The Disaster Management Complex: Law’s Adaptations in Times of Climate Disaster

I.  Introduction

Anthropogenic climate change is driving increasingly frequent and severe climate-related disasters caused by natural events, often colloquially referred to as natural disasters.1 Recent disasters have shattered records, costing federal, state, local, and tribal governments billions of dollars in response and recovery costs.2 Indeed, 2020 started the current decade with a record twenty-two billion-dollar disasters, only to be surpassed by 2023’s twenty-eight billion-dollar disasters, and 2024’s twenty-seven billion-dollar disasters.3 The cumulative cost of disasters in the last decade exceeds $1.4 trillion, accounting for nearly half of all disaster-related expenses since 1980.4 Striking as they are, these figures oversimplify the lived experiences of disaster-impacted communities nationwide. Disaster survivors will not soon forget the damage from Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria in 2017; Hurricanes Ian, Fiona, and Typhoon Merbok in 2022; and the devastating wildfires of 2018, 2020, and early 2025.5 Despite some wishful thinking, there are no true “climate havens.”6 In 2023, Vermont, often considered one such refuge from extreme climate change risk, experienced historic riverine flooding.7 And Lahaina, Hawaii, a perceived paradise on many levels, though not thought of as a climate haven, endured the deadliest U.S. wildfire in over a century.8 Due to unprecedented disaster costs, FEMA’s Disaster Relief Fund faced critical shortfalls, leading to use restrictions for several months in 2023 and 2024 that limited access to immediate, life-saving aid.9

And those are just the extreme events. The impacts of slow-onset climate-related disasters—such as sea level rise, drought, and increased average surface-level temperatures—operate on different timescales, are assessed on different ledgers, and engage decision-makers in different law and policy fields. Global average sea level rise set a new record in 2023, at nearly four inches above 1993 levels; that number is even higher in many U.S. coastal locations.10 High-tide flooding is now between three and nine times more frequent than it was fifty years ago.11 Due in large part to increased average temperatures, the incidence of heatwaves in the U.S. has tripled, and the duration of any one heatwave has increased by more than 25% since the 1960s.12 Compounding this, the western United States—especially California, Arizona, and New Mexico—has experienced severe and consistent drought conditions.13

And then there is infectious disease and the threat of another pandemic. As of January 2023, the federal government spent $4.6 trillion responding to the COVID-19 pandemic across federal agencies, requiring repeated and unprecedented infusions of funding from Congress.14 Although climate change is not likely a significant factor in the emergence or spread of COVID-19, some have argued that indirect impacts of climate change may have had an effect.15 Climate change makes the emergence and transmission of certain infectious diseases directly more likely through increasing disease vectors (e.g., mosquitoes) and indirectly more likely by increasing pressure on public health systems, which can exacerbate disease transmission and mortality.16

Law and policy tools necessarily play a critical role in reducing the risks of disasters. This includes both responding to their immediate aftermath and adapting with an eye toward future risk reduction and resilience.17 Yet, these increasing and varying disasters have repeatedly overwhelmed current federal systems, bringing into doubt whether the federal disaster law complex has evolved adequately to respond to these emerging threats. Federal disaster response is conducted against a backdrop of authorizing legislation designed primarily to support disaster management after the fact, with often murky definitions of which disaster types are eligible for assistance.18 The lack of clarity poses an inherent risk, leaving FEMA’s climate change efforts vulnerable to the swings of election cycles and political priorities. The back and forth of executive orders between President Joe Biden and President Donald Trump is emblematic of this dysfunction—increasing the focus of FEMA on climate change, on the one hand, and eliminating mention of climate change, on the other.19 Recent Supreme Court decisions complicate matters further, potentially placing limits on agencies’ existing abilities to angle disaster funding toward emerging hazards like slow-onset disasters, heatwaves, climate change, or pandemics.20

The need for reform is evident at multiple agencies, but it is particularly acute at FEMA. This Article analyzes how FEMA might integrate climate change into its disaster resilience efforts under existing statutory authority and provides a framework for a new formal legislative mandate to ensure the agency can be viable and effective in addressing emerging risks. Part II provides a picture of the federal disaster management complex, including relevant statutes and programs, and a description of how presidential administrations influence FEMA’s agenda and operation. Part III examines three case studies of the disaster management complex in action, looking at engagements with climate and equity, slow onset changes as exemplified by heatwaves, and COVID-19. Part IV reflects on how the case studies illustrate the need for reform and offers several proposals.21

II.  The Disaster Management Complex

A.  Key Statutes and Programs

The U.S. federal government has a range of authorities and assistance programs to address climate-related impacts both before and after a disaster. All told, there are more than ninety disaster assistance programs spread across approximately thirty agencies.22 Some of these programs are standardized and regularly activated. Others require activating legislation, such as the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Community Development Block Grants for Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR).23 This Article focuses on the universe of funding that becomes available in the wake of a disaster based on existing legislation and policy. This figure from the Brookings Institution demonstrates the complexity and interagency entanglements of disaster relief and recovery programs.24

The Stafford Act25 authorizes FEMA to act across all disaster phases: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.26 Following a disaster, the federal government funds a range of response and recovery activities.27 State, local, tribal, or territorial governments must receive a disaster declaration from FEMA and the President to be eligible for several types of funding, including Public Assistance, Individual Assistance, and the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program.28 Public Assistance (PA) provides funding for both emergency work (such as debris removal and other emergency protective measures) and permanent work (such as repairing roads and bridges, water control facilities, public utilities, and other facilities).29 Individual Assistance (IA) provides funding to individuals either directly or in coordination with public or private entities. IA operates across several programs, including those that address mass emergency assistance, housing, crisis counseling, legal services, unemployment assistance, and other needs.30

These programs are emblematic of the core approach to disaster relief in the aftermath of a disaster. But there are other programs that are available to prevent future impacts through investments in physical disaster mitigation efforts. The Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) provides funding for long-term disaster mitigation activities—actions taken pre-disaster that reduce impacts, such as physical infrastructure resilience, strategic planning, administrative costs, and partnership building.31 The Flood Mitigation Assistance Swift Current program provides funding for similar measures, specifically for buildings insured through the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).32 There are several other mitigation programs, generally awarded on annual funding cycles and requiring a separate application, that are not authorized by one specific declaration.33 These include the Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC) grant program, HMGP Post Fire, and the Safeguarding Tomorrow Revolving Loan Fund Program, all authorized via the Stafford Act.34 The Flood Mitigation Assistance Program, authorized via the National Flood Insurance Act, is another such program.35 However, the Trump Administration has effectively canceled the BRIC grant program, and, in at least several instances since the beginning of April, has halted new approvals for HMGP funding in the wake of recent disasters.36

Not all disaster impacts can be fully mitigated, so FEMA also funds preparedness, which includes planning, training, and educational activities directed at administrative capability building for disaster response.37 For natural disasters, these include the Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG), Continuing Training Grant Programs, Assistance to Firefighters Grants Program, and Emergency Management Baseline Assessment Grant Program.38

Outside of FEMA, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development provides disaster relief funding through the CDBG-DR program, which provides flexible funding for a broad range of recovery needs—from housing and infrastructure repair to employment training and business assistance—after certain disasters.39 The Small Business Administration also provides low-interest loans to businesses and homeowners to facilitate housing and economic recovery.40 Additionally, the U.S. Department of Agriculture has a myriad of programs that can be accessed to assist rural communities and other agricultural interests in disaster resilience and recovery.41

B.  The Administration’s Influence

While these programs and processes are authorized by federal statutes, different administrations have used them to prioritize different outcomes. At the time of this writing, the Trump Administration has issued and rescinded previous executive orders leading to the cancellation of programs and pullback of datasets related to climate change and equity.42 The Administration has also established an advisory group to look at significant reforms to FEMA, including even the agency’s wholesale elimination.43 In seeking a smaller role for the agency, the Administration has already limited or declined to approve disaster declarations in Arkansas, Washington, Los Angeles County, and North Carolina.44 These denials prevent the use of all programs that require a declaration.45 Even in jurisdictions that have already received declarations, the President halted new approvals for HMGP as of early April.46 The Trump Administration effectively eliminated the BRIC program, another mitigation grant that emphasized climate resilience and equity.47 The Administration has also targeted other programs, such as blocking recovery dollars via the CDBG-DR program to Asheville, North Carolina, because DEI was mentioned in the grant’s required Action Plan.48 These actions differ drastically from those of the Biden Administration, highlighting a sizable gray area in the interpretation of the scope of executive authority as it relates to disaster resilience. The full implications of this are yet to be fully understood, but this uncertainty reinforces the need for Congress to act and clarify the role of FEMA broadly.

In more ordinary times, the primary mechanisms for FEMA to influence climate resilience and overall disaster resilience include: (1) writing FEMA’s strategic plan, (2) reforming the execution of specific programs, (3) regulatory processes, and (4) granting disaster declarations.

1.  FEMA’s strategic plan

FEMA’s strategic plans are documents that outline the administration’s goals for the next four years. They set the tone for the general priorities and values that guide the various offices and the execution of policies and programs. They are messaging documents that trigger more concrete actions, such as eligibility and scoring criteria for various assistance programs, regulatory reforms, the president’s annual budget request, and, though to a lesser degree, the execution and terms of disaster declarations.49 It is important to note that the most recent strategic plan from FEMA was rescinded in May of 2025, without a clear timeline for its replacement amidst a broader agency review process.50

2.  Reforms to assistance programs

Presidential administrations have historically reformed both declaration-dependent and non-dependent assistance programs in line with their strategic plan. The priorities and eligibility criteria can significantly expand, contract, or target where the funds go, and even create entirely new pockets of assistance.51

3.  Regulatory processes

An administration can also use the usual tools of administrative agencies, such as notice-and-comment rulemaking and the issuance of guidance, to make policy changes to existing programs or rules. The agency will release a proposed regulation in the Federal Register that is open for public comment for a period of time. The administration will finalize the rule after taking public comments into account. On occasion, an agency will issue a Request for Information (RFI) that essentially formally solicits public input prior to developing the draft rule. The Biden Administration, for example, released an RFI in April 2021 requesting feedback on ways to make existing policies and programs more equitable.52 The Biden Administration also released proposed rules in July 2024 that would reform CFR 44 Part 206 in part to create a definition of “resilient” and “resilience,” citing that requirement under the Disaster Recovery Reform Act.53 In August 2024, FEMA released its first National Resilience Guidance, defining resilience as “[t]he ability to prepare for threats and hazards, adapt to changing conditions, and withstand and recover rapidly from adverse conditions and disruptions.”54

4.  Disaster declarations

The Stafford Act authorizes the President to provide federal assistance to impacted areas by declaring a specific event or occurrence an “emergency” or a “major disaster.”55

An “emergency” is defined as “any occasion or instance when the President determines federal assistance is needed.”56 “Emergency Declarations supplement State and local efforts in providing emergency services, such as the protection of lives, property, public health, and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States.”57 In essence, an Emergency Declaration is available in any situation requiring federal assistance, as determined by the president. Emergency assistance supports state and local efforts and is more flexible than the Major Disaster Declaration.58 However, the Emergency Declaration is limited to $5 million in assistance.59

A “major disaster” is defined as:

any natural event, including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind-driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought, or, regardless of cause, fire, flood, or explosion, that the President believes has caused damage of such severity that it is beyond the combined capabilities of state and local governments to respond.60

In essence, the Major Disaster Declaration is used when state and local capabilities and capacities are exceeded.61 A Major Disaster Declaration provides a broader set of assistance within the scope of the Disaster Relief Fund and can far exceed the $5 million limit of the Emergency Declaration.62

Disaster declarations are informed by a number of factors but ultimately are based on the discretion of the president.63 A disaster declaration will include what categories and subcategories of funding—under IA, PA, HMGP—are available, which jurisdictions qualify, and any adjustments to the federal cost share.64 In general, the federal government has covered 75% of allowable costs under the declaration, with the balance being paid for by the State (which may, in turn, require the local cost share).65 There are exceptions for an increased cost share, either through congressional supplemental funding or with discretionary action from the president.66 Several factors are typically considered, including the extent of damage, outsized local impact, recent multiple disasters, jurisdiction resources, the prevalence of insurance coverage, hazard mitigation investments, profile of impacted populations (including special populations), impact to community infrastructure, casualties, and disaster-related unemployment.67 Damage is documented by state and local officials, generally through the Preliminary Damage Assessment submitted through FEMA.68 If it is sufficiently demonstrated that state and local resources are overwhelmed, and that the types of impacts demand certain types of funding, a disaster declaration will be granted.69 In general, disaster declarations have been used liberally as long as the legal thresholds have been met for a disaster declaration. Presidential discretion has historically favored issuing declarations. However, recent signals from the Trump Administration suggest that the continued trend of presidential discretion favoring disaster declarations may not hold, and that the president may use his discretion to deny a disaster declaration request.70

Past presidents have interpreted this threshold for a disaster declaration and the definition of “disaster” used in the Stafford Act to decide when to grant a declaration, and for which hazards. For example, extreme heat events have always been denied a disaster declaration, but it is unclear whether that is due only to a failure to meet the threshold via documented costs (as former FEMA Administrator Deanne Criswell has testified)71 or whether it is from challenges defining impacts as a discrete event or a seasonal issue.72 On the other hand, the COVID-19 pandemic ushered in an unprecedented amount of funding via FEMA mechanisms to impacted communities, without specific mention of pandemics in the Stafford Act. While the first Trump Administration approved this unprecedented level of aid for COVID-19, the second Administration has used this discretion to limit declarations. It has declined to approve disaster declarations in Arkansas and Washington, attempted to condition declaration-dependent aid in Los Angeles on unrelated policy changes, and reduced the federal share of coverage under North Carolina’s existing declaration.73

Though it is outside the context of climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic provides another exemplary test of the definition of disaster in the Stafford Act, a mosaic of declarations that are not optimally designed for any single category of disaster response. This lack of clarity demonstrates the need for reform.

The statutory definitions of “emergency” and “major disaster” make no explicit mention of pandemics, nor of any other primarily health-based emergency. While previous planning by FEMA assumed an Emergency Declaration could be possible, a pre-COVID Congressional Research Service analysis was inconclusive as to whether pandemics were eligible for major disaster declarations.74 Nonetheless, the definition was evidently broad enough for President Trump to declare an emergency under the statute. The National Emergency Declaration under the Stafford Act, issued in March of 2020, began a series of unprecedented interpretations of the Stafford Act and FEMA powers and programs.75 This is explored in more detail in an elaboration on FEMA and pandemic declarations below.

To further illustrate the complexity of the Disaster Management Complex, the role of presidential and agency discretion, and the potential benefits of reform, we turn next to some case studies.

III.  The Disaster Management Complex in Action

This Part examines three case studies of the Disaster Management Complex in action: first, at the intersection of climate change and equity; second, in the context of the slow onset impacts, such as the increasing frequency and intensity of heatwaves; and third, the pandemic declarations for COVID-19. We then turn to an assessment of the need for reform, and several proposals for impactful, if inevitably incremental, changes.

A.  Climate Change and Equity

Until recently, some of the goals articulated in FEMA’s quadrennial Strategic Plan have held relatively firm from administration to administration. These include building a culture of preparedness,76 adopting a “whole community”77 approach, providing for nationwide readiness, proposing various flood insurance reforms, and strengthening the emergency management workforce. Goals related to climate change and equity, on the other hand, have been wildly inconsistent across administrations. There is no definition of equity under the Stafford Act, and FEMA’s National Advisory Council has used different versions of the term. FEMA’s 2022 definition focused on “the fair, just, and impartial treatment of individuals whom the agency serves.”78 Under President Barack Obama, FEMA included both climate change and equity considerations in the 2014–2018 strategic plan, though not in a central way.79 During President Trump’s first term, FEMA removed any mention of climate change from FEMA’s 2018–2022 strategic plan and focused instead on reducing the complexity of FEMA and leveraging public-private partnerships.80 Under President Biden, FEMA’s 2022–2026 strategic plan focused more squarely on both climate change and equity.81 Indeed, the first goal of the plan was to “[i]nstill [e]quity as a [f]oundation of [e]mergency [m]anagement.”82 The second was to “[l]ead [the] [w]hole of [the] [c]ommunity in [c]limate resilience.”83

This back-and-forth from one administration to the next illustrates how the Disaster Management Complex has operated, as well as some of the problems with leaving climate-related disaster management to the agency’s discretion—the primary problem being that an agency may, apparently with courts’ blessings, forgo disaster management altogether. By way of example, we here examine the radical shift in orientation and engagement between the Biden Administration and the second Trump Administration with respect to climate change and equity.

First, under the Biden Administration, the annual NOFO for the BRIC program and accompanying scoring rubric indicated that applications featuring a focus on climate resilience, disadvantaged communities, and nature-based solutions, “including those designed to reduce carbon emissions,” would receive some preference for funding.84 The NOFO also stated that BRIC funding would be available at 90% federal cost share for “Economically Disadvantaged Rural Communities” (EDRC).85 In addition, FEMA offered Direct Technical Assistance to jurisdictions to help with application completion, which was targeted to lower-income communities.86 The 2022–2026 FEMA Strategic Plan specifically favored the Biden Administration’s various efforts to support historically disadvantaged communities.87

The BRIC program also has certain statutorily-defined minimum requirements that a project application must meet.88 For instance, recipient jurisdictions must have adopted a Hazard Mitigation Plan, and any given project must have a benefit-cost analysis (BCA) ratio that is greater than one.89 During the Biden Administration, FEMA changed both these requirements. It issued a new requirement that Hazard Mitigation Plans are updated to include considerations for climate change and equity.90 FEMA also reformed the BCA process to improve accessibility for disadvantaged populations and include climate change considerations.91 These BCA revisions applied across the board to other annual hazard mitigation programs as well.92

While the first Trump Administration embraced full funding of the BRIC program, authorized in the Disaster Recovery Reform Act (DRRA), the second Administration effectively cancelled the BRIC program.93 The cancellation was meant to combat what was described as a “[p]olitized [g]rant [p]rogram” that deviated from the “[c]ore [m]ission” of FEMA and its focus on disaster recovery.94 The program still exists according to the DRRA, but is essentially defunct pending further action from the Trump Administration, Congress, or possibly the courts.

Beyond BRIC, during the Biden Administration, FEMA published an RFI from the public on modifications to policies and programs to advance equity and environmental justice.95 FEMA made several reforms after receiving feedback.96 For example, the agency expanded the list of acceptable documentation to prove homeownership and therefore qualify under Individual Assistance for housing assistance following a disaster; the previous version systematically and disproportionately excluded black communities in the South, and elsewhere, who historically passed down home ownership informally between generations without deeds or wills.97 FEMA also focused Continuing Training Grant program funds on training for rural and tribal communities, climate change, and equity principles via its annual Notice of Funding Opportunity.98 Finally, FEMA created an Equity Action Plan that details goals for improved access to assistance for underserved communities, routine consultation with underserved communities on policies and programs, equity trainings for FEMA partners, and the evaluation and elimination of disparities in outcomes.99

FEMA similarly pursued changes to the National Flood Insurance Program via two RFI, both of which considered the potential role of climate change. One sought information on the Community Rating System and the other on minimum standards for floodplain management.100

Later in Biden’s term, in early 2024, FEMA issued an Interim Final Rule detailing a series of equity reforms to the Individual Assistance program.101 These included expanded housing assistance for underinsured survivors, assistance regardless of pre-existing conditions of a property, and coverage for accessibility repairs for individuals with disabilities—whether or not those features existed pre-disaster.102 FEMA’s equity reforms also include two new benefits—Serious Needs Assistance and Displacement Assistance—which are meant to provide immediate, temporary, and flexible assistance to survivors for essential items and housing.103

In May 2024, the Biden Administration released a draft Version 5 of the Public Assistance Program and Policy Guide for public comment.104 The proposed changes sought to clarify procedures related to Civil Rights Act compliance and considerations for historically underserved communities.105 The changes also emphasized Tribal Nations’ context and needs related to the Public Assistance program, and reflected improvements to Public Assistance outlined in an earlier memorandum on the issue, titled “Recovery Program Enhancements to Support Tribal Nations.”106 Under Version 5 of the Guide, Tribal road repairs would be eligible for Public Assistance funding; additional protections would be afforded to culturally sensitive data; and sacred locations, traditional residences, and ceremonial buildings would be exempted from FEMA site inspections, photos, site maps, and GPS coordinate requirements.107 The document also specifically referred to climate change and nature-based solutions108 in regard to eligible activities for funding.109

Altogether, this activity—the NOFO and related focal points for funding, the BRIC reforms, the pursuit of climate and equity reforms in NFIP, and the changes to IA and PA—reflected a significant policy commitment to and a major investment of administrative resources in supporting climate-smart, equitable disaster management. However, the opening months of Donald Trump’s second term have begun a widespread reversal of this commitment.

First, an Executive Order issued on January 20, 2025 titled “Ending Radical And Wasteful Government DEI [Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion] Programs And Preferencing” largely put an end to equity-driven emergency management programs and policies across federal agencies, as well as programs at non-governmental institutions supported directly by federal funds.110 For example, the Trump Administration used this rationale to block CDBG-DR funding to Asheville, North Carolina due to mentions of DEI in the grant’s required Action Plan.111 On February 14, 2025, Department of Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem issued a memorandum to the department, which includes FEMA, directing staff to “eliminate all climate change activities and the use of climate change terminology in DHS policies and programs, to the extent permitted by law.”112 Since then, mentions of climate change have been removed from agency websites, equity-oriented programs have been terminated, and resilience planning tools have been removed.113

While some degree of discretionary flexibility is needed in dealing with the dynamic nature of disasters, the prospect of shifting from all-in on climate and equity to all-out based on the current Administration’s preferences is inherently harmful. Too much discretion is left with the agency. This discretion allows the executive to ignore significant aspects of disaster management that private and nonprofit sectors, as well as state, local, tribal, and territorial governments have relied upon. Given the drastically differing interpretations that recent administrations have taken on FEMA’s role in general, and specifically on climate change, it is the role of Congress to act and clarify. This is illustrated further by slow onset disasters and pandemic emergencies discussed below.

B.  Slow Onset Disasters: Heatwaves

FEMA has long been the agency with primary responsibility for responding to natural disasters, which includes natural disasters connected to climate-related extreme events. FEMA is also on the frontlines of the nation’s response to slow onset changes—such as sea level rise and average surface level temperature increases—that not only pose independent risks to individuals and communities at multiple levels of governance, but also contribute to the frequency, extent, and severity of pressing disasters. It is, in fact, quite difficult to disentangle slow onset changes and sudden events in this context, if it is possible at all. To illustrate the tensions and gaps in this area, we look more closely at the hazard of extreme heat.

Extreme heat is a leading driver of weather-related fatalities, and it is only getting worse. Heat-related deaths in 2024 amounted to more than double that of any other weather-related disaster tracked by the National Weather Service.114 Elderly and non-Hispanic Black populations are more likely to die from heat-related deaths than the general population.115 To make matters worse, heat-related deaths are likely systematically undercounted in official sources due to inconsistent classification and reporting on death certificates, as well as a limited ability to differentiate between extreme heat as a cause versus a contributor to a given fatality.116 For example, studies estimate that deaths resulting from the 1995 Chicago Heatwave may have been undercounted by hundreds of people.117 What is more, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency estimates that extreme heat costs the U.S. economy over $100 billion annually in critical infrastructure impacts, from buckling roadways to widespread power outages.118 The Congressional Budget Office projects that these and other losses from climate-driven hazards will only increase.119

As established previously in this paper, while many of FEMA’s pre- and post-disaster assistance programs could technically cover the impacts of extreme heat events, they rarely have been activated by the disaster declaration process. Few disaster declarations have ever been requested for extreme heat, and all those that have were denied.120 Governor Joseph Teasdale submitted one for extreme heat and drought in Missouri in 1980, while Governor Jim Edgar submitted one for the 1995 Chicago heat wave.121 Notably, rather than identifying extreme heat as outside the Stafford Act definition of a disaster, each administration concluded the events were “not of [the] severity and magnitude” to warrant a Major Disaster declaration.122 In 2022, California Governor Gavin Newsom requested a Major Disaster declaration for a heat dome and related wildfires.123 In its denial, FEMA clarified that only the wildfires had caused the damage for which the state sought assistance, and that “FEMA precedent is to evaluate discrete events and impacts, not seasonal or general atmospheric conditions.”124

While the statutory definitions of an “emergency” and “major disaster,” discussed above, are broad and seem on their face to include heatwaves, FEMA and the White House have, to date, demurred. Some congresspeople have recently advocated for reforming the definition to explicitly include extreme heat;125 at the same time, former FEMA Administrator Deanne Criswell testified in 2023 that a reform is not required to enable this coverage.126

One key challenge to the use of the Stafford Act to address extreme heat events is that the disaster declaration approval process requires a Preliminary Damage Assessment to demonstrate that state and local resources are overwhelmed by the documented and quantified impacts of the disaster in question. It can be difficult, especially while the event is transpiring, to definitively link extreme heat to the specific deaths and damage that follow. This challenge is true as well for other slow-onset disasters such as sea-level rise, drought, or cascading hazards (i.e., a heatwave that contributes to wildfires).127 It also biases disaster declarations towards disasters that cause direct physical damage to infrastructure and property, such as floods, wildfires, and severe storms.

Communities impacted by extreme heat may have more luck with FEMA’s mitigation grant programs—at least, such was the case under the Biden Administration. In a 2022 Fact Sheet, FEMA confirmed that the suite of programs within the agency’s Hazard Mitigation Assistance (HMA) offerings can be used for extreme heat.128 The BRIC program could be used for emergency backup power for heat-related outages, cooling centers, upgraded building codes, or retrofits that improve efficiency, cooling, and extreme heat resilience, and more.129 Under several of the HMA programs, communities could use funding to develop mitigation plans and engage the community and other partners on extreme heat preparedness. And all of these programs would cover multi-hazard projects (that address impacts of multiple types of disasters), such as nature-based solutions (green infrastructure such as green roofs, parks, rain gardens, and so on) that divert or otherwise reduce flooding impacts while also cooling the surrounding area.130 Preparedness grants, such as EMPG, could be used for training or other administrative purposes to prepare states and local governments for extreme heat events.131 And, according to the Congressional Research Service, HMGP mitigation funds resulting from declarations awarded for other hazard types could be used for extreme heat projects.132

Recent actions from the Trump Administration to remove mention of climate change make the use of these approaches even more questionable. Certainly, the use of funds explicitly for climate change is unlikely to be met with support. Whether or not alternative framings that do not use the term “climate change” will be accepted (e.g., extreme weather impacts) remains to be seen. This uncertainty again highlights the need for congressional action, and clarification whether the duration of a disaster’s unfolding excludes it definitionally under the Stafford Act. The Trump Administration’s threats to eliminate FEMA, limit or deny disaster declarations (in Arkansas, Washington, Los Angeles County, and North Carolina), and halt climate-friendly mitigation programs like BRIC and HMGP could preclude the use of these funds for any purpose, let alone for slow-onset disasters.133 The Trump Administration’s actions symbolize a significant shift in the federal government’s response to slow-onset disasters, as the mitigation programs it has eliminated have historically been the only avenue within FEMA to address these types of disasters.

C.  Pandemic Emergency Declaration

As mentioned above, the COVID-19 pandemic illustrated the opacity of the disaster declaration definitions and demonstrates some of the shortcomings in legal definitions for a disaster.

First, the pandemic declaration itself represented a rare use of Section 501(b) of the Stafford Act, which allows the president to declare an emergency without a governor’s request when the disaster is national in scope and thus primarily the responsibility of the federal government. This authority has been used at least twice before: by President George Bush for the 9/11 terrorist attack in New York, and by President Bill Clinton in 1995 for the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City.134 The national declaration did not stop governors from submitting Major Disaster Declarations for COVID; however, with their own specifications on which programs and amounts were needed based on “damage” assessments.

Second, the type of assistance provided through the national emergency declaration was unlike that of any other disaster because it bent interpretations and definitions of categories of declaration-dependent aid, as current vehicles for providing assistance were insufficient to meet the ongoing need. The primary vehicle for assistance to state and local governments was “Emergency Protective Measures” under Public Assistance. For the first time, this covered medical sheltering for quarantine of infected individuals, medical treatment for infected individuals, emergency medical care facilities, personal protective equipment, disinfection of public facilities, and more.135 It also covered more familiar types such as law enforcement, other security, and force overtime costs—but all in pursuit of addressing the impacts of a global pandemic rather than a flood, fire, hurricane, or other natural disaster. Eventually, the national declaration was amended to also include categories under Individual Assistance, covering funeral costs, counseling services, and supplementary unemployment benefits. Most memorably, the Lost Wages Assistance program was created by the Trump Administration, overseen jointly by FEMA and the Department of Labor, leveraging the “Other Needs Assistance” section of the Individuals and Households program, within IA.136 It funneled an unprecedented amount of funding through a little-used subsection of IA to provide additional unemployment assistance on top of what was already provided by state governments.

Finally, the Trump Administration invoked the Defense Production Act, which allowed FEMA to require companies to accept and prioritize federal contracts for goods and services that are “crucial to national defense.”137 In this case, that meant production of personal protective equipment, tests, ventilators, and other essential goods for pandemic response.

Much like climate change impacts, the COVID-19 pandemic showed how the flexibility of disaster management paradigms was essential to address emergent factors in the response. It also showed how unclear authorities, and limited preparedness for the extended use of multiple authorities, created an environment and a response that have yet to be fully understood, but are generally accepted as sub-optimal and contrary to predictions on pandemic preparedness.138 This requires both more robust definitions of disasters to accommodate threats beyond those causing extensive physical damage, and a re-envisioning of assistance programs to better address future disaster needs.

D.  Reforming the Disaster Management Complex

The current paradigm of disaster management is insufficient in the face of 21st century threats, chief among them being climate change. But an oversimplified and caustic pullback of federal assistance, which seems to be the strategy of the current Administration, fails to account for the growing need for federal assistance. Indeed, a more nuanced and transformative approach is needed. This includes clearer guideposts in law that balance flexibility and obligations to provide support for climate change impacts.

Disaster management requires flexibility and discretion to meet the needs of an ongoing emergency and anticipate future disasters. Thus, the flexibility and discretion afforded by the Stafford Act (and other statutes) proved beneficial, if imperfect, during the onset of COVID-19, when immediate resources were needed and the labor-intensive task of legislating required time. But it is not clear that similar successes will be achieved next time around. Meanwhile, the story playing out at the intersection of climate change, disaster, and equity lays bare how the lack of clear legal mandates for FEMA to provide leadership, or to even include climate change or equity as an area of focus, leaves policy prescriptions and agency actions that address these pressing problems vulnerable to electoral cycles and the politicalization of science.

Indeed, the implications of recent actions of the Trump Administration demonstrate the vulnerability to progress under the status quo. Most notably, the hobbling of mitigation programs like BRIC or HMGP, the freezing/rescinding of promised dollars under preparedness programs like Continuing Training Grants or CDBG-DR due to climate and equity provisions, or the potential for a drastic reduction in disaster declarations and all the recovery programs they unlock due to presidential discretion—as described earlier in this paper. In the longer term, climate science-informed planning will be dismissed, reliance on technocratic expertise will be forsworn, and any attempt to address unconventional but climate-driven risks (like slow-onset disasters) will make little progress under this framework. FEMA will remain frustrated in any effort to develop more sophisticated systems for assessing risk, as can already be seen through the implementation of Executive Orders and the pulling down of data to this effect.

The prospects for another future reversal, where FEMA reverts to an approach that targets climate change and equity, are uncertain. As has been widely observed, recent Supreme Court precedent, including most notably the creation of the “major questions doctrine” in a series of cases culminating in West Virginia v. EPA139  and the overturning of Chevron deference in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo,140 has made clear that a majority of Justices on the current Supreme Court view certain types of administrative action with suspicion. Thus, the Justices are poised to deploy their own interpretive lens to address areas of legislative ambiguity.141 This may not bode well for a future FEMA with climate change squarely in its sights, as a majority of Justices on the current Supreme Court have also expressed varying degrees of skepticism about the degree of discretion federal agencies have to address climate change.142

Notably, current FEMA products for determining risk generally do not include climate change projections. For instance, FEMA’s National Risk Index, a mapping tool to help determine hazards from a variety of vantage points, does not currently include climate change and projected impacts.143 The problem has not gone unnoticed. The Technical Mapping Advisory Council recognized in their 2023 annual report that the agency should “[e]xplore community/public product acceptance as FEMA presents regulatory flood hazard data, future conditions data, pluvial data, and graduate[d] hazard data through probabilistic methods to the public,” and “[r]ecommend ways that FEMA can represent all this complex data, with the possibility of additional third-party data, in a way that helps minimize confusion and increases usefulness toward reducing flood risk and disaster suffering.”144

FEMA itself has also sought to investigate regulatory reforms to better incorporate climate science and projections through several ROIs, as well as engage with national laboratories, and other partners, to utilize climate change forecasting products.145 Congress has also considered this issue, but has not yet codified this into law.146

FEMA had taken steps to include climate change requirements in certain aspects of its funding. For example, FEMA requires climate change impacts to be included in state-level Hazard Mitigation Plans to be eligible for funding, but this effort is unlikely to be preserved under the current Administration.147

Additionally, current legislation also does not provide sufficient guidance for slow-onset disasters. The design of current legislation is for acute events with damage threshold exceedance as standard metrics for evaluating disaster impacts.148 This also requires direct attribution of specific damage to specific events.149 Slow-onset events, while still technically being natural disasters, may lack the direct attribution for disaster declarations, or may be cumulative over time, or even compounded with other incidents.150 The discrete nature of disaster declarations limits the utility of some aspects of national disaster management systems for an expected increase in slow-onset events.151

We now explore proposals to address these problems.

E.  Proposed Reform

FEMA has an unwieldy role in managing the potential disaster programs to be made available across the interagency complex. It must also manage the federal response with insufficient legal authority to effectively lead on climate change. While FEMA took steps to explicitly integrate climate change into its efforts under the Biden Administration, the overt focus on climate change is not a part of the national emergency management strategy under the Trump Administration. Because of FEMA’s reliance on executive priorities, discretionary activities under the leadership of the politically-appointed FEMA administration, and legal ambiguity of the role of FEMA in the face of climate change, there is a need for some revision and clarification of the role of FEMA. In particular, there is a need for legislation explicitly requiring FEMA to integrate climate change responsibilities into its mission in all phases of disaster management. Some specific examples follow.

1.  Clarification of the definition and application of “equity” in FEMA programs

One of the greatest reversals between the Biden and Trump administrations with respect to the disaster complex has been on policies relating to equity. The Biden Administration introduced a definition of equity to the agency (where the Stafford Act did not) and wove equity principles into FEMA’s strategic plan, grant terms, regulatory actions, and a range of administrative processes. One of the first and most sweeping actions of Trump’s FEMA was to attempt the exact opposite. This has added an extensive level of confusion and inefficiency to FEMA programs and policies that must be addressed via an official action by Congress. Congress can prevent this kind of executive interpretation by more clearly defining equity in the Stafford Act and other disaster legislation.

2.  Clarification of the role of FEMA for slow-onset disasters

The impacts of extreme heat and drought, among other hazards, will continue to increase in the scope and scale of impacts on communities. Clarification of the Stafford Act, or the establishment of a complementary disaster assistance vehicle should be considered. Specifically, Congress could take a comprehensive approach, or simply revise the definition of a disaster in the Stafford Act to include slow-onset hazards like heatwaves, and adjust processes such as Preliminary Damage Assessments, the deadline to submit a disaster declaration, and other deadlines set for different types of declaration-dependent aid to account for the longer duration of heatwaves and their effects. The way that damage is documented and quantified under the Stafford Act could also be adjusted to account for broader types of impacts that are typically associated with slow-onset disasters like heatwaves but not with other types of disaster like floods, fires, earthquakes, etc. Any changes should also take into account the numerous programs already in existence at other agencies which are used for slow-onset disasters like heatwaves, and perhaps seek to consolidate and revise other programs to enhance clarity and availability for the needs of slow-onset disasters, starting with extreme heat events.

3.  Clarification of the role of FEMA for compounding disasters

Increasingly, disasters are occurring concurrently alongside recoveries from prior disasters. The linear nature of disaster declarations and the measurement of impacts failed to account for the synergistic effects of compounding disasters. The example of extreme heat is one where direct physical damage may be limited, but indirect effects of lost productivity and increased morbidity and mortality from chronic disease exacerbation can be extremely costly. Compounding disasters can also have synergistic effects, like the cluster of earthquakes in Puerto Rico amidst the recovery from Hurricane Maria. These events impacted the same communities but required different disaster declarations and attributions of damage to each event.

The disaster declaration and assistance process should be reimagined in light of concurrent and compounding events. In particular, the ability to co-mingle funds across disaster types is necessary, as well as to provide support for damage from disasters when it is not entirely traceable to a single event but clearly has disaster impact implications. This can be from sequential storms, or other extreme events, as well as from compounding vulnerabilities from extreme heat or extreme cold that follows or precedes a major weather event.

4.  Formal requirement to integrate climate projections and modelling into hazard and risk assessments

Core risk products from FEMA do not have climate change information integrated into methods of risk assessment, and steps to make this happen are being undone with the transition from the Biden Administration to the Trump Administration. This impacts FEMA, as well as partner agencies. In order to provide adequate risk projections into risk products, a clear legislative mandate is necessary that is not subject to the whims of executive priorities. It will also require engagement with academia and other scientific partners.

Establishing a national clearinghouse that develops standards for climate models, similar to the function of the National Hurricane Center (NHC) for hurricane models, is also necessary to help arbitrate between competing models and ultimately set baseline standards for integrating models into risk forecasting. Future risk data can be integrated into a range of programs, policies, and tools that largely rely on historical risk, such as FEMA’s flood maps, risk assessment tools such as the National Risk Index, and annual appropriations to the Disaster Relief Fund. There is a counterargument to this that climate models have longer time-scales and inherent uncertainty. This recommendation should not be construed as an attempt to pick a model, but rather to establish minimum standards of scientific vetting for models to be utilized. Different assumptions and different methods can lead to different forecasts. This process should lean into that by promoting transparency and empirical rigor for models for official use, versus numerous assumption laden models that provide deceptively sophisticated user interfaces that hide fundamental methodological flaws and assumptions in their forecasts.

This may be able to be accomplished under the Resilience Organization under FEMA (which essentially oversees all pre-disaster directorates and initiatives of the agency), through a new division, an interagency group, or perhaps a new agency altogether.

IV.  Conclusion

Climate change, slow-onset disasters, and pandemics have tested the legal and practical boundaries of the Stafford Act in recent years, challenging presidential administrations to address the resulting gray areas in its application. Leaders are left to interpret statutes in ways particular to their unique goals or priorities, resulting in extensive changes to programs, policies, and strategy across administrations. The COVID-19 pandemic and slow-onset events like heatwaves do not fit neatly into the statutory definition of “disaster” or the agency’s related procedures. Climate change is an increasingly important facet of disaster management in the United States and globally. FEMA can continue to be at the forefront of responding to the impacts of these events and can continue to play a central role in coordinating across federal agencies. But lessons from recent case studies, and the political pendulum swing of agency policy, demonstrate the need for more specific direction from Congress. The reality of climate-related disasters is not lessened by pretending that that reality doesn’t exist, nor by attributing those disasters to chance, or fate, or acts of god. A clear statement of the need to incorporate climate change into the federal disaster response mission can ensure improvement of the capacities and capabilities of the United States to respond to the repeated, now nearly continuous stresses of increasing climate impacts. In contrast, continued ambiguity, or silence, may well perpetuate the problem, with consequences ultimately measurable in lives and livelihoods lost.

• 1The term “natural disasters” refers in this report to disasters that are not directly “human made,” therefore excluding terrorism, gun violence, cybersecurity, and the like. The term can be imprecise, of course, and its definition is a key issue at the heart of this paper. Some disaster scholars argue that the term should be eliminated. See,e.g., Steve Puttick et al., Disasters Are Not Natural, 43 Teaching Geography 118, 120 (2018). This is premised on the idea that no disasters are totally natural—all have some human component leading to the hazard and/or underlying vulnerability. See id. at 119. Despite criticism, the term “natural disasters” and “natural events” persists in legal definitions and triggers for disaster aid, and generally refers to non-intentional disasters, as well as those that do not originate from infrastructure failure or other disasters of human origin. See, e.g., How a Disaster Gets Declared, FEMA (July 22, 2024), ‌h‌t‌t‌p‌s‌:‌/‌/‌w‌w‌w‌.‌f‌e‌m‌a‌.‌g‌o‌‌v‌‌‌/disaster/how-declared [perma.cc/KPN3-WSCF].
• 2See William L. Painter, Cong. Rsch. Serv., IFI2822, The Disaster Relief Fund: Requests Versus Reality (2025).
• 3Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters: United States Summary, Nat’l Ctrs. for Env’t Info., Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin. (2025), https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/access/bil‌l‌i‌ons/state-summary/US [perma.cc/HM33-5RB2] (relevant data from 2024).
• 4See Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters: Summary Stats, Nat’l Ctrs. for Env’t Info., Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin. (2025), https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/access/bil‌l‌i‌o‌n‌s‌/‌s‌‌u‌‌mmary-stats/US/2014-2024 [perma.cc/A48P-FXG3] (relevant data from 2014–2024).
• 5See Eric S. Blake, The 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season: Catastrophic Losses and Costs, Weatherwise, May/June 2018, at 28; Matt Horton et al., Inst. for Applied Econs., Impact of 2025 Los Angeles Wildfires and Comparative Study (2025), ‌h‌t‌t‌p‌s‌:‌/‌/‌l‌a‌e‌d‌c‌.‌o‌r‌g‌/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/LAEDC-2025-LA-Wildfires-Study.pdf [perma.cc/U7DY-‌K‌A‌U‌S‌]; Michael Carlowicz, Record-Setting Fires in Colorado and California, NASA Earth Observatory (Oct. 21, 2020), https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/147443/record-setting-fires-in-colorado-and-california [perma.cc/67EM-F37L]; Press Release, White House, FACT SHEET: The Biden Administration Continues to Support Hurricane Fiona Response Efforts in Puerto Rico (Sept. 28, 2022), https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-re‌l‌e‌a‌s‌e‌s‌/‌2‌0‌2‌2‌/‌0‌9‌/‌2‌8/fact-sheet-the-biden-administration-continues-to-support-hurricane-fiona-re‌s‌p‌o‌n‌s‌e‌-efforts-in-puerto-rico [perma.cc/GGU2-F4Q7]; Press Release, FEMA, President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Amends Federal Cost-Share for Alaska (Jan. 21, 2025), https://www.fema.gov/press-re‌l‌e‌a‌s‌e‌/20220929/president-joseph-r-biden-jr-amends-federal-cost-share-alaska [perma.cc/GZ2C-3TGY]; Press Release, Fla. Div. Emergency Mgmt., State of Florida Announces Additional 30 Days of 100% Federal Cost Share for Hurricane Ian (Oct. 6, 2022), https://www.floridadisaster.org/news-media/news/20221006-state-of-florida-announces-additional-30-days-of-100-federal-cost-share-for-hurricane-ian/ [perma.cc/5NZX-Q3YR].
• 6See Julia Simon, They Came to Asheville Looking for a ‘Climate Haven.’ Then Came Hurricane Helene, NPR (Oct. 9, 2024), https://www.npr.org/2024/10/09/nx-s1-5137024/climate-haven-‌h‌u‌r‌r‌i‌cane-helene-asheville [perma.cc/MMK5-WLE3].
• 7See Liam Stack, Officials Say the Flooding is the Worst Since Hurricane Irene, N.Y. Times (July 10, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/10/us/vermont-flooding-hurricane-irene.html ‌[‌p‌e‌r‌m‌a‌.cc/682V-NAXX].
• 8See Stephen Culp, Maui Wildfires: What Are the Deadliest Wildfires in US History?, Reuters (Aug. 21, 2023), https://www.reuters.com/world/us/maui-inferno-what-are-‌d‌e‌a‌d‌liest-‌w‌i‌l‌d‌f‌i‌res-us-history-2023-08-13/ [perma.cc/5JE8-HSEN].
• 9See Advisory, FEMA, FEMA Lifts Immediate Needs Funding (INF) Restrictions (Oct. 1, 2024), https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/up‌l‌o‌a‌d‌s‌/‌2‌0‌2‌4‌/‌1‌0‌/‌F‌E‌M‌A‌_‌A‌d‌v‌i‌s‌o‌r‌y‌_‌L‌i‌f‌t‌i‌n‌g‌_‌I‌N‌F‌_‌2‌0‌2‌‌4‌1‌0‌01.pdf [perma.cc/U7MR-CND9].
• 10See Rebecca Lindsey, Climate Change: Global Sea Level, Climate.gov (Aug. 22, 2023), ‌h‌t‌t‌p‌s‌://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/climate-change-global-sea-level ‌[‌p‌e‌r‌‌m‌‌‌a‌.‌cc/9EZA-QDKD].
• 11Id.
• 12See Climate Change Indicators: Heat Waves, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/climate-indica‌t‌o‌r‌s‌/‌c‌l‌imate-change-indicators-heat-waves [perma.cc/2B9H-W25Y] (last updated Apr. 18, 2025).
• 13See Climate Change Indicators: Drought, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/climate-indicators/climate-change-indicators-drought [perma.cc/Q3GP-WZAY] (last updated Apr. 28, 2025).
• 14See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-23-106647, COVID-19 Relief: Funding and Spending as of Jan. 31, 2023 (2023).
• 15See Saloni Gupta et al., Did Climate Change Influence the Emergence, Transmission, and Expression of the COVID-19 Pandemic?, Frontiers Med., Dec. 8, 2021, at 1.
• 16See generally Jan Semenza et al., Climate Change and Cascading Risks from Infectious Disease, 11 Infectious Diseases and Therapy 1371 (2022); Paige Van de Vuurst & Luis Escobar, Climate Change and Infectious Disease: a Review of Evidence and Research Trends, Infectious Diseases Poverty, May 16, 2023, at 1.
• 17Our focus for this paper is domestic U.S. federal law. International disaster law and policy would require a separate analysis that is beyond our scope.
• 18See William L. Painter, Cong. Rsch. Serv., IF12814, In Focus: Disasters and the Federal Budget (2025).
• 19See Justin Savage et al., Top 5 Environmental Actions You Should Know from President Trump’s First Day, Sidley: Env’t Energy Briefs (Jan. 21, 2025), https://environmentalenergybrief.sidley.com/2025/01/21/top-5-environmental-actions-you-should-know-from-president-trumps-first-day [perma.cc/KZ9N-TGXC]; Aubrie Spady, Federal Agencies Scrub Climate Change from Websites Amid Trump Rebranding, Fox News (Feb. 3, 2025), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/federal-agencies-scrub-climate-change-from-websites-amid-trump-rebranding ‌[‌p‌e‌r‌m‌a‌.‌c‌c‌/‌Z‌G‌6‌N‌-‌H94G].
• 20See, e.g., West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697 (2022); Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024); Ohio v. EPA, 603 U.S. 279 (2024).
• 21While the Article addresses, where relevant, developments in the early months of the second Trump Administration, it does not seek to solve for the problems presented by an administration that seeks to ignore statutory requirements, disregard agency expertise, and exert more purely political influence over FEMA and the nation’s disaster response. Those issues are beyond the scope of the present project.
• 22Carlos Martín et al., Federal Disaster Management Is a Confusing Patchwork. Reforming FEMA and Improving Interagency Coordination Can Fix It., Brookings Inst. (Aug. 3, 2023), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/federal-disaster-management-is-a-confusing-patchwork-reforming-fema-and-improving-interagency-coordination-can-fix-it/ [perma.cc/L28X-V6BU] (graphic displayed infra p. 6); Eugene Boyd, Cong. Rsch. Serv., RL33330, Community Development Block Grant Funds in Disaster Relief and Recovery (2012).
• 23See Boyd, supra note 22.
• 24Carlos Martín et al., supra note 22.
• 2542 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5207 (1988).
• 26See Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, P-592, Stafford Act, as Amended and Related Authorities (2019).
• 27See id.
• 28See id. at 7.
• 29See Types of Assistance: Individual Assistance Versus Public Assistance, FEMA (Jan. 21, 2025), https://www.fema.gov/fact-sheet/types-assistance-individual-assistance-versus-public-as‌s‌i‌s‌‌t‌‌‌ance [perma.cc/9ARV-3GPH].
• 30See id.
• 31See FEMA, Hazard Mitigation Assistance Program and Policy Guide (2023) [hereinafter Hazard Mitigation Assistance Program and Policy Guide], ‌h‌t‌t‌p‌s‌:‌/‌/‌w‌w‌w‌.‌f‌e‌m‌a‌.‌g‌o‌v‌/‌s‌i‌t‌e‌s‌/‌d‌efault/files/documents/fema_hma-program-policy-guide_032023.pdf [perma.cc/T5YF-N74B].
• 32See Swift Current, FEMA, https://www.fema.gov/grants/mitigation/learn/flood-mitigation-assistance/swift-current [perma.cc/82KN-JYAB] (last updated Dec. 5, 2024).
• 33See Hazard Mitigation Assistance Program and Policy Guide, supra note 31.
• 34See id.
• 35See id.
• 36See Press Release, FEMA, FEMA Ends Wasteful, Politicized Grant Program, Returning Agency to Core Mission of Helping Americans Recovering from Natural Disasters (Apr. 4, 2025) [hereinafter FEMA Ends Wasteful, Politicized Grant Program], https://www.fema.gov/press-re‌l‌e‌a‌s‌e‌/20250404/fema-ends-wasteful-politicized-grant-program-returning-agency-core-mission ‌[‌p‌e‌r‌m‌a‌.cc/6UEM-F5VW]; Thomas Frank, Trump Quietly Halts Money for Preventing Disaster Damage, E&E News(May 1, 2025), https://www.eenews.net/articles/trump-quietly-halts-money-for-pre‌v‌e‌n‌t‌i‌ng-disaster-damage/ [perma.cc/7LXC-AYFS].
• 37See Preparedness Grants, FEMA, https://www.fema.gov/grants/preparedness [‌p‌e‌r‌m‌a‌.‌c‌‌c‌/‌E‌5‌4‌D‌-DXLM] (last updated Feb. 20, 2024).
• 38See id.
• 39See CDBG Disaster Recovery Funds, HUD Exchange, https://www.hudexchange.info/pro‌g‌r‌a‌m‌s/cdbg-dr/ [perma.cc/P5BG-9MRS].
• 40See Disaster Assistance, U.S. Small Bus. Admin., https://sba.gov/disaster [perma.cc/364W-Y4R9].
• 41See Christine Whitt, Cong. Rsch. Serv., IF10565, Federal Disaster Assistance for Agriculture (2025).
• 42See Savage et al., supranote 19; Spady, supra note 19. See Exec. Order No. 14151, 90 Fed. Reg. 8339 (Jan. 20, 2025); Trump Administration Rescinds Batch of Biden-Era Executive Orders, Columbia L. Sch.: Sabin Ctr. for Climate Change L., https://climate.law.columbia.edu/content/trump-administration-rescinds-batch-biden-era-executive-orders [perma.cc/B7YM-FVBP].
• 43See Federal Emergency Management Agency Review Council Members, DHS‌,‌‌h‌t‌t‌p‌s‌:‌/‌/‌w‌w‌w.dhs.gov/fema-review-council-members [perma.cc/2J55-KUAG] (last ‌u‌p‌d‌ated May 15, 2025); Gabe Cohen, ‘We’re Not Preparing’: As Trump Officials Vow to Eliminate FEMA, the Agency is Already in Turmoil, CNN (Mar. 26, 2025), ‌h‌t‌t‌p‌s‌:‌/‌/‌w‌w‌w‌.‌c‌n‌n‌.‌c‌o‌m‌/‌2025/03/26/politics/fema-payments-staffing-stalled-turmoil [perma.cc/LV77-TYX4].
• 44See Ella Nilsen, Tornado Victims Blocked from Federal Recovery Aid After Trump Denied Request, CNN (Apr. 23, 2025), https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/23/weather/trump-denied-disaster-aid-arkansas-tornadoes/index.html [perma.cc/6RE4-3N2P]; Ja’han Jones, Trump Administration Denies FEMA Funds to Democratic-Led States, MSNBC (Apr. 15, 2025) [hereinafter Jones, Trump Administration Denies FEMA Funds], https://www.msnbc.com/top-stories/latest/fema-north-carolina-washington-recovery-funds-rcna201417 [perma.cc/DVP8-VJMT]; Ja’han Jones, Trump Wants California to Institute Restrictive Voter Law Before Receiving Fire Aid, MSNBC: ReidOut Blog (Jan. 27, 2025) [hereinafter Jones, Restrictive Voter Law], https://www.msnbc.com/the-‌r‌e‌i‌d‌o‌u‌t‌/‌r‌e‌i‌d‌out-blog/trump-wants-california-institute-restrictive-voter-id-law-receiving-wi-rcna189458 ‌[‌p‌e‌r‌m‌a‌.cc/6W6F-L34B].
• 45See Frank, supra note 36.
• 46See id.
• 47See FEMA Ends Wasteful, Politicized Grant Program, supra note 36.
• 48See Secretary Turner Denounces DEI Criteria in Asheville’s Draft Disaster Plan, HUD, ‌h‌t‌t‌p‌s‌://www.hud.gov/news/hud-no-25-040 [perma.cc/32XM-G2WC].
• 49See Lisa Berger, FEMA Releases Its 2022–2026 Strategic Plan Addressing Emergency Management Challenges, Bldg. Safety J. (Jan. 3, 2022), https://www.iccsafe.org/building-safety-journal/bsj-‌h‌i‌t‌s‌/‌f‌e‌m‌a-releases-its-2022-2026-strategic-plan-addressing-emergency-management-challenges/ [perma.cc/X4VC-VHRW].
• 50See Nicole Sganga, FEMA Rescinds Strategic Plan Less than 2 Weeks Before Hurricane Season, CBS News (May 21, 2025), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/fema-rescinds-strategic-plan-less-than-2-weeks-before-hurricane-season/ [perma.cc/XBW4-U8NV].
• 51See Reforming Individual Assistance: New Benefits and Streamlined Processes to Help Disaster Survivors, FEMA, https://www.fema.gov/assistance/individual/2024-reform ‌[‌p‌e‌r‌m‌a‌.‌c‌c‌/L2TV-D235] (last updated June 13, 2025).
• 52See Request for Information on FEMA Program, Regulation, and Policies, 86 Fed. Reg. 21325 (Apr. 22, 2021).
• 53See Update of FEMA’s Public Assistance Regulations, 89 Fed. Reg. 54966 (July 2, 2024).
• 54FEMA, National Resilience Guidance: A Collaborative Approach to Building Resilience 2 (2024) (emphasis omitted), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/docu‌m‌e‌n‌t‌s‌/‌f‌e‌m‌a‌_‌national-resili‌e‌n‌c‌e‌-guidance_august2024.pdf [perma.cc/VEV5-GQ2F].
• 55See FEMA, Disaster Declaration Process (2011) [hereinafter Disaster Declaration], ‌h‌t‌t‌ps://www.fema.gov/pdf/media/factsheets/dad_disaster_declaration.pdf [perma.cc/M6VJ-‌Q‌3‌D‌W‌].
• 56Id. at 2.
• 57Id.
• 58See id.
• 59See id.
• 60See id.
• 61See Disaster Declaration, supra note 55, at 2.
• 62See id.
• 63See How a Disaster Gets Declared, supra note 1.
• 64See id.
• 65See id.
• 66See id.
• 67See id.
• 68See id.
• 69See How a Disaster Gets Declared, supra note 1.
• 70SeeScott Waldman, Trump Revives Threats to Withhold Disaster Aid for Political Foes, E&E News (Jan. 9, 2025), https://www.eenews.net/articles/trump-revives-threats-to-‌withhold-dis‌a‌s‌ter-aid-for-political-foes/ [perma.cc/N92D-74Y4].
• 71See FEMA: The Current State of Disaster Readiness, Response, and Recovery: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Econ. Dev., Pub. Buildings, and Emergency Mgmt. of the Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure of the H.R., 118th Cong. 42 (2023) [hereinafter Criswell Statement] (statement of Deanne Criswell, former FEMA Administrator).
• 72SeeErica Lee & Bruce Lindsay, Cong. Rsch. Serv., IN12384, Stafford Act Declarations for Extreme Heat 2 (2024).
• 73SeeNilsen, supra note 44; Jones, Trump Administration Denies FEMA Funds, supra note 44; Jones, Restrictive Voter Law, supra note 44.
• 74See Edward Liu, Cong. Rsch. Serv., RL34724, Would an Influenza Pandemic Qualify as a Major Disaster Under the Stafford Act? (2008).
• 75President Trump also invoked other statutory emergency powers in early 2020, issuing declarations under the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 247d, the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1601, and the Defense Production Act, 50 U.S.C. § 4501. See Proclamation No. 9994, 85 Fed. Reg. 15337 (Mar. 13, 2020); Exec. Order No. 13911, 85 Fed. Reg. 18403 (Mar. 27, 2020). Trump reassigned the designation of “lead agency” for the pandemic from the Department of Health and Human Services to FEMA on March 19. See Erica Lee, et al.,Cong. Rsch. Serv., R46809, Federal Emergency and Major Disaster Declarations for the COVID-19 Pandemic (2021).
• 76Creating a “[c]ulture of [p]reparedness” was a priority identified in the 2018–2022 Strategic Plan under FEMA, championed by then FEMA Administrator, Brock Long, who was appointed by then President Donald Trump. See FEMA, 2018–2022 Strategic Plan 3–4 (2018) [hereinafter 2018–2022 Strategic Plan], https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/strat_plan_2018-‌2‌0‌2‌2.pdf [perma.cc/DE2S-YVAE]. But while it was championed under that term, this general sentiment has been contained in FEMA strategies throughout multiple administrations and strategic planning cycles in one form or another.
• 77See Whole Community, FEMA (Oct. 6, 2020), https://www.fema.gov/glossary/whole-commu‌n‌i‌t‌y [perma.cc/MC2S-F8A7].
• 78See Erica Lee & Elizabeth Webster, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R47280, Defining FEMA’s Approach to Equity and Emergency Management: Policy Considerations (2022).
• 79See FEMA, FEMA Strategic Plan: 2014–2018 (2014), https://bio‌t‌e‌c‌h‌.‌l‌a‌w‌.‌l‌s‌u‌.‌e‌d‌u‌/‌b‌l‌o‌g‌/‌J‌u‌l‌y‌18FEMAStratPlanDigital508HiResFINALh.pdf [perma.cc/M4PZ-QGL3].
• 80See Press Release, FEMA, FEMA Releases 2018–2022 Strategic Plan (Apr. 25, 2023), ‌h‌t‌t‌p‌s‌:‌//www.fema.gov/press-release/20230425/fema-releases-2018-2022-strategic-plan ‌[‌p‌e‌r‌m‌a‌.‌c‌c‌/‌A‌Q‌E‌6‌-ZG4M]; 2018–2022 Strategic Plan, supra note 76, at 3–4.
• 81See FEMA, FEMA Strategic Plan: 2022–2026 (2022), https://councilonstrate‌g‌i‌c‌r‌i‌s‌k‌s‌.‌o‌r‌g‌/‌w‌p-content/uploads/2025/04/FEMA-Strategic-Plan-2022-2026-2021.pdf [perma.cc/E733-‌8‌W‌5‌Z].
• 82See id. at 9 (scattered references).
• 83See id. at 14 (scattered references).
• 84See FEMA, Notice of Funding Opportunity for Fiscal Year 2024 Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities Program (2024), https://www.kvcog.org/im‌a‌g‌e‌s‌/‌f‌e‌m‌a‌_‌h‌m‌a‌_‌b‌ric-nofo-fact-sheet_fy2024.pdf [perma.cc/74XS-P2DY].
• 85See FEMA, Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities Tribal Information, FEMA Fiscal Year 2023 Program Support Materials 5 (2024) [hereinafter BRIC Tribal Information 2023] (emphasis omitted), ‌h‌t‌t‌p‌s‌:‌/‌/‌w‌w‌w‌.‌f‌e‌m‌‌a‌.‌g‌‌o‌v/sites/default/files/documents/fema_hma_bric-tribal-information_fy2024.pdf [perma.cc/9L8M-8FAR].
• 86Id.
• 87See FEMA, Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities Direct Technical Assistance (2025), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_hma_bric-dta-pro‌g‌r‌‌a‌‌‌m-support-material_fy2024.pdf [perma.cc/4U2P-FGQ4].
• 88See id.
• 89See Hazard Mitigation Assistance Program and Policy Guide, supra note 31, at 35, 86.
• 90Id. at 9–10, 11–12; see also BRIC Tribal Information 2023, supra note 85.
• 91FEMA, Streamlined Approaches to the Benefit-Cost Analysis of Hazard Mitigation Assistance (HMA) Projects (2024), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/docu‌m‌‌‌e‌‌‌‌n‌ts/fema_policy-aid-under1m-and-bca-assistance_2024.pdf [perma.cc/CMF4-U4RE].
• 92SeeNFIP Modifies Benefit-Cost Ratio of Community Grant Programs, FEMA, ‌h‌t‌t‌p‌s‌:‌/‌/‌w‌w‌w‌.‌f‌e‌ma.gov/case-study/nfip-modifies-benefit-cost-ratio-community-grant-programs [perma.cc/6RT4-‌S‌ZHR] (last updated Mar. 6, 2023).
• 93See FEMA Ends Wasteful, Politicized Grant Program, supra note 36.
• 94Id.
• 95See Update of FEMA’s Public Assistance Regulations, 89 Fed. Reg. 54966 (July 2, 2024).
• 96See FEMA, Request for Information Summary Report: Summary of Public Comments from the April-July 2021 Request for Information (2021), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_rfi-summary-report_climate-change-and-equity_20210813.pdf‌[‌p‌e‌r‌m‌a‌.‌c‌c/G968-WX5H]; FEMA, Request for Information Summary Report: Summary of Feedback and Actions Taken Relating to the 2021 Request for Information on FEMA Programs, Regulations, and Policies (2022) [hereinafter RFI 2021 Summary Report], ‌h‌t‌t‌p‌s‌:‌/‌/‌w‌w‌w‌.‌f‌e‌m‌a‌.‌gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_rfi-action-summary-report-20220401.pdf [perma.cc/U3U3-GYGB].
• 97See RFI 2021 Summary Report, supra note 96; Hannah Dreier & Andrew Ba Tran, ‘The Real Damage’, Wash. Post (July 11, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/na‌t‌i‌o‌n‌/‌2‌0‌2‌1‌/‌0‌7‌/‌1‌1‌/‌f‌e‌m‌a-black-owned-property/ [perma.cc/2U6S-Z28C].
• 98See FEMA, Notice of Funding Opportunity: Fiscal Year 2024 Homeland Security National Training Program Continuing Training Grants 50 (2024), ‌h‌t‌t‌p‌s‌:‌/‌/‌w‌w‌w‌.‌f‌e‌m‌a‌.‌g‌o‌v‌/‌s‌i‌t‌es/default/files/documents/fema_hsntp-fy2024-ctg-nofo.pdf [perma.cc/4A4M-W4HB]; ‌FEMA, Notice of Funding Opportunity: Fiscal Year 2023 Homeland Security National Training Program Continuing Training Grants48–49 (2023), https://www.fema.gov/sites/de‌f‌‌a‌‌‌u‌‌‌l‌t‌/‌f‌i‌l‌‌e‌‌s‌/‌‌d‌o‌c‌uments/fema_hsntp-ctg-competitive-nofo-fy-2023.pdf [perma.cc/6URQ-LJDR].
• 99See White House, Equity Action Plan Summary: Federal Emergency Management Agency (2022), https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/FEMA-‌E‌O‌1‌3‌9‌8‌‌5‌‌‌-equity-summary.pdf [perma.cc/6WCF-KX6G].
• 100See Request for Information on the National Flood Insurance Program’s Community Rating System, 86 Fed. Reg. 47128 (Aug. 23, 2021); Request for Information on the National Flood Insurance Program’s Floodplain Management Standards for Land Management and Use, and an Assessment of the Program’s Impact on Threatened and Endangered Species and Their Habitats, 86 Fed. Reg. 56713 (Oct. 12, 2021).
• 101See Individual Assistance Program Equity, 89 Fed. Reg. 3990 (Jan. 22, 2024).
• 102See id.
• 103See Reforming Individual Assistance: New Benefits and Streamlined Processes to Help Disaster Survivors, FEMA (Mar. 22, 2024), https://www.fema.gov/assistance/individual/2024-reform ‌[‌p‌e‌r‌m‌a.cc/5BH7-4EAC].
• 104See FEMA, FP 104-009-2, Public Assistance Program and Policy Guide: Version 5, DRAFT (2024) [hereinafter FP 104-009-2], https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_public-assistance-pro‌g‌r‌a‌m‌-and-policy-guide_v5_june2024.pdf [perma.cc/G48H-‌K‌E‌D‌4‌]‌.
• 105See id. at 4.
• 106Memorandum, FEMA, Recovery Program Enhancements to Support Tribal Nations (Nov. 22, 2023), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_2023-recovery-enhancements-‌f‌o‌r‌-tribal-nations.pdf [perma.cc/B3L6-4C6P].
• 107See id.
• 108Nature-based solutions refer to the use of natural protections rather than built defenses to protect against hazards. Examples may include planting mangroves or restoring coral reefs to protect against coastal storm surge and hurricane impacts. Planting fire-resistant trees in fire-prone areas is another example of a nature-based solution.
• 109See FP 104-009-2, supranote 104, at 149.
• 110See Exec. Order No. 14,151, 90 Fed. Reg. 8339 (Jan. 29, 2025); see also Spady, supra note 19.
• 111Secretary Turner Denounces DEI Criteria in Asheville’s Draft Disaster Plan, supranote 48.
• 112DHS, FEMA Ordered to Eliminate DEI and Climate-Related Work, Harv. L. Sch. Env’t & Energy L. Program (Feb. 14, 2025), https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/tracker/rollback-dhs-fema-or‌d‌e‌r‌e‌d-to-eliminate-climate-related-work-language/ [perma.cc/7UC5-XPDK].
• 113See Rachel Santasiero, Disappearing Data: Trump Administration Removing Climate Information from Government Websites, Nat’l Sec. Archive (Feb. 6, 2025), ‌h‌t‌t‌p‌s‌:‌/‌/‌n‌s‌a‌r‌c‌h‌i‌v‌e‌.‌g‌w‌u‌.‌e‌d‌u/briefing-book/climate-change-transparency-project-foia/2025-02-06/disappearing-data-trump‌[perma.cc/TS4J-DYLY].
• 114See Weather Related Fatality and Injury Statistics, Nat’l Weather Serv. (2024), ‌h‌t‌t‌p‌s‌:‌/‌/‌w‌w‌w.weather.gov/hazstat [perma.cc/G3A8-T7JV].
• 115See Climate Change Indicators: Heat-Related Deaths, EPA (Feb. 26, 2025), ‌h‌t‌t‌p‌s‌:‌/‌/‌w‌w‌w‌.‌e‌p‌a‌.gov/climate-indicators/climate-change-indicators-heat-related-deaths [perma.cc/48P4-Q3FB].
• 116See id.; Marcus Sarofim et al., Temperature-Related Death and Illness, U.S. Glob. Change Research Program, The Impacts of Climate Change on Human Health in the United States: A Scientific Assessment 47 (Allison Crimmins et al. eds., 2016).
• 117See Climate Change Indicators: Heat-Related Deaths, supra note 115.
• 118See Extreme Weather: Extreme Heat, Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Sec. Agency, ‌h‌t‌t‌p‌s://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/extreme-weather/ex‌t‌r‌e‌m‌e-‌heat [perma.cc/6A4P-5WNW]; Sarofim et al., supra note 116.
• 119Cong. Budget Off., CBO Pub. No. 60854, The Risks of Climate Change to the United States in the 21st Century (2024), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2024-12/60845-climate-risk.pdf [perma.cc/2NEK-7HVY].
• 120See Erica Lee, et al.,Cong. Rsch. Serv., R46873, Emergency Response to Extreme Heat: Federal Financial Assistance and Considerations for Congress 9–10 (2024).
• 121See id.
• 122See id.
• 123See Lee & Lindsay, supra note 72, at 2.
• 124Id.
• 125Lee et al., supra note 120, at 23.
• 126See Criswell Statement, supra note 71.
• 127See Diane P. Horn et al., Cong. Rsch. Serv., IN11696, Climate Change, Slow-Onset Disasters, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (2024).
• 128See FEMA, Mitigating the Risk of Extreme Temperatures with Hazard Mitigation Assistance Funds (2022), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_extreme-‌h‌e‌a‌t‌‌‌‌-fact-sheet_102022.pdf [perma.cc/B4NP-D9JR].
• 129See id.
• 130FEMA, The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO) Fiscal Year 2023 Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG) Program (2023), https://www.fema.gov/grants/preparedness/emergency-management-‌p‌e‌‌r‌‌‌formance/fy-23-nofo [perma.cc/53FT-UWVP].
• 131See id.
• 132See Lee et al., supra note 120.
• 133SeeCohen, supra note 43; Nilsen, supra note 44; Jones, Trump Administration Denies FEMA Funds, supra note 44; Jones, Restrictive Voter Law, supra note 44.
• 134SeeBruce Lindsay, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R44801, Stafford Act Assistance and Acts of Terrorism 2 (2023).
• 135See Eligible Emergency Protective Measures, FEMA, ‌h‌t‌t‌p‌s‌:‌/‌/‌w‌w‌w‌.‌f‌e‌m‌a‌.‌g‌o‌v‌/‌fact-sheet/eligi‌b‌l‌e‌-‌emergency-protective-measures [perma.cc/5WGZ-VEEX] (last updated May 10, 2023).
• 136See FEMA Supplemental Lost Wages Payments Under Other Needs Assistance, FEMA (Aug. 2021), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_supplemental-lost-wages-pay‌m‌e‌n‌‌t‌‌s-under-other-needs-assistance.pdf [perma.cc/Y3GP-VSPQ]; Memorandum, White House, Memorandum on Authorizing the Other Needs Assistance Program for Major Disaster Declarations Related to Coronavirus Disease 2019 (Aug. 8, 2020), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-authorizing-needs-assistance-program-major-disaster-declarations-related-coronavirus-disease-2019 [perma.cc/G6MT-L4S9].
• 137See DHS Components Seeking to Use DPA Authority, FEMA, ‌h‌t‌t‌‌p‌s‌:‌‌/‌/‌w‌w‌w‌.‌f‌e‌ma.gov/disaster/defense-production-act/dhs-components [perma.cc/N3E8-GN6T] (last updated June 11, 2025).
• 138See Simon Haeder & Sarah Gollust, From Poor to Worse: Health Policy and Politics Scholars’ Assessment of the U.S. COVID‐19 Response and Its Implications, 12 World Med. & Health Pol’y 454 (2020); see also Enoch Abbey et al., The Global Health Security Index Is Not Predictive of Coronavirus Pandemic Responses Among Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Countries, PLOS ONE, Oct. 7, 2020, at 1.
• 139597 U.S. 697 (2022).
• 140603 U.S. 369 (2024).
• 141See, e.g., West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 732 (2022) (“‘The importance of the issue,’ along with the fact that the same basic scheme EPA adopted ‘has been the subject of an earnest and profound debate across the country, . . . makes the oblique form of the claimed delegation all the more suspect.’” (quoting Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267–68 (2022))); Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 373 (2024) (“Instead of declaring a particular party’s reading ‘permissible’ in such a case, courts use every tool at their disposal to determine the best reading of the statute and resolve the ambiguity.”).
• 142See generallyWest Virginia, 597 U.S. at 697; Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014).
• 143See National Risk Index: FAQ, FEMA, https://hazards.fema.gov/nri/frequently-asked-questions [perma.cc/3JY3-8RMX].
• 144See Technical Mapping Advisory Council, FEMA, 2023 Annual Report v (2023), ‌h‌t‌t‌p‌s‌‌:‌‌‌/‌/‌www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_tmac-annual-report_2023.pdf [perma.cc/9ZAL-ZAQ3] (second bracket modification in original).
• 145FEMA published two RFI on NFIP in 2021 (similar process that led to numerous equity reforms). For example, in the first, it notes discounts available on NFIP rates for actions taken to address climate change risk. Request for Information on the National Flood Insurance Program’s Community Rating System, 86 Fed. Reg. 47128 (Aug. 23, 2021). And in the second, it specifically prompts, under section C, commenters to answer: “[s]hould FEMA base any NFIP minimum floodplain management standard changes on future risk and specifically on projections of climate change and associated impacts, such as sea level rise?” Request for Information on the National Flood Insurance Program’s Floodplain Management Standards for Land Management and Use, and an Assessment of the Program’s Impact on Threatened and Endangered Species and Their Habitats, 86 Fed. Reg. 56713, 56718 (Oct. 12, 2021).
• 146A recent proposal package for the reauthorization of the NFIP includes a mechanism to include Climate Change Projections. SeeCongressional Reauthorization for the National Flood Insurance Program, FEMA, https://www.fema.gov/flood-insurance/rules-legislation/congressional-reauthorization/legislative-proposals [perma.cc/KS9R-UZAA] (last updated Mar. 17, 2025).
• 147See John Upton, Include Climate Change in Disaster Planning, FEMA Says, Climate Central (Mar. 17, 2015), https://www.climatecentral.org/news/fema-states-need-climate-change-‌i‌n-disaster-planning-18786 [perma.cc/P96A-SMVN].
• 148See Horn et al., supra note 127.
• 149See id.
• 150See id.
• 151See id.