

B.  Pump-and-Dump Schemes

The most common kind of fraud in the meme stock context is pump-and-dump schemes. A pump-and-dump scheme is a type of market manipulation scheme that “attempts to boost the price of a stock or security through fake recommendations.”83 This type of price increase is distinguishable from a stock that rises in value because of genuine hype around its fundamentals or a market event that increases its outlook. The perpetrators of a pump-and-dump scheme work to artificially raise the price of a stock and then sell their shares when the price of the stock is at its peak before the price falls back down.84 Pump-and-dump schemes are characterized by three basic steps:

(1) large purchases of a particular stock (usually ones that are thinly traded and/or have low market capitalization); (2) “pumping up” of the asset’s price by the promoter through a fraudulent sales campaign based on misinformation; and (3) dumping of the asset back into the market by the promoter at an inflated price.85

18 U.S.C. § 1348 is frequently used to target pump-and-dump schemes, especially as the number of pump-and-dumps has risen in conjunction with the internet and the proliferation of cryptocurrency.86  While 18 U.S.C. § 1348 can capture the most nefarious online pump-and-dumps, its specific intent requirements are difficult to prove in an online meme stock context, especially through online postings, because such posts often include internet slang, emojis, and memes that are difficult to assign meaning and intent. Consequently, the 2021 GME events were not considered pump-and-dumps, even though investors attempted to bring suit alleging that they were.87

C.  The Case Law: Applications of Anti-Fraud Provisions to Meme Stock Cases

The existing case law demonstrates that it is difficult to impose legal liability upon online actors related to meme stock type events because it is hard to demonstrate loss causation for online actors, as well as to meet the materiality standards required by anti-fraud securities laws. These cases also raise a normative question of whether legal liability should even apply to situations in which all actors are free market participants acting on their own volition. This status quo often results in courts being reluctant to award damages to these unsympathetic plaintiffs.

1.  No path to criminal liability: United States v. Constantinescu

In March of 2024, the United States brought a criminal securities fraud case under 18 U.S.C. § 1348 against several defendants who were allegedly involved in pump-and-dump schemes of nineteen different stocks.88 The defendants allegedly posted misleading information on Twitter and Discord to “maximize their profits” at the expense of their online followers, while making statements to each other like “we’re robbing . . . idiots of their money.”89 The Southern District of Texas examined the case in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ciminelli v. United States,90 which limited the scope of the fraud statute to schemes which “harm a victim’s traditional property rights,”91 and the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Greenlaw,92 which held that an intent to defraud requires both “an intent to (1) deceive and (2) cause some harm to result from the deceit.”93

The Constantinescu court found that the defendants’ conduct constituted a scheme to deprive individuals of information necessary to make economic decisions rather than to deprive them of traditional property rights.94 Thus, the court held that the “alleged conduct cannot amount to a ‘scheme to defraud’ as a matter of law” under Ciminelli, and the indictment was dismissed.95 Notably, the defendants were “not alleged to have been insiders of the companies or otherwise to have been in control of the stocks at issue in any formal way.”96 The downside for prosecutors is that under this standard, they must make a showing that a defendant’s online representations both deprived someone of a traditional property right and that there was an intent to deceive and cause harm. This is a very high bar in the meme stock context, not easily met by prosecutors using posts to make their case. However, the Government may still be able to charge so-called company insiders who manipulate stock prices online.

As the Southern District of Texas noted, the difficulty for criminal prosecution of pump-and-dumps is compounded by the Supreme Court decisions in Shaw v. United States97 and Kelly v. United States,98 “in which the Supreme Court . . . urged courts to prevent fraud convictions based on deceit alone[.]”99 In Kelly, the Supreme Court held that the Government needs to show not only that the defendant “engaged in deception,” but that “an object of their fraud was property.”100 Crucially, because the “object” of the scheme was not other investors’ money in Constantinescu, and the “losses to victims happened incidentally,” the court could not identify harm to a victim’s property.101 Indeed, as the court wrote, “[t]he investors’ trading losses are one step too far removed from the Defendants’ alleged fraudulent misrepresentation.” Should this theory be extended, it would effectively curtail criminal liability in the meme stock context.102

2.  Class actions fail: Bed Bath & Beyond

In 2023, a class action lawsuit was filed against the retailer Bed Bath & Beyond and against major shareholder Ryan Cohen, following an alleged pump-and-dump scheme initiated by Cohen.103 The counts against Cohen alleged that he had violated Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.104 The plaintiffs claimed that Cohen published a tweet which “gave the false impression that [he] thought the stock would rise” and featured a moon emoji.105 Cohen also filed a Schedule 13D form,106 which gave the false impression that he had no “solid plans to sell” and a Form 144, which suggested that any plans to sell were only “potential.”107 The District Court of the District of Columbia determined that this was enough to survive a motion to dismiss the Rule 10b-5 claims.108 However, the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under Section 9(a)(2) of the 1934 Act,109 as they could not point to any series of transactions effected by Cohen.110 Extracting from this case, if a plaintiff is able to make a Section 9(a)(2) showing through a demonstration of the posting of transactions on an online forum, they might be able to obtain recovery. But such blatant postings occur infrequently, making this bar difficult to meet and limiting plaintiffs’ ability to recover in the civil context.

More positively for plaintiffs, the D.C. Circuit recognized for the first time in the Bed Bath & Beyond appeal that an emoji could constitute securities fraud. “Emojis may be actionable if they communicate an idea that would otherwise be actionable. A fraudster may not escape liability simply because he used an emoji. Just like with words, liability will turn on the emoji’s particular meaning in context.”111 This emoji-inclusive definition of online fraudulent representations builds on a history of recognizing symbols as speech and could provide a basis for future claims against individuals involved with pumping stocks in the online space, where emoji use is heavy and often acts as code to buy and sell stocks.112

The Southern District of New York also endorsed the idea that emojis can constitute fraudulent representations in Friel v. Dapper Labs, Inc.,113 emphasizing the correlation between certain emojis including rocket ships, money bags, and stock chats and the promise of profits: “although the literal word ‘profit’ is not included in any of the Tweets, the ‘rocket ship’ emoji, ‘stock chart’ emoji, and ‘money bags’ emoji objectively mean one thing: a financial return on investment.”114 Emoji use is typical of meme stock pump-and-dumps; for example, Gill used a number of memes and emojis in his online representations related to the GME events both in 2021 and in 2024.115 As courts continue to adopt broader definitions of what can qualify as a misrepresentation, plaintiffs may find more success in § 10(b) claims, especially given the prevalence of emoji use on online forums like Reddit.

In June 2024, another lawsuit was filed related to the Bed Bath & Beyond short squeeze.116 Two Bed Bath & Beyond shareholders attempted to sue Cohen under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act117 which “requires corporate insiders, including owners of more than ten percent of a company’s stock [and directors], to disgorge what are colloquially known as short-swing profits, i.e., any profits made from buying and selling or selling and buying within a six-month period a security based on that company’s stock.”118 The lawsuit proved unsuccessful, because the court found the plaintiffs’ claims moot as Bed Bath & Beyond went bankrupt and its bankruptcy plan canceled the plaintiffs’ stock in the company.119

All told, these cases demonstrate that it is very difficult to obtain recovery for plaintiffs suing under the traditional anti-fraud securities provisions in a meme stock context. With legal liability substantially foreclosed against those who perpetuate pump-and-dump schemes in both the criminal and civil contexts, the threat of legal consequences becomes less forceful to bad actors. Because of this, the securities industry must adapt and find other, more effective methods of reducing market volatility related to meme stocks.

D.  GME-Related Litigation

Unsurprisingly, existing securities laws were inadequate in dealing with the GME events. Several lawsuits were brought in response to the GME events, based on theories of fraudulent representation and pump-and-dump schemes. The series of suits can be divided into two time periods: those related to the 2021 GME events, and those related to the brief resurgence of the GME stock in mid-2024 following Keith Gill’s postings on the social media platform X after three years of inactivity.

1.  Suits related to 2021 events

Following the January 2021 events, customers affected by Robinhood’s pause in trading pursued a number of different legal avenues in attempts to capture their so-called lost funds. Shareholders filed a class action against Robinhood, alleging that “they lost money because Robinhood stopped them from acquiring an asset that would have continued to increase in value.”120 This suit was unsuccessful. The Eleventh Circuit applied tort principles to find that Robinhood had no duty to prevent pure economic loss, noting that the contract that customers signed with Robinhood gave the company the ability to do exactly what it did—restrict trading in a volatile period.121 The Eleventh Circuit found neither fiduciary breach nor liability by Robinhood.122

In a related consolidated suit in October 2024, the Eleventh Circuit found that there was no legal recourse for investors against Apex Clearing Corporation—another clearing broker that contracts to clear the trade of partner dealer brokers with smaller operational capacities.123 Plaintiffs, investors on partner broker-dealers Webull and Ally Invest, alleged that Apex was liable for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and tortious interference under New York law for its trading suspension.124 The Eleventh Circuit emphasized again that the economic loss doctrine precluded plaintiffs from pursuing tort claims and that Apex did not owe a duty of care under principles of agency law, or under industry standards.125

With liability foreclosed against Robinhood and other similarly positioned clearinghouses, retail investors then attempted to pursue a class action lawsuit against Gill, alleging market manipulation under §§ 9(a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(4) and § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.126 In the same complaint, investors also brought action against MML and MassMutual (Gill’s employer) for failing to uphold their obligations to supervise Gill’s activities concerning securities and the securities markets.127 The complaint was voluntarily withdrawn shortly thereafter for unknown reasons, so it is still not clear whether a court would have found that Gill engaged in market manipulation.

The only successful suit seeking redress for the GameStop scandal was one brought by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, likely because the Government targeted an established financial institution rather than an individual. In September 2021, Massachusetts securities regulators announced two settlements with MassMutual.128 MassMutual agreed to $4 million to resolve charges that it failed to monitor its agents (including Gill) and settled for $750,000 for failing to register more than 400 employees transacting in securities over a roughly five-year period.129 This resolution was unsatisfying for those who had hoped to see broader liability imposed on the actors who had been involved with the GameStop events. Gill himself is no worse for the wear; in fact, he has only gotten wealthier since 2021—his net worth is now about $268 million.130

2.  Suits related to 2024 events

The 2024 GME events can more readily be characterized as a pump-and-dump scheme than the 2021 events, although there is no legal ruling holding them as such. Shortly after Gill posted on X for the first time in three years, the price of GME rose again, and then Gill revealed that he was holding GME shares on Reddit.131 As the lawsuit against Gill recounts, on June 2, 2024, Gill “posted a screenshot of his GameStop portfolio on Reddit . . . revealing that he owned 5 million shares of GameStop stock and 120,000 GameStop call options with a strike price of $20, which were set to expire on June 21, 2024.”132 By June 13, 2024, Gill had sold off most of his shares for a profit, “belatedly revealing as much to investors on June 13, 2024, during after-market hours.”133

Investors again sued Gill after the series of events for artificially inflating GME’s price. The lawsuit included claims under Rule 10b-5 and § 9(a).134 The investors claimed that Gill had manipulated the market by accumulating a large holding of GME, first encouraging others to also purchase the position via misleading posts that implied the stock was going to increase in value, and then rapidly dumping his stock.135 The results were massive profits for Gill, but serious losses suffered by other investors.136 For unspecified reasons, the lawsuit was dropped in July 2024.137

If the lawsuit was continued, it seems that a court could find a basis for liability against Gill and recovery for the investors. First, this series of events tangibly resembles a pump-and-dump. Second, Gill’s action of posting records of his transactions online may contain the element of demonstrative postings missing from the Bed Bath and Beyond suit, where plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate under 9(a) that Cohen had effected a series of transactions. Third, following the Friel Dapper decision to expand the definition of misrepresentations to include emojis, Gill’s meme on X might be classed as a misrepresentation relied on by investors, allowing for liability under Rule 10b-5.

III.  The Regulatory Alternative: the SEC Should Continue to Shorten the Settlement Cycle

Even if Gill could face liability for his conduct in 2024, the lack of legal accountability for the 2021 events demonstrates that current securities laws are inadequate to contend with evolving market conditions in an online, meme-stock-based environment. While it is reasonable to view retail investors with skepticism, the SEC’s mission is to keep markets safe, efficient, and orderly, and to protect investors.138 Many retail investors invest their life savings in hopes of getting rich, based on information that they have seen on an online forum. It is therefore the SEC’s duty to make sure that they are operating in a marketplace that is maximally transparent and efficient. To that end, the SEC must keep abreast of changing market conditions and put guardrails in place to keep these sorts of volatile events from spilling over into the rest of the economy and causing systemic risk that could affect all investors.

Although legal recourse has proved difficult in the meme stock context, the SEC’s hands are not tied. This Comment demonstrates that there exists a regulatory alternative to lawsuit-based recovery for affected investors. It argues that decreasing the settlement cycle is the best way to control market volatility, and that the industry’s ultimate landing point should be T+0, or same-day settlement. This half of the Comment will examine the history of settlement cycles in the U.S., the successful shift from T+2 to T+1, and the possibility of shortening the settlement cycle even further. It ultimately makes the case that the securities industry should shift to T+0 netted same-day settlement, which will necessarily require a process of infrastructure modernization across the industry.

A.  History of U.S. Settlement Cycles

While the shift from T+2 to T+1 settlement marks the most recent change to the settlement cycle, it is far from its first; settlement cycles have historically fluctuated as technology, regulations, and the role of clearing houses have developed in the U.S. financial markets.139 Settlement cycles initially lengthened in response to the rising number of transactions in the marketplace, the entrance of new investors, and “the increasing complexity of the processing infrastructure necessary to facilitate the settlement of those transactions.”140 Subsequently, in the later part of the twentieth century, increased computing power enabled a shift back to shorter settlement cycles.

From 1792 to 1933, before the advent of clearinghouses, settlement cycles were set at T+1, with trades settling at 2:15 pm the next day and conveyed by messenger boys running from office to office to deliver direct firm-to-firm trades by paper.141 After World War I, trading volume began to increase dramatically as markets expanded. As a result, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), like other exchanges, had trouble keeping up; indeed, the 1929 crash was partially attributed to the increased volume of trades.142 By 1933, 558.2 million shares per year were trading on the NYSE, and accordingly, the industry was forced to move to a T+2 settlement cycle.143 Thus began a period of settlement cycle expansions.

In 1946, the NYSE moved to T+3 to keep up with the increased volume of trades following World War II.144 In 1952, the timeframe shifted again, this time to T+4.145 In 1968, after the 1967 “back-office crisis” that forced the exchange to close trading an hour and a half early for nine straight days, the settlement cycles expanded to T+5.146

It was clear that something had to fundamentally change. In 1966, the NYSE began operating the Central Certificate Service (CSS), which reduced the need for messenger boys.147 Instead of moving the physical certificates between firms or through the clearinghouse intermediary, the CSS simply recorded trades in a ledger to keep track of who owned what at any given time.148 This process is now performed digitally, but its mechanics remain largely the same today.

The next step for the industry was to form a “super CCS,” through which regional depositories were linked together and overseen by a single entity: the Depository Trust Company (DTC), which was established in 1973.149 In 1976, the DTC’s counterpart, the National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC), was established. As described in the Introduction to this Comment, the NSCC oversees depository requirements—holding deposits in case a clearinghouse defaults to reduce overall systemic risk.150 In 1999, the DTTC was established as a holding company to combine the DTC and the NSCC under one entity and to consolidate clearing and settlement regulation.151 This is the entity most clearinghouses report to today.

With better infrastructure in place, the trend of settlement cycle expansion finally began to reverse. In 1993, the settlement date moved from T+5 to T+3.152 Almost immediately after this shift, the SEC first contemplated moving to T+2, but intervening events like 9/11 proved more pressing and the SEC turned its focus to building operational market resilience.153 In 2012, the DTCC commissioned a study from the Boston Consulting Group (BCG), which found that “moving to a T+2 settlement cycle would . . . deliver[] significant benefits with respect to reducing risks and costs.”154 And, in 2017, the SEC amended Rule 15c6-1 to shorten the settlement cycle from T+3 to T+2.155 In the T+2 Adopting Release, the Commission explained that a T+1 standard settlement cycle would produce greater reductions in market, credit, and liquidity risk for market participants, but that shortening beyond T+2 would require significantly larger investments in new systems and processes.156 Thus, in January 2021, the settlement cycle was set at a two-day interval.

B.  T+2’s Contribution to the GME Events of 2021

Given this historical background and the long-term trend of market catastrophes resulting in part from the inefficient settlement cycles, it should come as no surprise that two major contributing players in the GME saga were the DTCC and the NSCC.157 In many ways, the GME event can be characterized as simply a repeat of historical financial events resulting in the expansion and contraction of the settlement cycle: a pattern of high volatility trading placed increased pressure on existing settlement infrastructure in a way that strains firms and other institutional players (like Robinhood, which was strained in meeting its increased depository requirements), ultimately leading to a systemic failure—such as a pause in trading. In this way, we can liken the 2021 GME events (although distinguishable because the trading moratorium was initiated by a private actor, Robinhood, instead of a system administrator/clearinghouse like the NYSE) to the back-office crisis that caused the NYSE to shorten trading hours for nine days in 1967.

As a brief refresher, the way that trades work on a brokerage platform like Robinhood is that when someone buys a stock, Robinhood sends the order to a market maker to execute the trade.158 Those market makers then send a record of the trade to Robinhood Securities, which works with the NSCC to record the trade before it settles in the account of the purchaser.159 As discussed above, in January 2021, this process took two days. This gap proved problematic for Robinhood because it meant that many trades were unsettled during the period when GME’s stock was wildly fluctuating, and that Robinhood did not have access to the cash needed to meet the DTCC’s deposit requirements, which were much higher than normal due to the high volatility of trading.160

The GME saga supercharged an existing public debate over the length of the settlement cycle, underscoring the significance of the settlement cycle for firms’ risk exposure in a new meme stock trading landscape. More time between trade and settlement means more credit risk for parties on both ends of the transaction. Quickly, pressure began to build for a shift to T+1. Robinhood CEO Vlad Tenev explicitly blamed T+2 settlement for the trading suspension: “[t]he existing two-day period to settle trades exposes investors and the industry to unnecessary risk and is ripe for change. . . . There is no reason why the greatest financial system the world has ever seen cannot settle trades in real time.”161 The SEC also conducted an independent analysis of the January 2021 events and concluded that “[o]ne method to mitigate the systemic risk posed by such entities to the clearinghouse and other participants is to shorten the settlement cycle.”162 Where legal recourse proved ineffective, regulators understood that a fundamental shift in market structure could plug the regulatory gap that the GME events had exposed. This was even reflected in the comments received by the Commission, which advocated for the shift specifically because it would help retail investors.163

Support for T+1 was also shared by major institutional market participants because they would also benefit from the shift. In February 2021, the DTCC published a White Paper which found that accelerating settlement cycles to T+1 would bring “significant risk reduction and the related reduction to margin requirements that could result, especially during times of high volatility and stressed markets.”164 Most notably, the paper estimated that a T+1 settlement cycle could reduce the volatility component of NSCC margin requirements by up to 41%, thus directly addressing the systemic issue that caused Robinhood to pause its trading, because Robinhood would not have had to post as much capital.165 This is underscored by the fact that the report found that “[o]ver the last year, the Volatility component has accounted for approximately 60% of NSCC’s total margin.”166

The DTCC also concluded that achieving T+1 could be largely supported by using existing systems and available tools and procedures, meaning that the shift would not be an unreasonable burden on industry participants.167 In December 2021, the DTCC, Deloitte, and other industry participants published a report that likewise recommended the implementation of a T+1 standard settlement cycle in the U.S.168

1.  The shift to T+1 settlement and market modernization

The SEC’s proposed rule, “Shortening the Securities Transaction Settlement Cycle” was published on February 24, 2022.169 The proposing rule specifically highlighted the GME saga as motivating the industry shift: “[t]his view has been informed by two recent episodes of increased market volatility—in March 2020 following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, and in January 2021 following heightened interest in certain ‘meme’ stocks.”170 In the release, the SEC reaffirmed a simple principle: reducing time between the execution of a securities transaction and its settlement reduces risk for market participants.171 After the notice and comment process, which also included a request for comments on the viability of a shift to T+0, the rule became final on May 23, 2023.172 And on May 28, 2024, the new rule went into effect, officially shifting the U.S. markets to a T+1 settlement cycle.173 This shift was lauded by SEC Chairman Gary Gensler, who said, “[f]or everyday investors who sell their stock on a Monday, shortening the settlement cycle will allow them to get their money on Tuesday. . . . It will make our market plumbing more resilient, timely and orderly.”174

The shift to T+1 has been resoundingly successful. In September 2024, the Investment Company Institute, SIFMA, and the DTCC released the “T+1 After Action Report,” which concluded that the transition had occurred successfully.175 The report found that under T+1, the NSCC Clearing Fund had decreased from $12.8 billion to $9.8 billion over a comparable three-month period—a 23% reduction.176 This means that since the shift, firms have been required to post less collateral because there is less credit risk associated with outstanding transactions. This result is directly responsive to the vulnerability exposed by the GME events. The report also found that compliance by firms did not decrease, finding that “the industry continues to affirm nearly 95% of transactions by the 9:00 p.m. ET cutoff on trade date,” which is an even higher compliance rate than under the T+2 environment.177 Furthermore, Continuous Net Settlement fail rates actually decreased following the shift to T+1, settling around 2%.178 This data all proves that the shift occurred smoothly and that it has effectuated the promised changes, making markets less volatile while not impacting trading processes. Most recently, Barclays Research found that “[m]ore than a year after the U.S. adopted one-day settlement, a key measure of corporate bond trading costs is down 12%. Margin requirements — the cash or collateral firms must post to cover the risk of failed trades — have dropped 29%.”179 This again reaffirms the prudence and effectiveness of shorter settlement cycles.

In addition to the settlement cycle shift, the SEC adopted “new rules related to the processing of institutional trades by broker-dealers and certain clearing agencies,” and “amended certain recordkeeping requirements applicable to registered investment advisers.”180 This included an update to Regulation SHO, increasing transparency among short sellers who now must publish more data about their positions, which is helpful to institutional investors and retail investors alike.181 Similarly, the Commission also adopted Rule 17Ad-27 “to require clearing agencies that provide a central matching service (‘CMSPs’) to establish, implement, maintain, and enforce policies and procedures reasonably designed to facilitate straight-through processing.”182 The impact of this rule is also greater transparency among the clearing services, which helps investors by making sure that the platforms they utilize for trading function smoothly, and by allowing for a greater level of accountability for clearinghouses. Likewise, increased information allows markets to function more efficiently by allowing market participants to make better-informed choices.183 Both of these rules are strong steps towards taming the market instability typical of meme-stock-related activity, but they have not yet succeeded in completely eliminating market volatility related to meme stocks.

C.  The SEC Should Push for a Comprehensive Industry Infrastructure Overhaul that the Shift to T+0 Requires

To keep up with changing market conditions and to maintain the U.S. financial markets global dominance, the SEC should push for further settlement cycle time reduction, with the ultimate goal of landing on T+0, or same-day netted settlement. Although the SEC indicated in the T+1 Adopting Release that the industry is not ready for this shift, the SEC should require clearinghouses and other market participants to modernize their infrastructure to facilitate the eventual shift to T+0. A move to T+0 will both protect all investors and make markets more efficient and orderly.

Within the T+0 world, there is a distinction between Real-Time Gross Settlement, which settles transactions instantly, and netted T+0 settlement, which settles transactions at the end of the trading day. Most readers will be familiar with Real-Time Gross Settlement: if you have wired funds from one bank account to another with a service such as Zelle, you did so with Real-Time Gross Settlement, as the transfer occurs instantly. Real-Time Gross Settlement is used by numerous countries, including in the U.S. central bank context. In 1970, the U.S. Fedwire system was launched, which was an evolution of the telegraph-based system used to transfer funds electronically between U.S. Federal Reserve banks.184 In netted T+0 settlement, trades are netted and settled at the end of the same trading day, which allows for time for the clearing houses to process trades, but without the benefit of overnight processing.185 While Real-Time Gross Settlement may be possible in the future as technology continues to advance, netted T+0 settlement is the industry’s logical next step because it provides some room for error correction before trades settle, and its implementation would allow for the industry to adapt to a same-day settlement cadence before making the full jump to Real-Time Gross Settlement. The success of the shift to T+1 has demonstrated the prudence in proceeding cautiously while instituting industry-wide shifts. The SEC should therefore first move to netted T+0 settlement, allowing some time for kinks to be worked out before making an even more dramatic shift.

Yet, at present, industry participants and regulators are reluctant to make the shift to T+0 in any variety. The 2021 DTCC White Paper explained that it did not believe that T+0 was currently viable for the industry:

real-time gross settlement, while very appealing in theory and aspirational in nature, could increase risk for investors and make markets less efficient. While it may be possible at some future point to implement real-time gross settlement, market participants have indicated that they are unprepared for such a significant change as it would require a fundamental restructuring of operational processes throughout the industry.186

Likewise, the ISC and IWG both concluded that “T+0 is not achievable in the short term given the current state of the settlement ecosystem.”187 The SEC also noted in the T+1 Adopting Release that a move towards a shortening of the settlement cycle to T+0 would require “an overall modernization of current-day clearance and settlement infrastructure, changes to business models, revisions to industry-wide regulatory frameworks, and the potential implementation of real-time currency movements to facilitate such a change.”188 These are real concerns: it will be expensive to move to T+0 because almost every firm will necessarily have to modernize its technology. However, the advantages of such a shift for the marketplace outweigh these costs, as the success of T+1 has demonstrated.

Most of the objections to T+0 are based on the cost of infrastructure modernization, but some are more about the distribution of that cost on market participants. For instance, the IWG has expressed concerns that “adoption of such technologies would disproportionately fall on small and medium-sized firms that rely on manual processing or legacy systems and may lack the resources to modernize their infrastructure rapidly.”189 While of course the goal of a T+0 implementation is not to burden some market participants more heavily than others, market modernization does require all firms to update their infrastructure to reduce systemic risk and to protect investors by reducing overall credit risk related to unsettled trades. One way to mitigate the regulatory burden of technological modernization might take the form of tax credits to help reduce the burden of compliance on smaller market participants. However, as markets continue to advance, firms, both big and small, will have to adapt technologically to stay competitive. Changes to settlement algorithms and infrastructure modernization can reduce the cost of implementation. Relatedly, advancing the settlement cycle will create a burden that will be leveled on the whole marketplace, and therefore, should not put any one firm at a competitive disadvantage.

The T+1 Proposed Rule also described several “key areas” that would be significantly impacted by a move to T+0 settlement. These areas include: “re-engineering of securities processing; securities netting; funding requirements for securities transactions; securities lending practices; prime brokerage practices; global settlement; and primary offerings, derivatives markets and corporate actions.”190 These are largely the same areas of concerns that were explored before the shift from T+2 to T+1—all of which have proved largely unproblematic after the shift occurred. Many of these problems are deeply technical and will require innovative technological solutions. This Comment’s purpose is merely to acknowledge that practical barriers do exist to T+0 implementation and do carry a cost. However, when we examine the history of settlement cycle expansions and contractions, it is apparent that advancements in technology and infrastructure have always pushed the industry forward and have ultimately reduced transaction costs in the settlement context, making markets safer and more efficient. It is time for our markets to move into the future once again. By taking the step of netted same-day settlement before moving to Real-Time Gross Settlement, the industry will have time to identify and solve problems that may arise during implementation. Technical problems can and must be worked around as they develop, for the need for T+0 is too great to delay its implementation until an unknown technical target is reached.

D.  Technological Innovation Will Enable the Shift to T+0

While it may not be feasible to shift to T+0 immediately, a comprehensive technological infrastructure overhaul would enable this shift. This is a regulatory burden that should be applied to all market participants for the good of investors both big and small. The shift to T+1 was possible because of structural changes to industry infrastructure and technology, and this trend must continue as markets continue to modernize. For example, as algorithms continue to develop and become more sophisticated, they can be implemented to make the settlement cycle more efficient. Algorithmic development is far from novel within the industry: in January 2020, the DTC implemented Night Cycle Reengineering, whereby the DTC updated its settlement processes with a new optimization algorithm, which “operate[s] in an ‘offline’ batch designed to allow DTC to run multiple processing scenarios until the optimal processing scenario is identified.”191 This reengineering reduced inefficiencies in the settlement process by changing the order in which transactions are processed based on member available position, and maximized transaction throughput.192 Modernized market settlement cycles must continue to engage in this sort of data-driven optimization to avoid situations like the GME saga and facilitate the shift to even shorter settlement cycles. Regulators have emphasized that market modernization must include algorithmic advancements, the use of machine learning, cloud-based storage, and AI.193 At the same time, the use of new technology like AI opens up increased third-party risk management and concerns about back-office settlement concentration risk that regulators must continue to be mindful of.

Technological shifts and industry-wide adoption of rules that force firms to modernize their infrastructure, like the DTCC’s Night Cycle Reengineering, should be prioritized by the SEC. In the comments on the T+1 Proposing Release, one commenter noted that while the shift to T+0 would require significant technological upgrades and change, many lessons could be learned from a successful transition to T+1—which has now occurred.194 Additionally, there were a number of comments on the T+1 Proposal advocating that the SEC utilize the blockchain to facilitate the move to T+0.195 The SEC should take steps to explore what new technologies might best enable the shift to netted same-day settlement, including blockchain. Notably, T+0 is already utilized in the Money Market Fund context, primarily because such funds are highly liquid.196 Requiring higher liquidity from broker-dealers could also facilitate the shift to T+0 more broadly, although such a rule would likely be disfavored by broker-dealers since it would leave them with less capital to invest.

A shorter settlement cycle would provide greater stability for retail investors because it would reduce market volatility even more than the shift to T+1 did, reduce capital margin requirements from the DTCC, and lead to overall more smoothly functioning markets. Indeed, if clearing had been faster in January 2021, Robinhood would not have had to post as much capital to the NSCC’s clearing fund because there would be less risk of default. Consequently, Robinhood would not have had to pause trading, and more investors would have been able to capitalize on the stock’s movement. If T+0 is not implemented, high-volume events like the GME saga will continue, allowing savvy investors like Gill to take advantage of unsophisticated actors.

The United States has always been a leader in the global financial markets,197 and it should continue that legacy by moving towards a T+0 settlement system. Unfortunately, the United States is currently behind its global peers in settlement: China and the Hong Kong Stock connect schemes already operate on a T+0 basis.198  While Real-Time Gross Settlement may be infeasible in the near term for the U.S., netted same-day settlement is a realistic goal for regulators if they continue to push for market modernization generally.

E.  Other SEC Rules Address Some but Not All Market Instability

In addition to T+1, the SEC adopted additional rules following the GME events: Rule 13f-2, which requires institutional investment managers to file Form SHO within 14 days of the end of each month if they have a short position in a stock that exceeds $10 million or 2.5% of a company’s total outstanding shares;199 and Rule 10(c)(1), which requires any person that loans a security on behalf of itself or another person to report the material terms of those securities lending transactions and related information to a registered national securities association.200

The new rules include “changes that [] provide greater transparency to investors and regulators by increasing the public availability of short sale-related data.”201 The SEC also adopted a new provision of Rule 205, or Regulation SHO, which requires broker-dealers to mark purchase orders as “long,” “short,” or “short-exempt.”202 These two provisions further increase market transparency around short selling and make markets more accessible to investors. This benefits both retail and institutional investors that manage substantial amounts of money, not just for high net worth individuals but also for pension funds, which bear directly on every day investors. Greater transparency will provide hedge funds and other institutional investors notice that there may be some stocks that they should avoid to keep their portfolios risk-averse.

One potential next step for the SEC could be to promulgate rules specifically addressing meme stocks. There is currently “no single formal or technical definition of a meme stock,” although the SEC has characterized meme stocks by (1) “frequent mentions on social media, including Reddit” and (2) “large price moves or increased trading volume that significantly exceeded broader market movements” and “the amount of ‘short interest’ measured as the number of shares sold short as a portion of the total shares outstanding [exceeding the market average].”203 In order to effectively regulate in this area, the SEC must land on a single definition of a meme stock so that it can begin to adopt rules that specifically target online actions that are currently difficult to reach through the existing securities laws.

IV.  Conclusion

The GME events of 2021 and 2024 both demonstrated that our present set of legal tools is ill-suited to address the new dynamics of online-driven market volatility. Attempts to hold bad actors accountable through criminal prosecution and securities fraud litigation have largely failed, not because the conduct was benign, but because our legal doctrines were built for a different era of market behavior. And while the SEC has already taken strong regulatory measures in response to the 2021 GME events, it must continue to push for market modernization, primarily through the implementation of T+0, or netted same-day settlement. This shift will require meaningful industry-wide infrastructure modernization. But history shows that modernization has always followed crisis, and that the financial markets can evolve when circumstances force them to. The shift to T+1 has already shown that technological upgrades and regulatory coordination can yield a safer, more efficient marketplace. While real-time gross settlement may not yet be tenable, netted same-day settlement is a realistic goal for the financial industry and its logical next step. Regulators must push for this shift in order to create a safer and more efficient marketplace for all.

• 1See generally João Rafael Cunha, The Financial Regulatory Cycle 2 (Univ. of St. Andrews Sch. of Econ. and Fin., Working Paper No. 2006, 2020).
• 2Id. at 2.
• 3Id. at 4.
• 4Allan M. Malz, The GameStop Episode: What Happened and What Does It Mean?, 33 J. Applied Corp. Fin. 87, 87 (2021).
• 5Dumb Money (Columbia Pictures 2023).
• 6Malz, supra note 4.
• 7See Cory Mitchell, Short Squeeze: Definition, Causes, and Examples, Investopedia (June 22, 2024), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/shortsqueeze.asp [perma.cc/M5J2-R6K4].
• 8Id.
• 9GameStop Corp. (GME) Historical Data, Yahoo! Finance, https://finance.ya‌h‌o‌o‌.‌c‌o‌m‌/‌q‌u‌o‌t‌e‌/‌G‌ME/history/ [perma.cc/55PK-7ZQ5] (choose start date of Jan. 1, 2021 and end date of Feb. 5, 2021).
• 10See Matt Levine, Meme Stocks Were Too Good to Robinhood, Bloomberg (June 27, 2022), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-06-27/matt-levine-s-money-stuff-meme-week-was-too-good-to-robinhood [perma.cc/MT5J-6QLV].
• 11Id. Though, of course, they could continue to sell their positions.
• 12Malz, supra note 4.
• 13Id.
• 14FACT SHEET: Reducing Risk in Clearance and Settlement, SEC, ‌h‌t‌t‌p‌s‌:‌‌/‌/‌w‌‌‌ww.‌se‌‌‌c.go‌v/f‌ile‌s/34‌-94‌196-f‌act-‌shee‌t.pdf [perma.cc/PAR8-UVEB].
• 15DTCC is the holding company for three registered clearing agencies: The Depository Trust Company, the National Securities Clearing Corporation, and the Fixed Income Clearing Corporation. It is the primary regulator of clearing houses. See About DTCC: The Depository Trust Company (DTC), DTCC, https://www.dtcc.com/about/businesses-and-subsidiaries/dtc ‌[‌per‌ma.‌cc/‌2KB‌4-‌U69L].
• 16Robinhood Securities is a registered broker-dealer and “provides brokerage clearing services.” Order Types, Robinhood, https://robinhood.com/us/en/support/articles/order-types/ [p‌er‌m‌‌‌a.cc/C8PN-ZRY6].
• 17Margin is defined as funds or collateral that each firm must contribute to the clearinghouse’s “pot” to guard against default risk. If a clearing member’s positions are at risk, the clearinghouse can issue margin calls, requiring the member to deposit additional collateral. See Bill Chronister, How Margin Calls Help Protect the Industry, DTCC (Jan. 12, 2021), h‌t‌‌‌tp‌‌s‌:‌/‌/‌‌w‌w‌w‌.‌dtcc.com/dtcc-connection/articles/2021/january/12/how-margin-calls-help-protect-the-industry [perma.cc/3ZXB-Z3EY].
• 18Levine, supra note 10.
• 19Chronister, supra note 17 (“Throughout each day, NSCC and FICC net down trades in each participant’s portfolio to calculate and assess margin requirements.”).
• 20See SEC, Staff Report on Equity and Options Market Structure Conditions in Early 2021 (2021).
• 21Majority Staff of H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 117th Cong., Game Stopped: How the Meme Stock Market Event Exposed Troubling Business Practices, Inadequate Risk Management, and the Need for Legislative and Regulatory Reform (2022).
• 22Id. at 54.
• 23What Happened This Week, Robinhood (Jan. 29, 2021), https://newsroom.aboutrobinhood.com/what-happened-this-week/ [perma.cc/XQ69-NHF7].
• 24See,e.g., Letter from Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Sen., to Allison Herren Lee, Acting Chair, SEC (Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/01.29.2021%20Let‌t‌e‌r‌%‌2‌0‌f‌r‌o‌m‌%‌2‌0‌S‌e‌‌nator%20Warren%20to%20Acting%20Chair%20Lee.pdf [perma.cc/4ZRK-3HLS] (“I am deeply concerned that these casino-like swings in the value of GameStop and other company shares are yet another example of the gamesmanship that interferes with the ‘fair, orderly, and efficient’ function of the market, raising obvious questions about public confidence in the market and those trading in it.”).
• 25Apex is another broker-dealer that clears trades for broker-dealers with lower operational capacities.
• 26See In re Jan. 2021 Short Squeeze Trading Litig., 76 F.4th 1335, 1341 (11th Cir. 2023); In re Jan. 2021 Short Squeeze Trading Litig., No. 23-10436, 2024 WL 4440230, at *1 (11th Cir. Oct. 8, 2024); Class Action Complaint, Iovin v. Gill, No. 21-cv-10264 (D. Mass. Feb. 16, 2021).
• 27Jonathan Stempel, ‘Roaring Kitty’ Lawsuit over GameStop is Withdrawn for Now, Reuters (July 1, 2024), https://www.reuters.com/legal/roaring-kitty-is-sued-alleged-gamestop-manipula‌t‌i‌o‌n‌-2024-07-01/ [perma.cc/G5A2-Z9U7].
• 28Matt Phillips, Ex-Employer of GameStop Trader ‘Roaring Kitty’ Fined for Lack of Oversight, N.Y. Times (Sept. 16, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/16/business/roaring-kitty-‌g‌a‌m‌e‌‌stop‌-massmutual-settlement.html [perma.cc/PUQ5-D58F].
• 29Press Release, SEC, SEC Proposes Short Sale Disclosure Rule, Order Marking Requirement, and CAT Amendments (Feb. 25, 2022), https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2022-32 [perma.cc/5SXZ-EACH].
• 30Shortening the Securities Transaction Settlement Cycle, 87 Fed. Reg. 10436 (proposed Feb. 24, 2022) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R pts. 232, 240, 275).
• 31Press Release, SEC, SEC Issues Proposal to Reduce Risk in Clearance and Settlement (Feb. 9, 2022), https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2022-21 [perma.cc/7CB8-Z6ER].
• 32Shortening the Securities Transaction Settlement Cycle, 17 C.F.R. §§ 232, 240, 275 (2023).
• 3317 C.F.R. § 240.15c6-1 (2023).
• 34Krystal Hur, Wall Street is About to See its Biggest Trading Change in Years, CNN (May 29, 2024), https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/24/investing/premarket-stocks-trading-t1-sec/index.html [perma.cc/C58L-6UE2].
• 35A meme stock is generally defined as a stock that has increased in value due to “viral popularity” and “heightened social sentiment . . . usually due to activity online and particularly on social media platforms.” Adam Hayes, What Are Meme Stocks, and Are They Real Investments?, Investopedia, https://www.investopedia.com/meme-stock-5206762 [perma.cc/3VHU-‌W‌Q‌Y‌E‌]‌(last updated Mar. 27, 2025).
• 36Benjamin Mullin, Why Was Newsmax, the Right-Wing Channel, Suddenly Worth More Than U.S. Steel?, N.Y. Times (Apr. 2, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/02/business/media/newsmax-stock-ipo.html [perma.cc/SH6Z-G529].
• 37Class Action Complaint at 9–10, Radev v. Gill, No. 24-CV-04608 (E.D.N.Y. June 28, 2024).
• 38Id. at 4. The complaint was dropped three days later for unknown reasons.
• 3915 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78rr.
• 40Will Kenton, What is the Securities Exchange Act of 1934? Reach and History, Investopedia (Feb. 24, 2023), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/seact1934.asp [perma.cc/8L2J-‌V‌9‌4‌H].
• 4115 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1951).
• 4215 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (“[m]anipulative and deceptive devices”).
• 4317 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1951).
• 44Joseph Dever & Paul Ryan, Market Manipulation Investigations, in SEC Compliance and Enforcement Answer Book (Seventh Edition) 16-3 (2025).
• 45Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976).
• 46See SEC v. Hwang, 692 F. Supp. 3d 362, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (“Open-market transactions that are not inherently manipulative may constitute manipulative activity when accompanied by manipulative intent.”) (quoting Set Cap. LLC v. Credit Suisse Grp. AG, 996 F.3d 64, 77 (2d Cir. 2021)). See also Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977) (“No doubt Congress meant to prohibit the full range of ingenious devices that might be used to manipulate securities prices.”).
• 4715 U.S.C. § 78j.
• 48552 U.S. 148 (2008).
• 49Id. at 159.
• 50Id.
• 51Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193–94.
• 52See, e.g., Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977).
• 53Elements of a § 10(b)—Rule 10b-5 Claim (Annotated), Bloomberg Law: Practical Guidance, https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/XFL3J2I8000000 [perma.cc/89U9-‌V‌Z‌B‌D].
• 5417 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1951); 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(1).
• 55Azizur Rahman, Market Manipulation Under US Federal Law, Rahman Ravelli (Feb. 7, 2021), https://www.rahmanravelli.co.uk/expertise/market-manipulation-investigations/artic‌l‌e‌s‌/‌m‌a‌r‌ket-manipulation-in-the-us-explained/ [perma.cc/FB7X-5FGD].
• 56Dever & Ryan, supra note 44 at 16-8.
• 57Id. at 16-4.
• 58Id.
• 59See U.S. v. Stein, 456 F.2d 844, 850 (2d Cir. 1972) (“The purpose of the statute is to prevent rigging of the market and to permit operation of the natural law of supply and demand.”).
• 60Dever & Ryan, supra note 44, at 16-4.
• 61Id. at 16-3.
• 6215 U.S.C. § 77q.
• 63Id.
• 64Rahman, supra note 55.
• 6518 U.S.C. § 1348.
• 66Id.
• 67See Ciminelli v. United States, 598 U.S. 306, 316 (2023); United States v. Greenlaw, 84 F.4th 325, 340 (5th Cir. 2023).
• 68David Rosenfeld, Current Trends in Insider Trading Prosecutions, 26 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 51, 55 (2023).
• 6917 C.F.R. § 242.200.
• 7017 C.F.R. § 242.200(a).
• 71Mitchell, supra note 7.
• 72Id.
• 73Key Points About Regulation SHO, SEC (May 31, 2022), https://www.sec.gov/inves‌t‌o‌r‌/‌p‌u‌b‌s‌/‌regsho.htm [perma.cc/22T9-6332]; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.1 (2004).
• 74See 17 C.F.R. § 240.1 (2004).
• 7517 C.F.R. § 242.200(g).
• 76Id.
• 77Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Rule to Increase Transparency into Short Selling and Amendment to CAT NMS Plan for Purposes of Short Sale Data Collection (Oct. 13, 2023), ‌‌‌h‌t‌t‌p‌s‌:‌/‌/‌www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023-221 [perma.cc/FN7J-8HQ7].
• 78See 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.608(a)(2),(b)(2).
• 79ATSI Comm., Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 101 (2d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).
• 80493 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2007).
• 81Id. at 101.
• 82Id.; see also, Gurary v. Winehouse, 190 F.3d 37, 45 (2d Cir. 1999) (“The gravamen of manipulation is deception of investors into believing that prices at which they purchase and sell securities are determined by the natural interplay of supply and demand, not rigged by manipulators.”).
• 83Rajeev Dhir, Pump-and-Dump: Definition, How the Scheme is Illegal, and Types, Investopedia, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/pumpanddump.asp ‌[‌p‌e‌r‌m‌a‌.‌c‌c‌/‌C‌U‌G‌5‌-‌4‌F‌4G] (last updated Jan. 13, 2022).
• 84Id.
• 85Rahman, supra note 55.
• 86See generally J.T. Hamrick et al., An Examination of the Cryptocurrency Pump-and-Dump Ecosystem, 58 Info. Processing & Mgmt. 102506 (2021) (documenting a proliferation of pump-and-dump schemes associated with the rise of cryptocurrency, identifying 952 schemes on Discord and 2,469 on Telegram over six months in 2018).
• 87Investors have additionally sued Gill for his actions in 2024, alleging a pump-and-dump. See Class Action Complaint at 1, Radev v. Gill, No. 24-CV-04608 (E.D.N.Y. June 28, 2024).
• 88United States v. Constantinescu, No. 22-CR-00612, 2024 WL 1221579, at *1–2 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 20, 2024).
• 89Id. at *1, *5.
• 90598 U.S. 306 (2023).
• 91Constantinescu, 2024 WL 1221579, at *2.
• 9284 F.4th 325 (5th Cir. 2023).
• 93Id. at 350 (internal quotation omitted).
• 94Constantinescu, 2024 WL 1221579, at *6.
• 95Id.
• 96Id. at *3.
• 97580 U.S. 63 (2016).
• 98590 U.S. 391 (2020).
• 99Constantinescu, 2024 WL 1221579, at *2 (quoting Greenlaw, 84 F.4th at 351 n.14).
• 100Kelly, 590 U.S. at 398.
• 101Constantinescu, 2024 WL 1221579, at *5.
• 102Id.
• 103In re Bed Bath & Beyond Corp. Sec. Litig., 687 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2023).
• 104Class Action Complaint at 82, In re Bed Bath & Beyond Corp. Sec. Litig., 687 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2023) (No. 22-cv-02541).
• 105Id. at 18.
• 106A Schedule 13D form is required when a person or entity acquires a 5% equity stake in a business. The form asks questions regarding the purpose of the transaction.
• 107Bed Bath & Beyond, 687 F. Supp. 3d at 18.
• 108Seeid.
• 10915 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2).
• 110Bed Bath & Beyond, 687 F. Supp. 3d at 19 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2)).
• 111Id. at 11.
• 112See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943) (symbols are “a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas”).
• 113657 F. Supp. 3d 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2023).
• 114Id. at 443.
• 115See Class Action Complaint at 21, Radev v. Gill, No. 24-CV-04608 (E.D.N.Y. June 28, 2024).
• 116In re Bed Bath & Beyond Inc. Section 16(B) Litig., No. 22-CV- 09327, 2024 WL 2958743, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2024).
• 11715 U.S.C. § 78p(b).
• 118In re Bed Bath & Beyond, 2024 WL 2958743 at *1 (quoting Klein ex rel. Qlik Techs., Inc. v. Qlik Techs., Inc., 906 F.3d 215, 219 (2d Cir. 2018)).
• 119See id. at *6.
• 120In re Jan. 2021 Short Squeeze Trading Litig., 76 F.4th 1335, 1350 (11th Cir. 2023).
• 121Id. at 1348, 1350.
• 122Id. at 1355.
• 123In re Jan. 2021 Short Squeeze Trading Litig., No. 23-10436, 2024 WL 4440230, at *3 (11th Cir. Oct. 8, 2024).
• 124Id. at *1.
• 125Id. at *8–13.
• 126Complaint at 22–27, 28, Iovin v. Gill, No. 31-CV-10264 (D. Mass. Feb. 16, 2021).
• 127Id. at 27–28, 29–32.
• 128MML Investors Servs., LLC, Consent Order No. E-2021-0004 at 2 (Mass. Sec. Div. Sept. 15, 2021); MML Investors Servs., LLC, Consent Order No. R‑2019‑0096 at 11 (Mass. Sec. Div. Sept. 15, 2021).
• 129MML Investors Servs., LLC, Consent Order No. E-2021-0004 at 2 (Mass. Sec. Div. Sept. 15, 2021); MML Investors Servs., LLC, Consent Order No. R‑2019‑0096 at 11 (Mass. Sec. Div. Sept. 15, 2021).
• 130Hiranmayi Srinivasan, Roaring Kitty’s Net Worth Includes More Than Just GameStop Stock, Investopedia (Sept. 23, 2024), https://www.investopedia.com/roaring-kitty-net-worth-‌m‌o‌r‌e‌-‌than-gamestop-stock-8714914 [perma.cc/YE5C-X2ZK].
• 131Class Action Complaint at 3–4, Radev v. Gill, No. 24-CV-04608 (E.D.N.Y. June 28, 2024).
• 132Id. at 4.
• 133Id. at 6.
• 134Id. at 26.
• 135Id. at 6.
• 136Id.
• 137Stempel, supra note 27.
• 138Mission, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/about/mission [perma.cc/5Y4Z-S2PU].
• 139See generally Kenneth S. Levine, Was Trade Settlement Always on T+3? A History of Clearing and Settlement Changes, Friends Fin. Hist., Summer 1996, at 21, https://archive.org/details/friendsoffinanci00muse_12/page/20/mode/2up?view=theater [perma.cc/6XKQ-W9B8].
• 140Shortening the Securities Transaction Settlement Cycle, 87 Fed. Reg. 10436, 10437 (Feb. 24, 2022) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242).
• 141Levine, supra note 139, at 22.
• 142Id. at 23.
• 143Id. at 24.
• 144Id.
• 145Id.
• 146Id. at 25.
• 147Levine, supra note 139, at 25.
• 148Id.
• 149About DTCC: The Depository Trust Company (DTC), supra note 15.
• 150National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC), NSCC, https://www.dtcc.com/about/businesses-and-subsidiaries/nscc [https://perma.cc/4988-GZEV].
• 151About DTCC: The Depository Trust Company (DTC), supra note 15.
• 152Shortening the Securities Transaction Settlement Cycle, 87 Fed. Reg. 10436, 10437 (proposed Feb. 24, 2022) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R pts. 232, 240, 275).
• 153Id. at 10438.
• 154Id.
• 155Amendment to Securities Transaction Settlement Cycle, Exchange Act Release No. 78,962 (Sept. 28, 2016), 81 Fed. Reg. 69240 (Oct. 5, 2016).
• 156Securities Transaction Settlement Cycle, Exchange Act Release No. 80,295 (Mar. 22, 2017), 82 Fed. Reg. 15564, 15601 (Mar. 29, 2017).
• 157Majority Staff of H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 117th Cong., Game Stopped: How the Meme Stock Market Event Exposed Troubling Business Practices, Inadequate Risk Management, and the Need for Legislative and Regulatory Reform (2022).
• 158What Happened This Week, supra note 23.
• 159Id.
• 160Levine, supra note 10.
• 161Vlad Tenev, It’s Time for Real-Time Settlement, Robinhood (Feb. 2, 2021), http://news‌r‌o‌o‌m‌.aboutrobinhood.com/its-time-for-real-time-settlement/ [perma.cc/79GB-KQ7P].
• 162SEC, supra note 20, at 44.
• 163Shortening the Securities Transaction Settlement Cycle, 17 C.F.R. pts. 232, 240, 275 (2023) (“[S]everal comment letters stated that shortening the settlement cycle to T+1 would benefit retail investors. For example, one commenter stated that retail investors would benefit from a move to T+1 through increased certainty, safety, and security in the financial system; access to the proceeds, or purchases, of their securities transactions a day earlier; and aligning the settlement cycles for ETF transactions (which now settle on T+2) with the settlement cycle for mutual funds (which typically settle on T+1).”).
• 164DTCC, Advancing Together: Leading the Industry to Accelerated Settlement 7 (2021), https://www.dtcc.com/-/media/Files/PDFs/White%20Paper/DTCC-Accelerated-Settle-WP-‌2‌0‌21.pdf [perma.cc/9A35-85S7].
• 165Id. at 2.
• 166Id. at 11.
• 167Id.
• 168Deloitte, DTCC, ICI, & SIFMA, Accelerating the U.S. Securities Settlement Cycle to T+1 (2021), https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Accelerating-the-U.S.-Securi‌t‌i‌e‌s‌-‌Settlement-Cycle-to-T1-December-1-2021.pdf [perma.cc/VG8R-V5Z4].
• 169Shortening the Securities Transaction Settlement Cycle, 87 Fed. Reg. 10436 (proposed Feb. 24, 2022) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R pts. 232, 240, 275).
• 170Id.
• 171FACT SHEET: Reducing Risk in Clearance and Settlement, SEC, h‌t‌t‌p‌s‌:‌/‌/‌w‌w‌w‌.‌s‌e‌c‌.‌g‌‌o‌v‌/‌files/34-94196-fact-sheet.pdf [perma.cc/PAR8-UVEB].
• 172The SEC concluded that this shift would not be possible with existing market infrastructure limitations. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c6-1 (2023).
• 173Id.
• 174Press Release, SEC, SEC Chair Gensler Statement on Upcoming Implementation of T+1 Settlement Cycle (May 21, 2024), https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2024-62 ‌[‌pe‌r‌m‌a‌.‌c‌c‌/8‌7A5-SGM6].
• 175DTCC, ICI & SIFMA, T+1 After Action Report (2024), https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/T1-After-Action-Report-FINAL-SIFMA-ICI-DTCC.pdf [‌p‌‌‌erma.‌cc/T‌‌R‌X‌2‌‌‌-CX‌‌R‌F]‌.
• 176[1]I‌d. at 6.
• 177Id.
• 178Id.
• 179Isabelle Lee & Caleb Mutua, Wall Street’s Transition to Faster Trading Is Paying Off for Credit, Bloomberg (Aug. 8, 2025), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-06/wall-‌s‌t‌r‌e‌e‌t-s-transition-to-t-1-slashes-trading-costs-for-credit [perma.cc/Q84Y-G3J9].
• 180Shortening the Securities Transaction Settlement Cycle, 17 C.F.R. pts. 232, 240, 275 (2023).
• 181Id.
• 182Id. at 3.
• 183See, e.g., Jones v. Harris Associates, 559 U.S. 335 (2010).
• 184Greg Daugherty, Real-Time Gross Settlement (RTGS): Definition and Benefits, Investopedia (Feb. 29, 2024), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/rtgs.asp [p‌erma.c‌c/R2A‌‌A‌‌‌-‌C‌2‌V‌J]‌.
• 185‌DTCC,‌ Advancing Together: Leading the Industry to Accelerated Settlement 4 (2021), https://www.dtcc.com/-/media/Files/PDFs/White%20Paper/DTCC-Accelerated-Settle-WP-2021.pdf [perma.cc/9A35-85S7].
• 186Id. at 10.
• 187Shortening the Securities Transaction Settlement Cycle, 87 Fed. Reg. 10436, 10445 (proposed Feb. 24, 2022) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R pts. 232, 240, 275).
• 188Id.
• 189Id. (citing Deloitte, DTCC, ICI, & SIFMA, supra note 168).
• 190Shortening the Securities Transaction Settlement Cycle, 87 Fed. Reg. 10436, 10446 (proposed Feb. 24, 2022) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R pts. 232, 240, 275).
• 191Settlement Optimization, DTCC (May 20, 2019), https://www.dtcc.com/-/media/Files/p‌d‌f‌/‌2‌0‌1‌9‌/5/21/11380-19.pdf [perma.cc/SKV5-37YF].
• 192Id.
• 193The Hon. Kristin Johnson, Comm’r, CFTC, Keynote Address at The Future of Financial Regulation in a New Presidential Administration Conference (Jan. 24, 2004).
• 194Steven Wager, Chair, Ams. Focus Comm. of the Ass’n of Glob. Custodians, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Changes to Reduce Risk in the Clearance and Settlement of Securities (Apr. 11, 2022).
• 195Shortening the Securities Transaction Settlement Cycle, 17 C.F.R. pts. 232, 240, 275, at 13 (2023).
• 196See Introduction to Money Market Funds and Ultra-Short Duration Strategies, J.P Morgan, https://am.jpmorgan.com/content/dam/jpm-am-aem/global/en/liq/literature/brochure/introduction-to-mmfs.pdf [perma.cc/79QG-4UZ2].
• 197For example, Canada has moved to T+1 as well. See Canadian Securities Regulators Announce Move to T+1 Settlement Cycle, Canadian Sec. Adm’rs (May 27, 2024), h‌t‌t‌p‌s‌:‌/‌/‌www.securities-administrators.ca/news/canadian-securities-regulators-announce-move-to-t1-settlement-‌c‌y‌c‌l‌e/ [perma.cc/TDX5-ZMAP].
• 198Mark Wooton, T+1 Settlement – Global Learnings for the APAC Region, BNP Paribas (July 23, 2024), https://securities.cib.bnpparibas/t1-settlement-global-learnings-for-the-apac-region/ ‌[perma.cc/8M74-7LUU].
• 199Press Release, SEC, SEC Proposes Short Sale Disclosure Rule, Order Marking Requirement, and CAT Amendments (Feb. 25, 2022), https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2022-32 [perma.cc/5SXZ-EACH].
• 200Id.
• 201Id.
• 202Id.
• 203Shupe v. Rocket Companies, Inc., No. 21-CV-11528, 2024 WL 4349172, at *20 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2024).